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Executive Summary 
 
The electricity industry is undergoing major changes mainly dictated by the need to simultaneously 
accomplish integration of European energy markets and build a low‐carbon economy. This process 
was facilitated if not initiated by a wave of technological innovation. In order to ensure a timely, 
orderly and efficient transition towards the new low-carbon landscape the present legal and 
regulatory frameworks, devised long ago, must be reviewed and adapted in order to provide 
adequate rules and suitable incentives.  
The purpose of this report is to help relevant stakeholders to take a leading role in transforming the 
way electricity systems are managed and operated in order to meet the twin targets of 
decarbonisation and increased market integration in the most efficient way. Because there are many 
uncertainties and some degrees of freedom as regards policy choices and their implementation, 
diverse future scenarios are conceivable. Instead of selecting one scenario and suggesting a 
mandatory approach, this report offers: 
a) A conceptual framework to assess and compare different options, showing the impact of 
different structural changes upon governance and regulation of electricity systems and 
markets. 
b) Useful checkpoints and recommendations aimed at safeguarding the internal coherence of 
any selected scenario.  
Although several alternative paths may lead to decarbonisation and integration of present electricity 
systems, each path presents its own governance and regulatory challenges and it commands 
specific actions. Decision-makers are free to favour, endorse or even determine any given “feasible” 
political or technological path. However, once they have taken this primordial decision, their 
subsequent choices should be compatible with objective - and unfortunately complex - technical, 
economic and institutional constraints of electricity systems and markets. Any lack of internal 
consistency will make energy transition unnecessarily costly and protracted. The main goal of this 
report is to help decision-makers steering energy transition along a coherent course.   
The transition towards low-carbon energy systems requires not only new rules, but also new roles. In 
particular, the role of transmission networks and the role of transmission system operators are 
changing and need to evolve even faster over the coming years. Given the different time-scales for 
investments in generation and in networks, any successful energy transition wishing to preserve 
current reliability standards requires timely and coherent adjustments of the role played by 
Transmission System Operators (TSOs). The recommendations provided take into account the need 
to ensure a dynamic balance between the “creative destruction” of market forces and technological 
innovation, on the one hand, and the intrinsic stringency of power system reliability governance, on 
the other hand.  
In order to better grasp some structural novelties of the new world we are entering in and to identify 
major critical issues, the report first introduces three basic conceptual scenarios: 
- Lower decarbonization within a pan-European system 
- Higher decarbonization within existing Member State systems 
- Higher decarbonization within decentralized systems 
They correspond to three “ideal types” (extreme scenarios), not to “most likely outcomes”. It is 
assumed that reality will most probably be a combination of these three basic scenarios. Hybridation 
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may happen “by design” (i.e., because decision-makers consciously opt for a hybrid model) or “by 
accident” (i.e., because decisions being taken by different agents at different places and at different 
points in time result in a dynamic hybrid outcome that does not correspond to the expected outcome 
of any individual agent). 
For each scenario, the report discusses in detail how the main functions and interactions of 
European TSOs need to change and how these changes differ between the three scenarios. The 
report analyses both the “hardware side” and the “software side”: 
- The “hardware” side means network planning, building infra-structure assets, managing electricity 
transmission, etc. – i.e., the traditional, strongly investment-related and therefore heavily regulated 
functions. 
- The “software” side includes, generally speaking, all procedures needed to manage system 
operation, to facilitate market operation at the interface with market operators, Distribution System 
Operators (DSOs) and other players in the power system – i.e. the more evolutionary, less capital-
intensive, rules-related functions.  
This two-side analysis enables the reader to fully realize the possible impact of structural changes 
upon the functioning of power systems, the functions performed by different actors and overall 
governance. 
None of the three basic scenarios is fully consistent with the present “legacy framework” and they all 
require substantial changes in terms of governance mechanisms and regulatory policies. Aware of 
the weaknesses of the “hybridation” actually growing in the EU, either “by design” or “by accident”, 
the report introduces a set of “checkpoints” aimed at ensuring critical levels of coherence, 
consistency and resilience along the energy system journey towards a 2050 low-carbon future. 
Although all three scenarios were constructed in order to fulfil EU energy and climate policy 
objectives, no individual scenario can easily fully meet all goals at reasonable cost. Societal 
expectations, technological developments and public policies are not necessarily and not always 
aligned, therefore this difficulty should be no surprise.  
As regards the internal coherence or self-consistency of each scenario, two points deserve special 
attention: 
1) Some critical system operational functions, currently mainly performed by national TSOs, will be 
totally or partially performed by other entities. These entities may be supra-national 
organizations, either emanating from or acting in close cooperation with TSOs, DSOs 
(individually or somehow associated) or even new players. Therefore, the legal and regulatory 
frameworks must be adapted, namely in order to: 
a) Clearly define and assign each operational function, indicating, for each, appropriate cost 
and liability sharing mechanisms. 
b) Establish appropriate coordination mechanisms, for both normal and abnormal situations, 
including appropriate redundancy safeguards and supervision tools. 
 
2) Even if from the technical (system operation) point of view it is theoretically possible to ensure 
appropriate system reliability (assuming that the necessary legal and regulatory changes are 
implemented), several “black holes” may still jeopardize the efficient functioning of electricity 
systems and markets. The report discusses how to patch them. 
Assuming that, in the short-term, implementation of 3rd Package legislation and associated Network 
Codes will continue and no fundamentally new legislation will be issued, serious governance issues 
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must be somehow addressed. In this respect, not only national/EU interfaces require continuous 
attention; local/national interfaces become increasingly critical for transparency and reliability. 
Among the many governance challenges to be addressed the following ones are particularly 
important: 
- Regionalisation and Europeanisation of grid planning, system and market operation, leading to 
better coordination or mutualisation of hardware and software TSOs functions, as well as of the 
NRAs actions.  
- Member States policies regarding security of supply and generation adequacy.  
- Articulation between Member States “2030 NAPs”, network investments, systems and markets.  
- Articulation of local and national grids, systems and pocket markets, implying new forms of multi-
layer coordination between DSOs, TSOs, NRAs and Member States.  
 
In the past, voluntary, informal cooperation among major actors (namely the European Commission, 
regulators and TSOs) has been crucial for the development of the internal energy market. This kind 
of cooperation can still deliver substantial results on the road to decarbonisation. However, the 
speed of delivering the many missing “building blocks” for the proper functioning of the system (from 
planning to real-time operation) needs to be considerably increased in the short-term.  
After several years of high retail energy prices, consumers may have accepted the inevitability of this 
trend and, to some extent, they have already adapted their behaviours to this new reality. However, 
the increasing dependence of economic and social life upon electrical devices makes security of 
supply and reliability an absolute priority for all consumers. For the energy transition to succeed, 
governance and regulatory mechanisms have to be quickly adapted and partially redesigned with 
this “absolute must” in mind. 
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Introduction 
The electricity industry is currently undergoing major changes. The transformation is mainly dictated 
by the need to simultaneously accomplish the integration of European energy markets and build a 
low‐carbon economy, which has been facilitated, if not initiated, by a wave of technological change. 
This policy goal has been translated into several documents approved by the European Union and 
established quantitative targets for 2020, 2030 and 2050 in terms of, i.e., greenhouse gas emissions 
and the share of renewable energy in total energy consumption. However, the present legal and 
regulatory frameworks are not considered to provide adequate rules or suitable incentives for a 
timely, orderly and efficient transition; in fact, even if all EU legislation and network codes had been 
properly implemented, they would not be fit for the new low-carbon landscape. Therefore, the legal 
and regulatory frameworks must be adapted, taking into account not only the internal market and 
energy and climate policy objectives, but also recent technological developments.  
The “Energy Union” project recently launched by the European Commission aims at reconciling 
these different objectives, improving the coherence and speed of the transition towards low-carbon 
energy systems, while taking into account the new technological trends, the growing concerns about 
energy independence, the efficient use of endogenous resources and the fair allocation of the costs 
and benefits of the EU energy and climate policy. 
The purpose of this report is to help the relevant stakeholders to take a leading role in transforming 
the way power systems are managed and operated in order to meet the twin targets of 
decarbonisation and increased market integration in the most efficient way. Because there are many 
uncertainties, and some level of freedom as regards policy choices and their implementation, diverse 
future scenarios are conceivable. Therefore, the present report provides a set of recommendations 
about appropriate regulatory paths and incentives that are conducive to different scenarios. The 
report does not prescribe a mandatory solution – it offers a conceptual framework to assess and 
compare different options. 
The transition towards low-carbon energy systems requires not only new rules, but also new roles. In 
particular, the role of transmission networks and the role of transmission system operators are 
changing and need to evolve even faster over the coming years. The different time-scales for 
investments in generation and in networks should also be kept in mind. 
The analysis and recommendations provided in this report take into account the current 
diversification of agents in charge of the system operation (System Operators - SOs, Independent 
System Operators - ISOs, RSCIs – Regional Security Coordination Initiatives – etc.) at both national 
and supra‐national levels. They also consider the need to ensure a dynamic balance between the 
“creative destruction” of market forces and technological innovation, on the one hand, and the 
intrinsic stringency of power system reliability governance, on the other hand.  
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This report is divided into 4 chapters: 
Chapter 1 describes the major trends impacting the role of TSOs in a low-carbon energy landscape. 
After introducing the present political, legal and regulatory framework, as well as the internal and 
external factors shaping the transition to low-carbon electricity systems, recent developments in the 
generation mix and in consumption patterns are illustrated. Following a discussion of necessary 
market and governance changes, three different future scenarios are presented. It is assumed that 
the reality will most probably be a combination of these three “ideal types”1. 
Taking into account electricity system developments described in the first chapter and their general 
implications, Chapters 2 and 3 discuss how the main functions and interactions of European TSOs 
will change and how these changes will differ between the three scenarios. Chapter 2 addresses 
the “hardware” side (network planning, building infra-structure assets, managing electricity 
transmission, etc. – the traditional, strongly investment-related and therefore heavily regulated 
functions), while Chapter 3 focuses on the “software” side (generally speaking, all procedures 
needed to manage the system operation, to facilitate the market operation at the interface with 
market operators, DSOs and other players in the power system – the more evolutive, less capital-
intensive, rules-related functions). 
Finally, Chapter 4 discusses the required regulatory and governance frameworks for each scenario, 
providing “checkpoints” and recommendations in order to achieve a smooth and efficient transition 
towards low-carbon electricity systems. Finally, the possibility of “hybridation” of the three basic 
scenarios is introduced and governance and regulatory requirements needed to ensure coherence 
of the transition process are also analysed under this perspective. 
  
                                                             
 
1 “Ideal type, a common mental construct in the social sciences derived from observable reality, although not conforming to it in detail 
because of deliberate simplification and exaggeration. It is not ideal in the sense that it is excellent, nor is it an average; it is, rather, a 
constructed ideal used to approximate reality by selecting and accentuating certain elements. 
The concept of the ideal type was developed by German sociologist Max Weber, who used it as an analytic tool for his historical studies.”   
http://www.britannica.com/topic/ideal-type 
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1. Major trends affecting the role of TSOs in a low-carbon energy landscape 
Before the liberalisation of energy markets, the electricity transmission system operation was a little 
noticed function, usually performed by relatively small departments within large vertically integrated 
utilities.  
Liberalisation means competition. Competition - even if only large consumers were initially eligible - 
required non-discriminatory access to transmission infrastructure. In order to ensure non-
discriminatory access of both suppliers and eligible consumers, people and assets assigned to the 
transmission system operation had to be ring-fenced from other departments within vertically 
integrated utilities; their mission had to be clearly defined, their performance properly monitored and 
their activity strictly regulated. This process, known as "unbundling", gave transmission system 
operators a very strong identity and very high public visibility; their role became clearly identifiable to 
all relevant stakeholders. In many countries, governments (e.g. Spain, UK, Norway, Portugal, Italy, 
Sweden, Netherlands) or utilities (e.g. Switzerland, Germany) decided to separate transmission 
assets from other types of electricity assets, creating new companies dedicated exclusively to the 
energy transmission system operation 2 . Ownership unbundling, although not applied in all EU 
Member States, contributed to bolstering the identity of a new category of industry actors. 
Over the last two decades, each step aimed at enlarging the scope and increasing the intensity of 
electricity market liberalisation resulted in more duties and more competences being assigned to 
transmission system operators. The 2009 EU electricity Directive (Directive 2009/72/EC) 
institutionalised the role of transmission system operators, confirming their vital importance in fully 
liberalised markets. 
Nowadays, new public policies, new technologies and new consumer attitudes push transmission 
system operators towards new horizons and new roles. The present chapter first describes the legal 
and regulatory frameworks where TSOs currently perform their functions (Section 1.1); then, a brief 
review of the major trends that are impacting the role of TSOs is provided (Section 1.2), followed by 
a more specific analysis of changes on the supply and demand sides (Section 1.3). The multiple 
interactions between the different drivers for change, electricity markets and the system operation 
are discussed in Section 1.4. Finally, Section 1.5 introduces the three scenarios considered for the 
analytical work performed in the following Chapters 2 and 3. 
                                                             
 
2 In some cases these undertakings are responsible for electricity only, in other cases they are in charge of both electricity and natural 
gas system operation. 
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1.1  The role and functions of TSOs in the current system and market structures   
In vertically integrated monopolies the system operation is a straightforward task, merging the 
economic dispatch of generators and security objectives under a single control umbrella. A single 
entity is responsible for determining the output of each power plant and managing all power flows 
through the transmission network, including flows to distribution networks and import/export flows at 
interconnectors.  
Liberalisation abolishes generation and supply monopolies. Hence, liberalisation brings new players 
into the picture and allows power plants to decide how much they want to produce (i.e., to sell, either 
bilaterally or to organised markets/power pools). Liberalisation also introduces a strict separation of 
generation, network and supply activities (“unbundling”), limiting the scope for vertical integration 
and defining the rights and duties of players in each area. In a liberalised framework, market and 
security objectives are treated separately and must be reconciled in real-time according to 
transparent rules previously agreed, making the system operation a much more complex task as 
compared to the monopolistic era.  
The system operation is now allowed to interfere with the generators’ output only when their 
declared schedule conflicts with the overall system security. However, because the electricity market 
consists of several different “market places” (financial, physical, day-ahead, intra-day, balancing, 
etc.), the system operation must closely follow all types of market operations, and coordination 
between the market operation and system operation becomes increasingly complex. As system 
security must prevail over the individual economic interests of market agents, system operators 
retain the ultimate responsibility for the well-functioning of electricity markets and systems. 
The liberalisation of electricity markets can be achieved in many different ways: how much and how 
quickly the market can be opened up usually depends on legislators; how competition is organised 
may be defined in several ways and typically evolves over time, following the learning patterns of 
market players, market operators, system operators and regulators. 
One of the striking features of the European electricity liberalisation process is the absence of 
“market design” prescriptions in all directives and regulations, leaving Member States the freedom to 
decide how to design and implement national markets. This omission created a certain vacuum at 
the European level, since no mandatory “European market design” has been issued - e.g., initially no 
rules concerning data exchange between market operators and system operators were available. 
The Commission attempted to overcome these difficulties through the promotion of a “Market target 
model”, but it arrived at a time when the conflicts between “traditional” market models, on the one 
hand, and new EU and national policies, on the other hand, were already rather obvious. In the 
meantime, many system operators took a pro-active role, assuming de facto a leading role in the 
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development of the European electricity market through close cooperation with each other, along 
with relevant stakeholders. 
This Section describes the European case, providing a brief historical perspective, as well as short 
descriptions of the current legal and regulatory frameworks in the European Union, and examples of 
voluntary cooperation among system operators. 
1.1.1 The development of the European model 1996-2015 
In 1988, following the 1985 European Council decision to achieve a single market by 1992 and the 
1986 Single European Act, the European Commission published the first document on the Internal 
Energy Market 3. This working paper stated that “a more integrated European energy market should 
reduce energy costs, to the direct benefit of individual consumers, but also of user industries” and, at 
the same time, “encourage the maintenance or development within the Community of healthy and 
prosperous energy enterprises”, thus improving the security of supply. 
The transition from national monopolistic organisations to partially liberalised electricity markets took 
more than eight years: the first electricity Directive explicitly defining some “common rules” for the 
Internal Energy Market 4 was approved in 19965. The Commission’s approach was mainly based on 
the removal of all “obstacles to the internal energy market”, abolishing generation, supply, import 
and export monopolies and giving large industrial consumers the right to choose an electricity 
supplier from any Member State.  
The first electricity Directive basically obliged Member States to “ensure, on the basis of their 
institutional organisation and with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, that, without prejudice 
to paragraph 2 [“Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the electricity sector, in 
the general economic interest, public service obligations”], electricity undertakings are operated in 
accordance with the principles of this Directive, with a view to achieving a competitive market in 
electricity, and shall not discriminate between these undertakings as regards either rights or 
obligations.” 6 Three approaches to system access were defined (regulated, negotiated and single 
buyer), a dynamic minimum threshold for eligibility was introduced and unbundling and the 
transparency of accounts was mandated: “Integrated electricity undertakings shall, in their internal 
accounting, keep separate accounts for their generation, transmission and distribution activities, and, 
                                                             
 
3 Working Paper “The Internal Energy Market” COM(88) 238 final of 2 May 1988 
4 Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal 
market in electricity. Official Journal L 027, 30/01/1997. 
5 In the meantime (1990), directives on energy price transparency and energy transmission through high-voltage/high-pressure networks 
were approved, but their impact was very limited. 
6 Article 3 of Directive 96/92/EC 
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where appropriate, consolidated accounts for other, non-electricity activities, as they would be 
required to do if the activities in question were carried out by separate undertakings, with a view to 
avoiding discrimination, cross-subsidisation and distortion of competition.” 7 
As regards the transmission system operation, the first electricity Directive was rather vague (see full 
text in Box 1 on page 15). Although the Directive defined “transmission”, “interconnected system” 
and “ancillary services”, it did not provide an explicit definition of the “system operation” and even 
contained a certain level of circularity – for instance, defining ancillary services as “all services 
necessary for the operation of a transmission or distribution system” and a system operator as the 
entity “responsible for managing energy flows on the system, taking into account exchanges with 
other interconnected systems. To that end, the system operator shall be responsible for ensuring a 
secure, reliable and efficient electricity system and, in that context, for ensuring the availability of all 
necessary ancillary services.” 8 
  
                                                             
 
7 Article 14 of Directive 96/92/EC 
8 Articles 2 and 7 of Directive 96/92/EC, respectively 
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Box 1: Transmission system operation in the 1996 Directive  
CHAPTER IV 
Transmission system operation 
Article 7 
1. Member States shall designate or shall require undertakings which own transmission systems to designate, for a period of time to be 
determined by Member States having regard to considerations of efficiency and economic balance, a system operator to be responsible 
for operating, ensuring the maintenance of, and, if necessary, developing the transmission system in a given area and its interconnectors 
with other systems, in order to guarantee security of supply. 
2. Member States shall ensure that technical rules establishing the minimum technical design and operational requirements for the 
connection to the system of generating installations, distribution systems, directly connected consumers' equipment, interconnector circuits 
and direct lines are developed and published. These requirements shall ensure the interoperability of systems and shall be objective and 
non-discriminatory. They shall be notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 8 of Council Directive 83/189/EEC of 28 March 
1983 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations (7). 
3. The system operator shall be responsible for managing energy flows on the system, taking into account exchanges with other 
interconnected systems. To that end, the system operator shall be responsible for ensuring a secure, reliable and efficient electricity 
system and, in that context, for ensuring the availability of all necessary ancillary services. 
4. The system operator shall provide to the operator of any other system with which its system is interconnected sufficient information to 
ensure the secure and efficient operation, coordinated development and interoperability of the interconnected system. 
5. The system operator shall not discriminate between system users or classes of system users, particularly in favour of its subsidiaries or 
shareholders. 
6. Unless the transmission system is already independent from generation and distribution activities, the system operator shall be 
independent, at least in management terms, from other activities not relating to the transmission system. 
Article 8 
1. The transmission system operator shall be responsible for dispatching the generating installations in its area and for determining the 
use of interconnectors with other systems. 
2. Without prejudice to the supply of electricity on the basis of contractual obligations, including those which derive from the tendering 
specifications, the dispatching of generating installations and the use of interconnectors shall be determined on the basis of criteria which 
may be approved by the Member State and which must be objective, published and applied in a non-discriminatory manner which ensures 
the proper functioning of the internal market in electricity. They shall take into account the economic precedence of electricity from 
available generating installations of interconnector transfers and the technical constraints on the system. 
3. A Member State may require the system operator, when dispatching generating installations, to give priority to generating installations 
using renewable energy sources or waste or producing combined heat and power. 
4. A Member State may, for reasons of security of supply, direct that priority be given to the dispatch of generating installations using 
indigenous primary energy fuel sources, to an extent not exceeding in any calendar year 15 % of the overall primary energy necessary to 
produce the electricity consumed in the Member State concerned. 
Article 9 
The transmission system operator must preserve the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information obtained in the course of 
carrying out its business. 
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For several reasons, including the lack of detailed technical rules and the absence of any clear rules 
on developing a regulatory framework or settling disputes9, the first Directive did not deliver the 
expected results. In order to promote a better understanding of the remaining obstacles, as well as 
to facilitate the implementation of voluntary agreements, the Commission decided to set up the 
Florence Forum in February 1998. Although the Forum delivered “too little, too late”, it had several 
important consequences, namely the creation of some European professional associations, 
including ETSO (European Transmission System Operators) in 1999. While a voluntary professional 
association, ETSO played a very important role in the development of the Internal Energy Market, 
contributing decisively to the new identity of transmission system operators in Europe and across the 
globe. In 2009, ETSO was wound up and its tasks transferred to ENTSO-E, a proper European 
entity set up in a Directive. 
The lack of progress in cross-border electricity trade and the political decision taken by the European 
Council in 2000 to fully liberalise some crucial sectors, including energy, within the framework of the 
so-called “Lisbon Agenda”, led to the second electricity Directive 10, approved in 2003. This Directive 
asked for a full opening of all EU markets, extended to all consumers of any type and any size. A 
specific Regulation on cross-border trade was approved at the same time11, within the so-called 
“second energy package”. The second electricity Directive and the new Regulation enlarged the 
scope and consolidated the common rules for the internal electricity market. 
The second energy package finally provides a definition of “transmission system operator”: 
“ ‘transmission system operator' means a natural or legal person responsible for operating, ensuring 
the maintenance of and, if necessary, developing the transmission system in a given area and, 
where applicable, its interconnections with other systems, and for ensuring the long term ability of 
the system to meet reasonable demands for the transmission of electricity;” 12 
The definition of the tasks and the duties of the transmission system operators is much more 
detailed in 2003 as compared to 1996, as can be seen in Boxes 2 and 3 on pages 18-20 and 21-22, 
respectively. 
 
 
                                                             
 
9 For a more detailed analysis see Jorge Vasconcelos, ‘Towards a European energy policy’, in Peter Ludlow (ed.), Setting EU priorities 
2007, European Strategy Forum, 2007.  
10 Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market 
in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC. O.J. L 176, 15/07/2003 
11 Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on conditions for access to the network 
for cross-border exchanges in electricity. O.J. L 176, 15/07/2003 
12 Article 2, Directive 2003/54/EC 
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Box 2: Transmission system operation in the 2003 Directive 
CHAPTER IV 
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATION 
Article 8 
Designation of Transmission System Operators 
Member States shall designate, or shall require undertakings which own transmission systems to designate, for a period of time to be 
determined by Member States having regard to considerations of efficiency and economic balance, one or more transmission system 
operators. Member States shall ensure that transmission system operators act in accordance with Articles 9 to 12. 
Article 9 
Tasks of Transmission System Operators 
Each transmission system operator shall be responsible for: 
(a) ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the transmission of electricity; 
(b) contributing to security of supply through adequate transmission capacity and system reliability; 
(c) managing energy flows on the system, taking into account exchanges with other interconnected systems. To that end, the 
transmission system operator shall be responsible for ensuring a secure, reliable and efficient electricity system and, in that context, for 
ensuring the availability of all necessary ancillary services insofar as this availability is independent from any other transmission system 
with which its system is interconnected; 
(d) providing to the operator of any other system with which its system is interconnected sufficient information to ensure the secure and 
efficient operation, coordinated development and interoperability of the interconnected system; 
(e) ensuring non-discrimination as between system users or classes of system users, particularly in favour of its related undertakings; 
(f) providing system users with the information they need for efficient access to the system. 
Article 10 
Unbundling of Transmission System Operators 
1. Where the transmission system operator is part of a vertically integrated undertaking, it shall be independent at least in terms of its 
legal form, organisation and decision making from other activities not relating to transmission. These rules shall not create an obligation to 
separate the ownership of assets of the transmission system from the vertically integrated undertaking. 
2. In order to ensure the independence of the transmission system operator referred to in paragraph 1, the following minimum criteria 
shall apply: 
(a) those persons responsible for the management of the transmission system operator may not participate in company structures of the 
integrated electricity undertaking responsible, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day operation of the generation, distribution and supply 
of electricity; 
(b) appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the professional interests of the persons responsible for the management of the 
transmission system operator are taken into account in a manner that ensures that they are capable of acting independently; 
(c) the transmission system operator shall have effective decision-making rights, independent from the integrated electricity undertaking, 
with respect to assets necessary to operate, maintain or develop the network. This should not prevent the existence of appropriate 
coordination mechanisms to ensure that the economic and management supervision rights of the parent company in respect of return on 
assets, regulated indirectly in accordance with Article 23(2), in a subsidiary are protected. In particular, this shall enable the parent 
company to approve the annual financial plan, or any equivalent instrument, of the transmission system operator and to set global limits 
on the levels of indebtedness of its subsidiary. It shall not permit the parent company to give instructions regarding day-to-day operations, 
nor with respect to individual decisions concerning the construction or upgrading of transmission lines, that do not exceed the terms of the 
approved financial plan, or any equivalent instrument; 
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(d) the transmission system operator shall establish a compliance programme, which sets out measures taken to ensure that 
discriminatory conduct is excluded, and ensure that observance of it is adequately monitored. The programme shall set out the specific 
obligations of employees to meet this objective. An annual report, setting out the measures taken, shall be submitted by the person or 
body responsible for monitoring the compliance programme to the regulatory authority referred to in Article 23(1) and shall be published. 
Article 11 
Dispatching and balancing 
1. Without prejudice to the supply of electricity on the basis of contractual obligations, including those which derive from the tendering 
specifications, the transmission system operator shall, where it has this function, be responsible for dispatching the generating 
installations in its area and for determining the use of interconnectors with other systems. 
2. The dispatching of generating installations and the use of interconnectors shall be determined on the basis of criteria which may be 
approved by the Member State and which must be objective, published and applied in a non discriminatory manner which ensures the 
proper functioning of the internal market in electricity. They shall take into account the economic precedence of electricity from available 
generating installations or interconnector transfers and the technical constraints on the system. 
3. A Member State may require the system operator, when dispatching generating installations, to give priority to generating installations 
using renewable energy sources or waste or producing combined heat and power. 
4. A Member State may, for reasons of security of supply, direct that priority be given to the dispatch of generating installations using 
indigenous primary energy fuel sources, to an extent not exceeding in any calendar year 15 % of the overall primary energy necessary to 
produce the electricity consumed in the Member State concerned. 
5. Member States may require transmission system operators to comply with minimum standards for the maintenance and development 
of the transmission system, including interconnection capacity. 
6. Transmission system operators shall procure the energy they use to cover energy losses and reserve capacity in their system 
according to transparent, non-discriminatory and market-based procedures, whenever they have this function. 
7. Rules adopted by transmission system operators for balancing the electricity system shall be objective, transparent and non-
discriminatory, including rules for the charging of system users of their networks for energy imbalance. Terms and conditions, including 
rules and tariffs, for the provision of such services by transmission system operators shall be established pursuant to a methodology 
compatible with Article 23(2) in a non-discriminatory and cost-reflective way and shall be published. 
Article 12 
Confidentiality for Transmission System Operators 
Without prejudice to Article 18 or any other legal duty to disclose information, the transmission system operator shall preserve the 
confidentiality of commercially sensitive information obtained in the course of carrying out its business. Information disclosed regarding its 
own activities, which may be commercially advantageous, shall be made available in a non-discriminatory manner. 
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Box 3: Transmission system operation in the 2003 Regulation  
Article 3 
Inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism 
1. Transmission system operators shall receive compensation for costs incurred as a result of hosting cross-border flows 
of electricity on their networks. 
(...) 
Article 4 
Charges for access to networks 
1. Charges applied by network-operators for access to networks shall be transparent, take into account the need for 
network security and reflect actual costs incurred insofar as they correspond to those of an efficient and structurally 
comparable network operator and applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Those charges shall not be distance-related. 
(...) 
Article 5 
Provision of information on interconnection capacities 
1. Transmission system operators shall put in place coordination and information exchange mechanisms to ensure the 
security of the networks in the context of congestion management. 
2. The safety, operational and planning standards used by transmission system operators shall be made public. The 
information published shall include a general scheme for the calculation of the total transfer capacity and the transmission 
reliability margin based upon the electrical and physical features of the network. Such schemes shall be subject to the 
approval of the regulatory authorities. 
3. Transmission system operators shall publish estimates of available transfer capacity for each day, indicating any 
available transfer capacity already reserved. These publications shall be made at specified intervals before the day of 
transport and shall include, in any case, week-ahead and month-ahead estimates, as well as a quantitative indication of 
the expected reliability of the available capacity. 
(...) 
Article 6 
General principles of congestion management 
1. Network congestion problems shall be addressed with non-discriminatory market based solutions which give efficient 
economic signals to the market participants and transmission system operators involved. Network congestion problems 
shall preferentially be solved with non transaction based methods, i.e. methods that do not involve a selection between the 
contracts of individual market participants. 
(...) 
5. Transmission system operators shall, as far as technically possible, net the capacity requirements of any power flows in 
opposite direction over the congested interconnection line in order to use this line to its maximum capacity. Having full 
regard to network security, transactions that relieve the congestion shall never be denied. 
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In spite of the second energy package, the functioning of the Internal Energy Market was not yet 
satisfactory; substantial widespread price increases, persistent price differentials among 
neighbouring geographical regions and blackouts in some areas, particularly dramatic in 2003, 
convinced consumers and the European Commission that new initiatives were necessary. The 
Competition Directorate-General launched an extensive “sector inquiry” in 2005 and identified four 
major deficiencies 13 requiring the adoption of structural measures. In September 2007 the European 
Commission presented a set of new legislative proposals – the so-called “third energy package” - 
that was adopted in 2009, following substantial amendments by the Council and by the Parliament.  
In the meantime, national and regional (supra-national) wholesale electricity markets were set up. 
Because EU legislation never attempted to provide a blueprint for the design of wholesale energy 
markets, different models were implemented, creating potential and actual barriers to cross-border 
electricity trade. Later on, step-by-step the harmonisation of market rules and increased market-to-
market coordination through “market coupling” procedures, based on voluntary cooperation among 
several stakeholders, including TSOs, and being bound with the CACM, has prevented the drift of 
such heteromorphic markets.  
Although the third electricity package introduced some provisions aimed at improving the 
coordination of planning and the expansion of transmission networks throughout Europe, namely 
assigning to ENTSO-E - as a new European entity - the responsibility to deliver a biennial Ten-Year 
Network Development Plan (TYNDP), interconnection capacity at several borders was, and still is, 
scarce. It was acknowledged that one of the main reasons for this situation was the duration of the 
permitting process; on average ten years are necessary to build a new transmission line, of which 
only two to three years are used for the works. Therefore, in 2011 the Commission proposed a new 
infrastructure Regulation that was adopted in 2013 14 , laying down “guidelines for the timely 
development and interoperability of priority corridors and areas of trans-European energy 
infrastructure”. This Regulation was part of a package on trans-European infrastructure 
encompassing energy, transport and digital networks and including a €50 billion Connecting Europe 
Facility (CEF) to leverage priority investments. 
Several factors prevented the Internal Energy Market from becoming an accomplished reality until 
now, namely: 
                                                             
 
13 “(1) achieving effective unbundling of network and supply activities, (2) removing the regulatory gaps (in particular for cross border 
issues), (3) addressing market concentration and barriers to entry, and (4) increasing transparency in market operations” - COM(2006) 
851 final of 10.1.2007 
14 Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy 
infrastructure and repealing Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending Regulations (EC) No 713/2009, (EC) No 714/2009 and (EC) No 
715/2009. O.J. L 115 of 25.04.2013 
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- Lack of physical cross-border infrastructure at several borders (obviously a necessary, 
although not sufficient condition for the development of integrated markets based upon 
physical networks, such as electricity). 
- Lack of a single European market model – conceived either as the top-down implementation 
of a centralised single design or as the bottom-up construction of a hierarchical organisation 
of compatible market structures. 
- Lack of a multi-divisional organisation able to optimise the system operation at European 
level (in spite of an increasing number of related rules in Network Codes and in spite of 
several regional efforts and projects, coordination of the system operation at European level 
cannot yet be considered to be fully optimised). 
- Lack of effective regulation at EU level through an independent, energy specific regulatory 
authority. 
The European institutions keep their faith on the possibility of accomplishing the Internal Energy 
Market in a brief period of time and remain committed to the “single energy market” venture. Political 
statements frequently reaffirm this commitment, monitoring reports are regularly published, some 
anti-trust cases have been carried out and the Competition Directorate-General in many 
circumstances has imposed severe remedies 15 , regulators continue to promote the 
“Europeanisation” of energy markets, et cetera. However, in the meantime, new European public 
policies (as the ones known as “20-20-20 in 2020”) “require a revolution in energy systems”16. With 
different speeds and different degrees of engagement across Europe, electricity systems and 
electricity markets started the transition towards a low-carbon landscape. This means that to be 
efficient both vis-à-vis the market operation and the policy targets the Internal Electricity Market that 
one day may be achieved will be very different from the initial “Single Market” project launched a 
quarter century ago. 
1.1.2 The European legal framework 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (Treaty of Lisbon) came into force on 1 December 2009 
and includes, for the first time in the history of European Treaties, a specific energy chapter (Article 
194). Establishing and ensuring the proper functioning of the internal energy market are now the 
explicit responsibilities of the EU, although Member States have the “right to determine the 
conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply”. 
                                                             
 
15 See list of cases in http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/electricity/electricity_en.html 
16 European Council conclusions, 4 February 2011 
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Box 4: Energy in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
TITLE XXI 
ENERGY 
Article 194 
1. In the context of the establishment and functioning of the internal market and with regard for the need to preserve and 
improve the environment, Union policy on energy shall aim, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, to: 
(a) ensure the functioning of the energy market; 
(b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; 
(c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and 
(d) promote the interconnection of energy networks. 
2. Without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the Treaties, the European Parliament and the Council, acting 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the objectives in 
paragraph 1. Such measures shall be adopted after consultation of the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions. 
Such measures shall not affect a Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its 
choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply, without prejudice to Article 
192(2)(c). 
3. By way of derogation from paragraph 2, the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall 
unanimously and after consulting the European Parliament, establish the measures referred to therein when they are 
primarily of a fiscal nature. 
 
Besides the Treaty, the so-called 2009 “third energy package” defines the current legal framework 
for the energy industry in Europe. The definitions presented in the following box (most of them first 
introduced in 2003) are the most relevant for the purpose of the present report: 
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Box 5: Definitions provided by current EU legislation17  
Article 2 
Definitions 
For the purposes of this Directive, the following definitions apply:  
3. ‘transmission’ means the transport of electricity on the extra high-voltage and high-voltage interconnected system with a view to its 
delivery to final customers or to distributors, but does not include supply; 
4. ‘transmission system operator’ means a natural or legal person responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance of and, if 
necessary, developing the transmission system in a given area and, where applicable, its interconnections with other systems, and for 
ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the transmission of electricity; 
5. ‘distribution’ means the transport of electricity on high-voltage, medium-voltage and low-voltage distribution systems with a view to its 
delivery to customers, but does not include supply; 
6. ‘distribution system operator’ means a natural or legal person responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance of and, if necessary, 
developing the distribution system in a given area and, where applicable, its interconnections with other systems and for ensuring the 
long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the distribution of electricity; 
(...) 
13. ‘interconnector’ means equipment used to link electricity systems; 
14. ‘interconnected system’ means a number of transmission and distribution systems linked together by means of one or more 
interconnectors; 
(...) 
17. ‘ancillary service’ means a service necessary for the operation of a transmission or distribution system; 
18. ‘system user’ means a natural or legal person supplying to, or being supplied by, a transmission or distribution system; 
(...) 
26. ‘small isolated system’ means any system with consumption of less than 3 000 GWh in the year 1996, where less than 5 % of annual 
consumption is obtained through interconnection with other systems; 
27. ‘micro isolated system’ means any system with consumption less than 500 GWh in the year 1996, where there is no connection with 
other systems; 
(...) 
29. ‘energy efficiency/demand-side management’ means a global or integrated approach aimed at influencing the amount and timing of 
electricity consumption in order to reduce primary energy consumption and peak loads by giving precedence to investments in energy 
efficiency measures, or other measures, such as interruptible supply contracts, over investments to increase generation capacity, if the 
former are the most effective and economical option, taking into account the positive environmental impact of reduced energy 
consumption and the security of supply and distribution cost aspects related to it; 
30. ‘renewable energy sources’ means renewable non-fossil energy sources (wind, solar, geothermal, wave, tidal, hydropower, biomass, 
landfill gas, sewage treatment plant gas and biogases); 
31. ‘distributed generation’ means generation plants connected to the distribution system; 
                                                             
 
17 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market 
in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC. O.J. L 211 of 14.8.2009 
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The definition of the tasks and the duties of transmission system operators is much more detailed 
under the “third energy package” as compared to 1996 and 2003, as can be seen in Boxes 6 and 7 
on pages 27 and 28, respectively. Moreover, other provisions of Directive 2009/72/EC have 
substantial organizational (although not much functional) impact upon individual TSOs, namely 
Chapter V (Independent Transmission Operator) and the following articles from Chapter IV: 
- Article 6 - “Promotion of regional cooperation”; 
- Article 9 - “Unbundling of transmission systems and transmission system operators”; 
- Article 10 - “Designation and certification of transmission system operators”; 
- Article 11 - “Certification in relation to third countries”; 
- Article 13 - “Independent system operator”; 
- Article 14 - “Unbundling of transmission system owners”; 
- Article 16 - “Confidentiality for transmission system operators and transmission system 
owners” 
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Box 6: Transmission system operation in the 2009 Directive 
Article 12 
Tasks of transmission system operators 
Each transmission system operator shall be responsible for: 
(a) ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the transmission of electricity, operating, 
maintaining and developing under economic conditions secure, reliable and efficient transmission systems with due regard 
to the environment; 
(b) ensuring adequate means to meet service obligations; 
(c) contributing to security of supply through adequate transmission capacity and system reliability; 
(d) managing electricity flows on the system, taking into account exchanges with other interconnected systems. To that 
end, the transmission system operator shall be responsible for ensuring a secure, reliable and efficient electricity system 
and, in that context, for ensuring the availability of all necessary ancillary services, including those provided by demand 
response, insofar as such availability is independent from any other transmission system with which its system is 
interconnected; 
(e) providing to the operator of any other system with which its system is interconnected sufficient information to ensure 
the secure and efficient operation, coordinated development and interoperability of the interconnected system; 
(f) ensuring non-discrimination as between system users or classes of system users, particularly in favour of its related 
undertakings; 
(g) providing system users with the information they need for efficient access to the system; and 
(h) collecting congestion rents and payments under the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism, in 
compliance with Article 13 of Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, granting and managing third-party access and giving 
reasoned explanations when it denies such access, which shall be monitored by the national regulatory authorities; in 
carrying out their tasks under this Article transmission system operators shall primarily facilitate market integration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 
Box 7:  Transmission system operation in the 2009 Directive 
Article 15 
Dispatching and balancing 
 
1.   Without prejudice to the supply of electricity on the basis of contractual obligations, including those which derive from 
the tendering specifications, the transmission system operator shall, where it has such a function, be responsible for 
dispatching the generating installations in its area and for determining the use of interconnectors with other systems. 
2.   The dispatching of generating installations and the use of interconnectors shall be determined on the basis of criteria 
which shall be approved by national regulatory authorities where competent and which must be objective, published and 
applied in a non-discriminatory manner, ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market in electricity. The criteria 
shall take into account the economic precedence of electricity from available generating installations or interconnector 
transfers and the technical constraints on the system. 
3.   A Member State shall require system operators to act in accordance with Article 16 of Directive 2009/28/EC when 
dispatching generating installations using renewable energy sources. They also may require the system operator to give 
priority when dispatching generating installations producing combined heat and power. 
4.   A Member State may, for reasons of security of supply, direct that priority be given to the dispatch of generating 
installations using indigenous primary energy fuel sources, to an extent not exceeding, in any calendar year, 15 % of the 
overall primary energy necessary to produce the electricity consumed in the Member State concerned. 
5.   The regulatory authorities where Member States have so provided or Member States shall require transmission 
system operators to comply with minimum standards for the maintenance and development of the transmission system, 
including interconnection capacity. 
6.   Transmission system operators shall procure the energy they use to cover energy losses and reserve capacity in their 
system according to transparent, non-discriminatory and market-based procedures, whenever they have such a function. 
7.   Rules adopted by transmission system operators for balancing the electricity system shall be objective, transparent 
and non-discriminatory, including rules for charging system users of their networks for energy imbalance. The terms and 
conditions, including the rules and tariffs, for the provision of such services by transmission system operators shall be 
established pursuant to a methodology compatible with Article 37(6) in a non-discriminatory and cost-reflective way and 
shall be published. 
  
 
As mentioned above, the third electricity package, in particular the 2009 Regulation 18 , 
institutionalised the collective action of TSOs by establishing a European entity named “European 
Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity” (the ENTSO for Electricity). “In order 
to ensure optimal management of the electricity transmission network and to allow trading and 
                                                             
 
18 Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on conditions for access to the network 
for cross-border exchanges in electricity and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003. O.J. L 211 of 14.8.2009 
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supplying electricity across borders in the Community”. The Regulation also defines the statutory 
tasks of the ENTSO for Electricity in some detail - see Box 8. 
Box 8: Collective EU transmission system operation in the 2009 Regulation 
Article 8 
Tasks of the ENTSO for Electricity 
1.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall elaborate network codes in the areas referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article upon a request 
addressed to it by the Commission in accordance with Article 6(6). 
2.   The ENTSO for Electricity may elaborate network codes in the areas set out in paragraph 6 with a view to achieving the objectives set 
out in Article 4 where those network codes do not relate to areas covered by a request addressed to it by the Commission. Those network 
codes shall be submitted to the Agency for an opinion. That opinion shall be duly taken into account by the ENTSO for Electricity. 
3.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall adopt: 
(a) common network operation tools to ensure coordination of network operation in normal and emergency conditions, including a 
common incidents classification scale, and research plans; 
(b) a non-binding Community-wide ten-year network development plan, (Community-wide network development plan), including a 
European generation adequacy outlook, every two years; 
(c) recommendations relating to the coordination of technical cooperation between Community and third-country transmission system 
operators; 
(d) an annual work programme; 
(e) an annual report; 
(f) annual summer and winter generation adequacy outlooks. 
4.   The European generation adequacy outlook referred to in point (b) of paragraph 3 shall cover the overall adequacy of the electricity 
system to supply current and projected demands for electricity for the next five-year period as well as for the period between five and 15 
years from the date of that outlook. The European generation adequacy outlook shall build on national generation adequacy outlooks 
prepared by each individual transmission system operator. 
5.   The annual work programme referred to in point (d) of paragraph 3 shall contain a list and description of the network codes to be 
prepared, a plan on coordination of operation of the network, and research and development activities, to be realised in that year, and an 
indicative calendar. 
6.   The network codes referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall cover the following areas, taking into account, if appropriate, regional 
specificities: 
(a) network security and reliability rules including rules for technical transmission reserve capacity for operational network security; 
(b) network connection rules; 
(c) third-party access rules; 
(d) data exchange and settlement rules; 
(e) interoperability rules; 
(f) operational procedures in an emergency; 
(g) capacity-allocation and congestion-management rules; 
(h) rules for trading related to technical and operational provision of network access services and system balancing; 
(i) transparency rules; 
(j) balancing rules including network-related reserve power rules; 
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(k) rules regarding harmonised transmission tariff structures including locational signals and inter-transmission system operator 
compensation rules; and 
(l) energy efficiency regarding electricity networks. 
 
7.   The network codes shall be developed for cross-border network issues and market integration issues and shall be without prejudice to 
the Member States’ right to establish national network codes which do not affect cross-border trade. 
8.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall monitor and analyse the implementation of the network codes and the Guidelines adopted by the 
Commission in accordance with Article 6(11), and their effect on the harmonisation of applicable rules aimed at facilitating market 
integration. The ENTSO for Electricity shall report its findings to the Agency and shall include the results of the analysis in the annual 
report referred to in point (e) of paragraph 3 of this Article. 
9.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall make available all information required by the Agency to fulfil its tasks under Article 9(1). 
10.   The ENTSO for Electricity shall adopt and publish a Community-wide network development plan every two years. The Community-
wide network development plan shall include the modelling of the integrated network, scenario development, a European generation 
adequacy outlook and an assessment of the resilience of the system. 
The Community-wide network development plan shall, in particular: 
(a) build on national investment plans, taking into account regional investment plans as referred to in Article 12(1), and, if appropriate, 
Community aspects of network planning including the guidelines for trans-European energy networks in accordance with Decision No 
1364/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (9); 
(b) regarding cross-border interconnections, also build on the reasonable needs of different system users and integrate long-term 
commitments from investors referred to in Article 8 and Articles 13 and 22 of Directive 2009/72/EC; and 
(c) identify investment gaps, notably with respect to cross-border capacities. 
In regard to point (c) of the second subparagraph, a review of barriers to the increase of cross-border capacity of the network arising from 
different approval procedures or practices may be annexed to the Community-wide network development plan. 
11.   The Agency shall provide an opinion on the national ten-year network development plans to assess their consistency with the 
Community-wide network development plan. If the Agency identifies inconsistencies between a national ten-year network development 
plan and the Community-wide network development plan, it shall recommend amending the national ten-year network development plan 
or the Community-wide network development plan as appropriate. If such national ten-year network development plan is elaborated in 
accordance with Article 22 of Directive 2009/72/EC, the Agency shall recommend that the competent national regulatory authority amend 
the national ten-year network development plan in accordance with Article 22(7) of that Directive and inform the Commission thereof. 
12.   Upon request of the Commission, the ENTSO for Electricity shall give its views to the Commission on the adoption of the Guidelines 
as laid down in Article 18. 
 
As mentioned earlier, since 1996 EU legislation has foreseen the establishment of a single electricity 
market where electricity sellers and buyers (generators, suppliers, traders, end-users, etc.) have the 
right to enter into bilateral or multilateral trading arrangements independent of the Member States 
where they are located, as long as those transactions are compatible with the legitimate interests of 
other market agents and comply with applicable market and operational rules.  Handling the 
requests of a very large array of market players, in order to enable the development of well-
functioning European wholesale and retail markets while fulfilling several reliability criteria, is a 
challenging task, especially given the geographical scale and the potential volume involved. 
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EU legislation assigns to TSOs the obligation to facilitate electricity trade, including cross-border 
trade, while ensuring appropriate reliability and security standards. However, until recently EU 
legislation did not specify how TSOs should coordinate their activities in order to ensure an effective 
network operation at European level. Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 17 April 2013 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure and repealing 
Decision No 1364/2006/EC and amending Regulations (EC) No 713/2009, (EC) No 714/2009 and 
(EC) No 715/200919 , amending Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, at last provided some concrete 
guidance, as shown in Box 9. 
Box 9: Specification of TSO obligations at EU level 
Article 21 
Amendments to Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 is hereby amended as follows: 
(1) Article 8 is amended as follows: 
(a) in paragraph 3, point (a) is replaced by the following: 
‘(a) common network operation tools to ensure coordination of network operation in normal and emergency conditions, 
including a common incident classification scale, and research plans. These tools shall specify inter alia: 
(i) the information, including appropriate day ahead, intra-day and real-time information, useful for improving operational 
coordination, as well as the optimal frequency for the collection and sharing of such information; 
(ii) the technological platform for the exchange of information in real time and where appropriate, the technological 
platforms for the collection, processing and transmission of the other information referred to in point (i), as well as for the 
implementation of the procedures capable of increasing operational coordination between transmission system operators 
with a view to such coordination becoming Union-wide; 
(iii) how transmission system operators make available the operational information to other transmission system operators 
or any entity duly mandated to support them to achieve operational coordination, and to the Agency; and 
(iv) that transmission system operators designate a contact point in charge of answering inquiries from other transmission 
system operators or from any entity duly mandated as referred to in point (iii), or from the Agency concerning such 
information. 
The ENTSO for Electricity shall submit the adopted specifications on points (i) to (iv) above to the Agency and to the 
Commission by 16 May 2015. 
Within 12 months of the adoption of the specifications, the Agency shall issue an opinion in which it considers whether 
they sufficiently contribute to the promotion of cross-border trade and to ensuring the optimal management, coordinated 
operation, efficient use and sound technical evolution of the European electricity transmission network.’;  
 
                                                             
 
19 O.J. L 115/39 of 25.04.2013 
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Besides the Treaty and the two above mentioned 2009 documents - Directive 2009/72/EC and 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 - the energy industry legal framework consists of many more pieces of 
legislation. The official site of the Directorate-General for Energy (DG ENER) lists 13 for electricity 
alone, as of 19 December 201420. The following Box recalls the main types of EU secondary 
legislation (the primary legislation being the Treaties)21. 
 
Box 10: Basic types of EU secondary legislation 22 
 
There are three basic types of EU legislation: regulations, directives and decisions. 
A regulation is similar to a national law with the difference that it is applicable in all EU countries. 
Directives set out general rules to be transferred into national law by each country as they deem appropriate. 
A decision only deals with a particular issue and specifically mentioned persons or organisations.  
 
 
Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 foresees other types of documents, namely “Guidelines” and “Network 
Codes”23. A Guideline is approved by the Commission on its own and published as “Commission 
Regulation” (the other type of regulation, like Regulation (EC) No 714/2009, is called “Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council”). A Network Code must be approved through the 
“Committee procedure”24 , which means a Committee of representatives of the Member States 
chaired by the representative of the Commission and voting with a qualified majority. Fig. 1 
describes different types of EU legislation governing the electricity sector in Europe at present, while 
Fig. 2 depicts the typical national framework in each Member State. 
At EU level there is no energy regulator: no independent body “making regulation”. In the EU, there 
are “regulations” issued by the Council and Parliament or by the Commission and there are 
decisions of a regulatory nature taken by non-legislators - either the European Commission or 
special Committees. Usually at national level, regulation means rules and decisions taken by the 
                                                             
 
20 https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2014-12-19-ener-legislation.pdf 
21 There are two more types of unilateral acts foreseen in Article 288 of the Treaty: opinions and recommendations; unlike regulations, 
directives and decisions, these two have no binding force. Furthermore, the Commission also issues “atypical” acts such as 
communications and recommendations. 
22 http://ec.europa.eu/legislation/index_en.htm 
23 Article 290 of the Treaty establishes that “A legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of 
general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act.” 
24  For a full description of the Committee Procedures (“Comitology”) see Council Decision of 17 July 2006 amending Decision 
1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. O.J. L 200 of 22.7.2006 
 31 
designated national regulatory authority. In the next Section, the existing EU “regulatory rules” are 
briefly described. 
 
Fig. 1: The EU legal framework – electricity 
 
 
Fig. 2: The typical national legal framework - electricity 
 
1.1.3 The European “regulatory” framework 
As described in the previous Section, at EU level there is a complex legal framework, including legal 
acts called “regulations”, but there is no regulatory framework as such, which would be developed by 
an independent EU regulator, similar to the national regulatory frameworks established by 
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independent national regulators. This “regulatory gap” between national and EU levels was identified 
many years ago as a major obstacle to the proper functioning of the internal energy market25, and it 
has not yet been overcome. 
What we use to call the European “regulatory” framework is mainly a set of guidelines and network 
codes that have been developed since the third energy package came into force. The number and 
the intrinsic complexity of these documents is growing rapidly. It sometimes makes it difficult for 
newcomers to understand the actual functioning of the internal energy market at the EU level. 
Fig. 3 describes the process leading to the approval of Network Codes. 
 
 
Fig. 3: Development process of Network Codes 26  
 
 
Fig. 4 indicates all Network Codes currently under development, while Fig. 5 shows the status of 
their respective developments. Table 1 provides a brief overview of each Network Code. 
                                                             
 
25 Cf. Vasconcelos, J. (2001) “Regulation of energy markets and European governance - discussion paper” CEER 
26 FWGL means framework guidelines and NC means network codes.  
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Fig. 4: Overview of Network Codes under development 
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Fig. 5: Network Codes development status (July 2015) 27 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
27 https://www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/network-code-development/updates-milestones/Pages/default.aspx  
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Table 1:  Main contents of current electricity Network Codes 
 
                                                             
 
28 Operational codes (OS, OPS, LFC&R) were merged and are about to enter comitology. 
Network Code Timeframe Specifications 
Requirements 
for Generators 
Adopted in 
Comitology 
Process (2015) 
 Size-dependent, technical requirements for Power Generating Modules 
 Common framework of obligations for Network Operators to appropriately make 
use of the Power Generating Facilities’ capabilities 
Demand 
Connection 
Comitology 
Process (entered 
2014) 
 European rules on how demand interacts with the transmission system 
 Ensure effective contribution to the stability of the power system by all distribution 
networks and demand facilities 
 Clarify the role that demand response will play in contributing to the deployment 
of RES 
HVDC 
Connection 
ACER 
recommendation 
submitted (2014) 
Manage HVDC lines and connections: 
 Determine contribution to system security 
 Promote coordinated development of the infrastructure 
Operational 
Security 
ACER 
recommendation 
submitted (2013) 
Framework for maintaining a secure interconnected European electricity transmission 
system: common, legally binding principles and rules for operating electricity 
transmission networks 
 Operational Security requirements and principles; Data exchange; provisions for 
training of System Operator Employees 
Operational 
Planning & 
Scheduling 
ACER 
recommendation 
submitted (2013) 
Common time horizons, methodologies and principles allowing to carry out 
coordinated Operational Security Analysis and Adequacy analysis to maintain 
Operational Security and support the efficient functioning of the European internal 
electricity market 
Load 
Frequency 
Control & 
Reserves 
ACER 
recommendation 
submitted (2013) 
 Formalised harmonised system frequency quality targets 
 Objective and harmonised requirements regarding Load-Frequency-Control (LFC) 
and Reserves 
Emergency & 
Restoration28 
Recommended for 
adoption by ACER 
(2015) 
Procedures and remedial actions to be applied in the Emergency, Blackout and 
Restoration states 
Capacity 
Allocation & 
Congestion 
Management 
Entered into force 
(2015) 
Rules that will introduce an EU Target Model: single approach to cross-border 
electricity trading 
 for cross-border capacity allocation in day-ahead and intraday timescales. 
Outlines the way in which capacity will be calculated across the different zones 
 for congestion management 
Forward 
Capacity 
Allocation 
Comitology 
Process (entered 
2015) 
Design and operation of the markets in which the right to use cross-border capacity is 
sold in advance 
Electricity 
Balancing 
Recommended for 
adoption by ACER 
(2015) 
Steps for transforming balancing markets to a set of regional markets and later a pan-
European market 
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Despite the fact that several national markets are increasingly converging and that the European 
regulatory framework is increasingly driving this harmonisation process, there are still different 
national initiatives taking place. Perhaps the most telling example is capacity markets, a solution for 
rewarding generators for their potential capability to produce electricity (their installed generation 
capacity), in addition to the flows of energy that they actually generate and sell in the market.  
An inefficient and uncoordinated way of implementing capacity markets could aggravate existing EU 
market inefficiencies and hold back the implementation of urgent EU market reforms. Figure 15 
shows the diversity of capacity remuneration mechanisms (CRM) in Europe as of June 2014. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Implementation of CRM across Europe. Source: Eurelectric, 2014 
 
Reacting to this, on April 29, 2015, the European Commission launched a sector inquiry into 
capacity mechanisms as potential disruptions of EU markets. Commissioner for Competition 
Margrethe Vestager, said: "This sector inquiry sends a clear signal to Member States to respect EU 
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state aid rules when implementing capacity mechanisms, and contributes to the Commission's goal 
to build a true Energy Union in Europe." 29 
1.1.4 The functions of European TSOs today 
The TSOs perform different tasks to fulfil their duties and manage the power system. The co-
existence of different tasks is better presented in a TSO modular analysis framework similar to the 
one presented in Rious et al. (2008). These TSO functions can be classified as either hardware or 
software functions. The “Hardware” functions relate to the management of the assets of the network, 
implying investment in and maintenance of the network; including the connection of grid users. The 
“Software” functions relate to the operation of the grid and the system, which covers the system 
operation, the facilitation of the market operation at the interfaces with other agents.  
 
 Hardware function 1 - Network maintenance and expansion 
Transmission planning is the process that evaluates potential investments and maintenance plans in 
the network. New transmission assets are evaluated in the investment plan determining when, 
where and how much capacity should be added, assets be maintained or upgraded, along with other 
technical characteristics of the assets. Scheduling of line outages and other tasks necessary to 
maintain network operation under some adequate reliability levels are evaluated in the maintenance 
plans (Pérez-Arriaga, 2013). 
Transmission planning is not only necessary at national level (as the Intra-TSO network upgrade 
investments do), but also for interconnecting different national systems (as an Inter-TSO network 
upgrade investment has to do). A full separation of these two kinds of planning (internal and cross-
border) can only result in inefficiencies because, on the one hand, investments needed to solve 
problems within one TSO control zone do not necessarily favour trade between TSO zones and, on 
the other hand, cross-border investments can result in inefficiencies in the internal grid which have to 
be solved in order to get the full potential of the cross-border investment. 
Furthermore, power generation and transmission are complementary activities that must be 
coordinated to ensure the optimal use and development of the transmission grid (e.g., a new line can 
be a substitute to a new plant; and vice-versa). Before liberalisation and the unbundling of 
generation and transmission activities, a single vertically integrated utility planned the joint 
expansion of generation and transmission. It is now more difficult to plan a system expansion 
because generation and transmission activities are independent, and several different actors take 
                                                             
 
29 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4891_en.htm 
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independent, uncoordinated decisions. Different regulatory approaches have been proposed to solve 
this power network problem (Pérez-Arriaga and Olmos, 2007): 
1. Supervised centralised planning and regulated remuneration: Planning is made by a 
specialist agent (the “system operator”), and the transmission network owner is responsible 
for expansion proposals. In this case, the remuneration is based on the actual grid 
infrastructure. New facilities are included in the regulated asset base and remunerated at a 
specific rate of return. 
2. Traditional regulated monopoly: The transmission company is responsible for making 
investment decisions, and remuneration is based on an efficient grid design and operating 
cost criteria using an incentive-based monopoly regulation, such as a revenue cap or price 
cap regulation. 
3. Market player initiative with regulatory supervision: It is the grid users who propose network 
reinforcements, taking into consideration the benefits they expect to receive. The regulatory 
agency evaluates the proposals using pre-established criteria and organises a tender for 
building and maintenance. The transmission company that wins the tender is remunerated 
according to its bid, and the operation is left to the system operator. 
4. Merchant lines: It is the merchant investors who develop the network and use it or collect the 
congestion rents or other revenue borne on their lines. 
 
Another important issue in transmission planning is the time lag between investment horizons for 
generation and for the network; this may create significant uncertainty when planning the network. 
New generation units’ connection may create congestions in the system before the TSO can 
upgrade the grid. In order to solve this problem, the TSO may anticipate the connection of new users 
and plan the network investments to avoid congestion. This allows the TSO to deal with the time lag 
between the building times of new generation units and the time necessary to upgrade the network. 
However, this anticipation strategy is only efficient when the time differences are significant and the 
cost of anticipation and errors is moderate (Rious et al., 2011).  
 
Hardware function 2 - Connection of grid users  
TSOs must guarantee non-discriminatory and transparent access to the network for all grid users 
(generation plants, loads, etc.). However the physical constraints of the network may impose 
restrictions to the connection of users, and therefore it may be necessary for the TSO to expand the 
network or to refuse access. This asks for clear and objective rules to authorise network 
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connections, as well as predetermined criteria to refuse access. At European level, these rules are 
being proposed by ENTSO-E in the codes of network connection (Section 1.1.3). 
It is frequent that short-term signals are complemented with long-term tariffs known as transmission 
charges. These transmission charges send other economic signals to users, to encourage them to 
reduce the costs of network expansion. This can be achieved if the allocation of transmission costs 
rely on some basic principles as explained by Pérez-Arriaga (2013):  
1. The “Beneficiary pays” principle: the transmission cost should be divided among users in 
proportion to their aggregate economic benefits. Thus, both generators and loads should pay 
because both benefit from the network expansion. 
2. Transmission charges should not be based on individual commercial transactions: 
transmission charges should depend on objective grid related characteristics, such as the 
location of the users of the network and the aggregated temporal patterns of power injection 
(for generators) and power withdrawal (for loads). Transmission charges should not depend 
on individual commercial transactions between users. If this principle is not met, it may result 
in “pancaking”, a situation in which users must pay cumulative tariffs for each region where 
power is expected to pass in the contract between buyer and seller, regardless of actual 
power flows. In fact, individual commercial transactions cannot be tracked in physical flows of 
electricity due to the superposition of flows resulting from the various injections and 
withdraws. 
3. Transmission charges should be established ex ante: Transmission charges for new users 
should be established ex ante and not be updated for a reasonable time. Thus, predictable 
economic signals are sent to investors in order to choose the most suitable sites with low 
financial risks. 
4. The format of the transmission charges matters: The format of the transmission charges has 
implications for the market behavior of agents. The level of distortions of the economic 
dispatch is not the same if connection transmission charges are structured as lump sums (€), 
or if volumetric charges (€/MWh) or capacity charges (€/MW) are applied instead. 
Transmission charges can therefore be divided into connection charges and Use of the System 
(UoS) charges. Connection charges can be shallow charges or heavy charges. With the shallow 
charges, new users are only charged for a small portion of the fixed costs of the network. This 
portion only covers the cost of the infrastructure required to connect the new user. The costs of any 
other reinforcement in the network are socialised. Heavy charges cover the cost of both the direct 
connection infrastructure and the necessary network reinforcements. Thus, new users are charged 
the total cost of all new connection infrastructures.  
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Software function 1 - System operation  
Electricity systems consist of generation plants, transmission and distribution networks, and loads. 
The transmission network is necessary to transmit the electricity from generation plants to 
consumption centers. The distribution networks carry the electricity to users of smaller size that are 
not connected to the transmission grid. Any disturbance in the system may compromise the overall 
reliability as well as the supply and balance of electricity. For this reason, a global operation of the 
system is necessary, which comprises measures required to ensure the reliability and continuity of 
supply, as well as coordination between the transmission and generation to keep the energy flowing 
to the load under certain quality conditions. In the EU, TSOs are responsible for the power system 
operation, taking into account externalities such as grid congestions or imbalances between 
generators and consumers, as explained below. 
 
Balancing generation and demand 
To keep energy flows flowing, power systems require a permanent equilibrium between generation 
and consumption. Even small deviations from the equilibrium (“imbalances”) affect a key parameter - 
the operating frequency of the system. Keeping this balance between generation and demand is a 
complex task because, to this day, there is no affordable massive electricity storage - which implies 
that actual coordination between generation and demand can only be fully assessed near the real-
time operation of the system. 
The primary structural consequence is that this real time power balance management is not 
performed by the wholesale market on its own (as a decentralised decision process), but by a 
“central authority” responsible for the security of the system (as does “air control” for air 
transportation). While this balancing task is administered by the TSO, it is also a key and essential 
component of the market itself (market design and market sequencing), which hence go far beyond 
the mission played within the proper transmission area (Glachant and Saguan, 2006). The TSOs are 
“market facilitators”. Power markets cannot work without the TSOs dedication to the markets. 
In general terms, the balancing tools (being markets or other mechanisms) allow the TSOs to 
guarantee the feasibility of all operations of power injection (generation) and power withdrawal 
(consumption) from several minutes or hours before the real-time operation to its actual 
implementation in real-time. The main difference between “real-time markets” and “balancing 
mechanisms” is that real-time markets use the market clearing price to determine the beneficiaries 
and the value of electricity in real time, while balancing mechanisms impose a unilateral penalty to 
the imbalances. The imbalance costs are incorporated into the prices of the observed volume gap 
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between the power contracted previous to real-time (especially in day-ahead and intraday markets) 
and the actual volume of power being consumed and generated. 
The way balancing services are provided, managed and charged to users has changed over time; 
the more sophisticated electricity markets become and the more intermittent generation is added to 
the system, the more balancing services play a crucial role. The role of TSOs in managing ancillary 
services in general and balancing services in particular has also changed substantially since 
liberalisation started. 
Congestion management 
The power flows in most of the transmission lines cannot be steered through any contractual path. 
They obey Kirchhoff’s laws of physics and depend on the impedance of the lines as well as on the 
injections and withdrawals of power at the different network nodes. A congestion occurs when the 
network security constraints (mainly caused by the thermal limits of the lines) cannot be violated, 
making it impossible to deliver the desired amount of energy for grid users from one node to another. 
Different mechanisms can be used to clear the congestion. The choice of a particular mechanism 
depends on the market design and the system size, i.e., it is highly dependent on regulatory models, 
and may undergo significant changes in a short time period. 
Theoretically, the most efficient way to determine short-term electricity prices is the nodal-pricing 
system (Green, 2007; Neuhoff et al., 2011). In this setting, the electricity market explicitly takes the 
actual operational constraints imposed by the power network into account and remunerates the 
corresponding actual costs of producing and transporting energy through the different nodes - which 
may lead to different electricity prices in each node of the system (Schweppe et al., 1988).  
Another congestion management mechanism is redispatching. In this setting, the actual constraints 
of the electricity network are not taken into account in the daily wholesale electricity market-clearing 
process. One assumes that all energy is traded on a single “reference node”, and therefore that the 
electricity price is the same for all nodes in the system. This setting may be suitable when the 
transmission network is sufficiently robust and when there are no structural constraints to repeatedly 
cause significant congestion in the system. When some congestion arises, the redispatch of some 
generation units is necessary to perform the system adjustments in order to clear the congestion. 
Thus, only the redispatched generation units are involved in the adaptation to the grid constraints. 
They are the only ones to receive direct economic signals on the existence of transmission 
constraints in the implementation of the market equilibrium.  
In addition to the nodal-pricing system and the redispatch mechanism, congestion at 
interconnections between multiple power systems might use explicit and implicit auctions (Pérez-
Arriaga and Olmos, 2005). In the explicit auctions, the interconnection capacity is allocated 
independent of the energy markets outcomes. In this setting, first the transmission capacity in the 
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interconnection is allocated, and it is only in a second phase that the generation volume and the 
prices of the interconnected electricity markets are determined. In the “implicit” setting, the 
interconnection capacity is allocated according to the merit order of energy bids made by buyers and 
generation companies.  
When systems are interconnected radially, a “market splitting” mechanism can clear congestion by 
establishing different prices in the sub bidding areas of the same market administered by a single 
market operator. The electricity market price is the same for all the sub-areas only when there is no 
congestion on the interconnections. There are different sub-area prices in the event of congestion. 
Another mechanism known as “market coupling” is used when the adjacent markets and systems 
cannot be centrally managed by a single market operator (within a single PX) due to institutional 
constraints. Working between several neighbouring PXs, this mechanism allows agents to offer their 
energy locally in local exchanges, which are all coordinated with a single common price when no 
congestion occurs. At congestion, these PXs are decoupled from each other. Each system operator 
is responsible for communicating with the neighbouring system operators to coordinate their grid and 
system information. Thus, the congestion on interconnections is cleared through an iterative process 
of information exchange, and different electricity prices in the areas are determined.  
 
Software function 2 - Interface with other actors 
a) With other TSOs 
One of the main objectives of energy policy in Europe is the integration of national electricity 
systems into a single EU market. The TSOs in the different Member States must interact and 
coordinate their decisions in order to achieve this goal. Coordination between TSOs is necessary in 
both the long term for the proper planning of the transmission network expansion and the short term 
for a proper system operation.  
There are two basic types of coordination, “uniformisation” and “combination” (Rious et al., 2008). 
“Uniformisation” involves the harmonisation of the rules. Therefore, the TSOs use the same methods 
for the operation and planning of the system and they exchange information about the status of their 
systems. “Combination” involves establishing rules that allow for the coexistence of different 
individual mechanisms in different zones.  
b) With DSOs 
The transmission network is designed to balance generation and demand within a large territory in 
order to dispatch the most efficient generation, whereas distribution networks have been conceived 
to carry electricity to consumers not directly connected to the transmission grid.  
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Under this scheme, TSOs are responsible for managing the transmission network and the system, 
and they interact with several market agents. Most Distribution System Operators (DSOs) perform a 
more passive kind of system operation, in the sense that they are only responsible for managing 
their own networks. Thus, the distribution grids are mainly acting beyond the borders of observability 
and the control areas of TSOs, which are, up to now, very often limited to the flows at the boundaries 
between both networks. Some degree of interaction and coordination between the TSO and the 
DSOs must be found in order to have a better knowledge and control of all system conditions and to 
achieve an optimal and efficient system operation.  
c) Market facilitation  
Although this is not a direct inherent task of TSOs, they are actually responsible for developing the 
rules and operating some of the electricity markets, i.e., TSOs are market facilitators. As presented 
in the previous Section, ENTSO-E is responsible for developing the network codes to be used in 
Europe. These network codes are a set of rules for the connection of users to the grid, the operation 
of the network, and the electricity markets. De facto, ENTSO-E is responsible for developing the 
rules for cross-border capacity allocation in the short and long-term, congestion management and 
the creation of balancing markets. In addition, the TSOs are responsible for managing and operating 
these balancing markets in order to ensure an optimal operation of the system. 
d) Institutional actors  
Besides interacting with other T &D network operators, market operators, transmission network 
users and some market agents, TSOs are also required to interact with institutional actors, such as 
national regulatory authorities, the European Commission, ACER and several more or less informal 
fora.  
Most of the functions currently performed by TSOs are described in national and EU legislation, as 
well as in national and EU Network Codes. However, some functions are not at all mentioned in any 
legislation or are not clearly defined. The following table provides a summary of the functions de 
facto performed nowadays by most European TSOs. 
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 Security of supply Market facilitator 
Long term (> 1 year) System adequacy outlook 
Grid planning : TYNDP 
Long term security analysis 
(1 to 5 years ahead) 
Year ahead capacity calculation 
Yearly capacity allocation 
(auction office) 
Medium term 
(> 1 week, <1year) 
Adequacy assessment 
(seasonal, monthly)   
Grid Security analysis 
Outage planning 
(yearly plans, monthly update) 
Month ahead capacity 
calculation 
Monthly capacity allocation 
(auction office) 
Short term 
(>1h, < 1 week) 
Outage planning (weekly plan, 
daily confirmation) 
Grid security analysis (weekly, 
D-2, D-1, intraday) 
Generation/demand balance 
assessment 
Remedial actions ahead of real 
time (changes in generation 
schedule) 
D-2 / D-1 capacity calculation 
Intraday capacity calculation 
Providing parameters to day-
ahead and intra-day market 
coupling platforms 
Real time Continuous Security analysis 
(frequency deviation, grid 
capacities) 
Balancing services activation 
Remedial actions activation to 
relieve grid constraints (grid 
topology, generation schedule 
changes)  
 
Post real time BRP positions settlement 
Grid access billing 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of functions currently performed by European TSOs 
 
It should be pointed out that the “traditional”, pre-liberalisation TSO functions have themselves been 
considerably extended over the last few years. Here are some examples of such expansion: 
 Adequacy assessments evolved from pure network and generation adequacy towards more 
general system adequacy (network, generation, voltage/reactive power, inertia, etc.). 
Assessments developed from pure national ones towards regional and European wide 
assessments. 
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 Stability studies (transient behavior of the system, wide area effects) nowadays include 
interconnections with adjacent non-EU systems (e.g. Turkey). 
 Analysis of market behavior became a “standard” TSO activity.  Analysis of behavior of market 
participants and of gaming possibilities is required for improving various products (e.g., auctioning 
products, balancing products), for further developing market design and the interface between 
market operation and system operation, as well as for performing a meaningful cost-benefit 
analysis concerning new transmission projects. 
 
Sometimes, TSOs are active promoters of innovation, for instance introducing new predictive control 
strategies, exploring the possibilities of netting balancing needs in real time and introducing new 
market clearing algorithms to maximise social welfare. 
1.1.5 Voluntary regional cooperation among system operators 
The need for enhanced operational coordination among TSOs has been recognised for a long time 
and for several reasons, namely: 
- improving the overall reliability of the European electricity system; 
- enabling the more efficient use of existing interconnections for cross-border trade; 
- ensuring system security under the increasing volume of intermittent generation. 
The large power disruptions of 2003 and 2006 clearly revealed the need for enhanced coordination 
at EU level.  The European Commission, regulators and TSOs concluded that immediate action was 
necessary and some TSOs started working together in order to set up appropriate voluntary 
structures. 
In December 2008, Coreso (Coordination of Electricity System Operators), the first regional technical 
coordination centre for electricity was established, bringing together the French (RTE) and Belgian 
(Elia) transmission system operators.  In February 2009 Coreso launched its operational activities in 
a centralised coordination centre in Brussels: “Every afternoon, seven days a week, Coreso provides 
forecasts of the electrical flows in the CWE area (France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) for the following day (so-called ‘D 1 activities’).”30 Later on, National Grid from the UK, 
Terna from Italy and 50hertz from Germany joined Coreso. 
Another initiative was also launched in December 2008: TSC – (TSO Security Cooperation). It now 
includes 13 TSOs (see Fig. 16) with its headquarters in Munich. 
                                                             
 
30 http://www.coreso.eu/mission/history-of-coreso/ 
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Fig. 7: TSC - TSO Security Cooperation 31 
 
 “The TSC IT tool allows member TSOs to access key data and provides them with access to 
advanced methods for choosing appropriate remedial actions. These IT services can be used by 
TSOs for day-to-day operations in their regions, starting first with day-ahead planning processes. In 
a second phase, these services will be expanded to grant TSOs with nearly real-time control over 
their operations. 
TSC strives to achieve a high level of system security in the heart of Europe. This common IT 
platform was implemented in a joint project in 2010.” 32 
                                                             
 
31 http://www.tscnet.eu/where-we-are/ 
32 http://www.tscnet.eu/what-we-do/ 
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1.2 Major trends shaping the transition towards a low-carbon energy landscape 
The transition towards low-carbon electricity systems was triggered by changes in energy policy. 
Back in 2007, the EU acknowledged that “given that energy production and use are the main 
sources for greenhouse gas emissions, an integrated approach to climate and energy policy is 
needed” 33 in order to limit the global average temperature increase to not more than 2° C above 
pre-industrial levels. According to the Council, “Integration should be achieved in a mutually 
supportive way.” 
This “integrated approach” has produced several directives and regulations with significant impact 
upon energy markets, mainly as regards the development of electricity from renewable energy 
sources.  
The EU pledge to cut greenhouse gas emissions was reinforced in 2009 when the Council decided 
“to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels”34. As noticed by 
the Council in 2011, this “will require a revolution in energy systems, which must start now”35. 
As regards electricity, this “revolution in energy systems” is enabled by a large spectrum of new 
technologies, briefly described below, and it is composed of two concurrent revolutions, respectively 
on the supply-side (Section 1.3.1) and on the demand-side (Section 1.3.2). 
Research into further measures, which may support the successful integration of large amounts of 
generation from RES into the power system, have so far delivered numerous options that differ in 
the complexity level of their implementation, in their expected costs and in the areas that they 
benefit. They range from improved RES forecasts, network monitoring and control to decentralised 
storage systems and innovative transmission and smart grid technologies.  
A report commissioned by the DG Energy of the European Commission on the integration of 
renewable energy in Europe (DNV GL et al., 2014) offered a scenario-based quantitative analysis of 
several technical measures. Besides distinguishing them according to the areas of possible cost 
reductions, it gives an indicative comparison of their costs and net benefits, summarised in Figure 
17. 
 
                                                             
 
33 European Council conclusions, 8/9 March 2007 
34 European Council conclusions, 29/30 October 2009 
35 European Council conclusions, 4 February 2011 
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Source: DNV GL - Report No. 9011-700 (DNV GL et al., 2014) 
Fig. 8: Comparison of costs and net benefits of selected technical solutions 
 
Demand response (Chapter 1.3.2) is considered the most attractive option in the report, which at 
limited costs can facilitate both the integration of RES and overcoming the challenges posed by 
additional loads from an increasing penetration of heat pumps and electric vehicles. The analysis 
further showed that measures not requiring significant investments in additional infrastructure and 
technological developments, and that thus can be implemented at limited costs (top left corner in 
Figure 16), may lead to substantial savings if deployed in combination. Additionally, they ensure full 
compatibility with the existing EU Target Model for the electricity market and therefore do not pose 
major legislative or regulatory obstacles, in spite of the expected increase in the complexity of the 
system operation and market functioning resulting from their implementation. In contrast, the more 
expensive options require a location-specific weighing against the costs, as their economic value 
strongly depends on the specific situation regarding the existing distribution network and DG 
penetration. The report singles out storage systems by questioning whether decentralised storage 
will represent an economically justifiable measure by 2030 mainly because of the high capital costs, 
high conversion losses and the uncertainty of a major cost reduction of the technologies involved. 
A brief review is enough to understand that despite the numerous, individually consistent studies and 
projects to assess different possible pathways to achieve a low-carbon electricity system, Europe 
has not yet made a decision on an overall consistent strategy to get there. A good example to 
demonstrate this occurrence is the position on storage devices. As mentioned before, there are 
parties skeptical of their future relevance due to the high costs of these technologies and the 
uncertain cost reduction potential that would allow them to be competitive with other options 
(Florence School of Regulation, THINK report on storage, 2012). However, other studies consider 
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storage systems “a key component of the future low-carbon electricity system” given their need 
relating “to the increase in intermittent wind and solar and to the demand peak increase” (European 
Commission, 2013). In other words, “there is no universal answer on whether storage is a profitable 
investment or adds value to a system” because “all attempts at storage valuation require making 
assumptions on storage regulation” (Zucker, A., Hinchliffe, T., Spisto, A., 2013). “Storage will thus be 
affected by the upcoming regulatory discussions emerging from the developments in the power 
system, such as market design and rules for RES integration or considerations on ownership and 
operation of storage devices” (Zucker, A., Hinchliffe, T., Spisto, A., 2013).  
This dynamic is similarly reflected in the area of electric mobility, which experienced a “’turbulent’ 
period of excitement and promise as well as disappointment” (Amsterdam Roundtables Foundation, 
McKinsey, 2014). The electrification of the automotive powertrain, driven either by the goal of a 
decarbonised European economy or simply by the automotive sector’s goal of diversifying the 
portfolio, still has a low impact in Europe with sales amounting up to 1% (Germany has recently 
confirmed a goal of 1 million vehicles in 2020; with no clear implementation strategy). However, even 
with low market shares, electric vehicles (EVs) could intensify the disturbances mainly occurring at 
the distribution level. Instead of further expanding the grid (a solution that is soon bound to reach its 
limit of cost effectiveness and local acceptance), the alternative of adopting some sort of “smart 
charging” mechanisms to optimise the EV’s interaction with the grid has been widely discussed. The 
extent of the interaction [be it a simple manual and voluntary orientation of the customer to price 
signals (Demand Response) or the automatic, remote control of the bidirectional charging and 
storing of electricity (V2G, Demand Side Management)] is technically almost unlimited but depends 
greatly on economic evaluations, the efforts for improving customer participation and the supporting 
policies (e.g. Eurelectric, 2015, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, 2013). The competitiveness of 
smart charging with other flexibility options will be determined by new approaches to capacity 
remuneration and reserve markets. 
Besides Demand Side Flexibilisation, it is not clear yet which flexibility measures will occur and to 
what extent they will characterise electricity systems in the future. Irrespective of this, it is clear that 
more flexibility will be integrated in the distribution and transmission grids through, amongst other 
things, a large amount of new Information and Communication Technology (ICT). This will combine 
with increasing the bidirectional interaction of the grid with its components and users, changing the 
interfaces with other actors of the energy systems, diversifying the short-term system operation and 
impacting the long-term planning. 
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1.3 The supply-side and the demand-side revolutions 
1.3.1 The supply-side revolution 
Back in 2007, the EU decided to achieve a 20 % share of energy from renewable sources in overall 
Community gross final energy consumption by 2020. This collective target was legally established in 
the 2009 renewable energy Directive 36 that also indicates the mandatory individual national targets 
consistent with the 20% share at EU level. More recently, the decision was taken to increase this 
share to at least 27% by 2030: 
“An EU target of at least 27% is set for the share of renewable energy consumed in the EU in 2030. 
This target will be binding at EU level. It will be fulfilled through Member States contributions guided 
by the need to deliver collectively the EU target without preventing Member States from setting their 
own more ambitious national targets and supporting them, in line with the state aid guidelines, as 
well as taking into account their degree of integration in the internal energy market.” 37 
The EU commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions, first clearly established in 2007, was 
strengthened in 2009 when the Council decided “to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 
2050 compared to 1990 levels”38. According to the Energy Roadmap 2050 (European Commission, 
2011a), this overall target translates into a share of RES in electricity consumption between 64% (in 
a high-energy efficiency scenario) and 97% (in a high renewables scenario).  
The generation capacity of renewable energies has increased considerably in the EU-28 in the last 
15 years, as shown in Figure 18. Wind and solar resources have had the largest increase in 
generation capacity in recent years. Wind generation capacity has increased from 4 GW in 1999 to 
103 GW in 2012. Solar generation capacity has increased from 2 GW in 2005 to 71 GW in 2012. 
 
                                                             
 
36 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC. Official Journal L/140 of 5.6.2009 
37 European Council conclusions, 23/24 October 2014 
38 European Council conclusions, 29/30 October 2009 
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: nrg_113a) 
Fig. 9: Electricity generation capacities in EU-28 
 
In the period between 2000 and 2014, the net electricity generation growth in the EU was almost 
entirely based on wind (117 GW), solar (88 GW) and gas (101 GW), while fuel oil, coal and nuclear 
net installed capacities decreased by, respectively, 26 GW, 25 GW and 13 GW 39. In 2000, the total 
installed renewable capacity (including large hydro) represented 24 % of the total installed electricity 
generation capacity; in 2014, this figure was 42 %40. 
The integration of such a large amount of intermittent RES has a substantial impact on the 
development and operation of transmission grids. If the electricity system is managed in a territory 
large enough, correlation among the input of the different renewable sources will be lower; hence, it 
will be easier for TSOs to cope with the high variability, low predictability and specific localisation of 
the intermittent RES. Enlarging the relevant geographical area reduces the impact of RES output 
uncertainty upon the system operation, as well as the stress on transmission systems. However, this 
implies that the TSOs face several challenges related to the management of large power flows 
covering vast distances, and the need of significant investments in the transmission network (Olmos 
et al., 2015).  
According to the ENTSO-E Ten-Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP), RES development is the 
major driver for grid development until 2030 (ENTSO-E, 2014a). The TYNDP predicts that the 
overall interconnection capacity should double on average by 2030. It also identifies about 100 
                                                             
 
39 http://www.ewea.org/fileadmin/files/library/publications/statistics/EWEA-Annual-Statistics-2014.pdf 
40 idem 
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potential bottlenecks in the European electricity system for the next few years, if new transmission 
assets are not installed on time (see Fig. 19). These situations, in which transfer capabilities may not 
suffice to accommodate the necessary or likely power flow in a certain grid section at a certain point 
in time, can occur due to three main reasons: 1) security of supply, 2) direct connection of 
generation, or 3) market integration (ENTSO-E, 2014a).  
The first relates to the situation in which the expected quality standards in specific areas cannot be 
met due to insufficient supply; the second refers to the installation of new generation capacities in 
locations with a limited transmission capacity; the third comprises the necessary distinction to be 
made between inter-area balancing that is either internal to a price zone or between price zones. 
 
Source: ENTSO-E, Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2014 
Fig. 10: Map of main bottlenecks in the European electricity grid 
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Besides demanding upgrades of the transmission networks, the large-scale deployment of 
distributed generation from RES also has an impact on the provision of system services. 
Traditionally, large conventional power plants were the main providers of balancing and ancillary 
services such as black start capability, frequency response, fast response and the provision of 
reactive power. With an increasing share of RES in the electricity generation however, new providers 
are urgently needed and thus a review of how the secure operation of the power supply system can 
be re-organised must be undertaken. Figure 20 shows the system services reserve as part of the 
Net Generating Capacity (NGC) evolution for 2011 to 2013, which experienced a yearly decrease. 
 
Source: ENTSO-E Yearly Statistics & Adequacy Retrospect 2013 
Fig. 11: System services reserve as a part of NGC evolution. 
 
In addition, as certain ancillary services such as the provision of reactive power for voltage control 
can only be provided locally, requiring distributed generators to provide them seems reasonable. 
More than the technical challenges, it is argued that it is the lack of a suitable framework that would 
guarantee fair market access and remuneration mechanisms which is the main reason why 
distributed generators are not yet significant providers of ancillary services. This is currently being 
dealt with at national level, with a wide range of approaches being tested. For an increased 
provision of reserve power by Distributed Generators, the most common solutions entail the 
alteration of prequalification requirements and the facilitation of market access through, for instance, 
aggregation (e.g. virtual power plants). Regarding an increased provision of reactive power, the 
solutions range from the introduction of legally binding requirements (e.g. in Germany, VDE 2011) 
to the active involvement of distribution grids or customers directly connected to the transmission 
grid on a voluntary-basis, which is incentivised through the monetary compensation for the delivered 
reactive power (e.g. in Switzerland, Swissgrid 2011).  
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1.3.2 The demand-side revolution  
In its updated report on the trends leading up to 2050, the EC defines a Reference Scenario 2013 for 
the development of the EU energy system under current trends and policies. Based on those 
assumptions, it deduces that there will be a downward trend on energy consumption and that Gross 
Inland Consumption (GIC) and GDP growth decouple (Figure 21) – a development that is traced 
back, among other things, to the adopted legislation on energy efficiency (European Commission 
2014b). 
 
 
Source: EC, EU Energy Transport and GHG Emissions; Trends to 2050; Reference Scenario 2013 
Fig. 12: GIC in relation to GDP. 
 
Opposing this downward trend on energy consumption is an increasing share of the electricity of the 
final energy demand (see Fig. 22). According to the scenario-based outlook contained in the Energy 
Roadmap 2050, “electricity will have to play a much greater role than now (almost doubling its share 
in final energy demand to 36-39% in 2050) and will have to contribute to the decarbonisation of 
transport and heating/cooling” (European Commission, 2011a). This will also result in an increasing 
electricity demand in absolute terms. 
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Source: EC, Energy Roadmap 2050 
Fig. 13: Share of electricity in the current trend and decarbonisation scenarios (in % of final energy demand) 
 
These developments will, of course, put a further strain on an electricity system, which already has 
to deal with the fact that the integration of an increasing amount of RES in the power supply system 
has moved away from the traditional “supply follows demand” model because of the intermittent 
nature of RES. Therefore, in order to maintain the frequency equilibrium, new flexibilisation options 
in the power system must be explored, of which an important one is the flexibilisation of the demand 
side.  
The importance of this measure for successfully completing the transition to low-carbon energy 
systems has been repeatedly publicised at European level by institutional players such as the 
European Commission (European Commission 2012, European Parliament 2009a, European 
Parliament 2012), ACER (ACER, 2014) and CEER (CEER 2011, CEER 2014). The contribution of 
demand flexibilisation to energy efficiency and market integration objectives, and the fact that it “can 
have a comparative advantage over other sources of flexibility in delivering flexibility at particular 
timescales” (Cambridge Economic Policy Associates et al., 2014), are both acknowledged and used 
as rationale for large-scale deployments of smart metering systems (European Commission, 2011c).  
However, there are still several concerns hindering the Europe-wide progress in response to the 
Energy Efficiency Directive requirements. A report issued by the Smart Energy Demand Coalition in 
2014 found that only a few European countries “have reached a level where Demand Response is a 
commercially viable product offering”, while in others the regulatory framework “remain[s] an issue 
and hinder[s] market growth” (SEDC, 2014). Further reservations arise from the economic 
uncertainties of the future, as Demand Side Response (DSR) “competes with electricity storage, 
higher flexibility generation, and interconnection to provide flexibility services. The value of DSR 
depends upon the cost and usage of these other sources of flexibility. Developments in wind 
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forecasting will also affect the value that demand flexibility services can provide.” (Cambridge 
Economic Policy Associates et al., 2014).  
Despite the numerous studies on the qualitative and quantitative estimations of the benefits and 
challenges of Demand-Side Flexibility (DSF) measures and the open discussions, targets and 
strategy recommendations, it remains difficult for most Member States and at European level to 
assess the future worth of DSF and its position among other flexibility options. As long as there is no 
overall optimisation and prioritisation of the flexibilisation options either at European or national level, 
it is hazardous to predict the extent to which DSF will be relevant to the transmission system 
operation. 
1.4 Policies, markets and the system operation 
Before liberalisation, electricity systems were required to be reliable and to provide electricity at fair 
and reasonable prices. When competition was introduced, first at generation level and for large 
industrial customers, later on for all customers, electricity systems were required to provide the 
physical infrastructure for the development of efficient wholesale and retail markets. Market rules 
and system operational rules had to be defined in order to enable transparent, non-discriminatory 
and efficient interactions among market agents, market operators and system operators, while 
ensuring the appropriate reliability and quality of service standards. 
In different countries, different market models, different system operation models and different 
approaches to competition were adopted with differing results. 
Today, both EU public policies and national public policies require electricity systems to contribute to 
the development of a low-carbon economy. This means basically that: 
1. Electricity generation must be increasingly based on low-carbon primary energy 
sources (“green electricity”). 
2. The electricity system as a whole must improve its (technical and environmental) 
efficiency. 
3. The electricity system could help other sectors – e.g. industry and transport – to 
reduce their carbon emissions. 
 
The consequence of 3) is that electricity should increase its share of total final energy demand; 
therefore, the electricity industry is a potential winner of the transition to a low-carbon economy, 
while other industries, namely coal and oil, would be losers (assuming no viable Carbon Capture & 
Storage). 
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The consequence of 1) and 2) is that the electricity industry should undergo a deep structural 
change. This impacts not only the generation mix, the demand participation and system operation, 
but also the market design and the interaction between market operators and system operators. 
Changes in one area – say, the generation mix and generation profile – have a substantial impact 
upon all other areas. The problem one faces is a system of equations with several dependent and 
independent variables. A large number of solutions are technically feasible, although the associated 
economic, social and environmental costs (and benefits) are not equivalent for each and every 
solution.  
Advanced information and communication technologies, exhibiting increasing performances and 
decreasing costs, help to solve the problem but, at the same time, they introduce new opportunities, 
new variables that can also increase the complexity of the basic problem to be solved: how to 
manage an efficient transition to low-carbon electricity systems? 
Technology developments, as well as social behaviour, economic environments and financial 
markets are characterised by considerable uncertainties. The “energy transition” is therefore a highly 
political and institutional process, requiring several clear cut political options. However, in order to 
identify, compare and select different political options, it is key to have clear, comprehensive views 
about their implications for the way electricity markets and an electricity system operation may or 
may not be organised.  
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1.5 Three scenarios for the evolution of the European electricity system 
Based on the analysis of the current legal and regulatory framework (Section 1.2), the driving forces 
behind the transition to low-carbon electricity systems (Section 1.3) and the conceivable interactions 
between operational and market changes (Section 1.4), three basic scenarios can be identified. 
These scenarios correspond to three “ideal types”, not to the “most likely outcomes”. They are 
represented in a schematic form in Figure 23. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 14: Three scenarios for the evolution of the European electricity system 
 
a) Scenario A: Lower decarbonisation within a pan-European system 
For many years, several industry decision makers and academics considered that EU and national 
energy and climate policies could be accepted if, and only if, they were compatible with operational 
and market arrangements put in place over the previous two decades to accomplish the internal 
electricity market – i.e., full integration. This approach corresponds to scenario A in Figure 23: in a 
very strict interpretation, it may lead to increased European electricity integration, but it can hardly 
contribute to a higher level of decarbonisation, under the assumption that the legacy operational and 
market structures cannot accommodate the technological and behavioral changes required in low-
carbon electricity systems. Table 3 describes the main characteristics of this scenario A. 
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The need to achieve the internal market 
in electricity 
Large amount of intermittent RES connected to the network 
DER and Smart grid 
technologies impact on the 
distribution level 
Network maintenance and 
expansion 
1. Higher priority is given to cross-border interconnection projects instead of the development of 
national transmission networks 
2. There are obstacles created by investment shortages and acceptance issues  
Connection of grid users 3. Intermittent RES generation plants are not completely free in their locational decisions 
4. It may disregard the 
potential positive effects of 
innovative solutions (smart 
grids, prosumers, etc.) 
System operation 
5. More efficient system operation at European level 
6. Better use within the region of the intermittent RES located far from consumption centers 
7. Reduction of system operation costs. Reduced need for additional generation capacity 
8. Reduced need for load 
management and storage 
systems 
Interface with other TSOs 9. Coordination challenges between TSOs in the network expansion planning and system operation 
 
Interface with other actors 
(DSOs, market operation) 
10. More integration and coordination of intraday and balancing markets 
 
Table 3: Main characteristics of scenario A: Lower decarbonisation within a pan-European system 
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b) Scenario B: Higher decarbonisation within existing MS systems 
In scenario B, EU Member States basically attempt to meet their respective 
decarbonisation targets at national level. Each Member State implements its own 
energy policy that translates, i.e., into a particular electricity generation mix, imposing 
specific requirements upon markets, the system operation and interactions between 
them. In this scenario, like in scenario C, there is no real motivation to expand cross-
border trade; however, the “inertia” of current EU arrangements should keep the 
integration acquis at the present level. 
Table 4 describes the main characteristics of this B scenario. 
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The need to achieve the internal market 
in electricity 
Large amount of intermittent RES connected to the network 
DER and Smart grid 
technologies impact on the 
distribution level 
Network maintenance and 
expansion 
1. Higher priority of national 
projects instead of cross-border 
interconnections 
2. Further development of the national transmission networks 
3. There are obstacles created by investment shortages and 
acceptance issues 
 
Connection of grid users 
 
4. Intermittent RES generation plants are not completely free in 
their locational decisions 
5. It may disregard the 
potential positive effects 
of innovative solutions 
(smart grids, prosumers, 
etc.) 
System operation 
 
6. More efficient system operation at national level 
7. Better use within the country of the intermittent RES located 
far from consumption centers 
8. Reduction of system operation costs. Reduced need for 
additional generation capacity and redispatch measures 
9. Reduced need for load 
management and storage 
systems 
Interface with other TSOs 
10. Low coordination in the network 
maintenance and expansion, and 
system operation tasks 
  
Interface with other actors 
(DSOs, market operation) 
11. Low integration and low coordination 
of intraday and balancing markets   
 
Table 4: Main characteristics of scenario B: Higher decarbonisation within existing MS systems 
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c) Scenario C: Higher decarbonisation within decentralized systems 
Several pilot projects on “micro grids”, “smart cities” and similar “bottom-up” 
concepts, carried out in several countries, aim at reaching, at local level, “carbon-
free” or “near carbon-free” electricity systems. If generalised, this approach, 
corresponding to scenario C in Figure 23, leads to very high degrees of 
decarbonisation while, at the same time, reduces the scope for non-local trade – 
even more so for cross-border trade, thus de facto decreasing the integration of 
national markets at EU level. Table 5 describes the main characteristics of this C 
scenario. 
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 The need to achieve the 
internal market in 
electricity 
Large amount of intermittent RES connected to 
the network 
DER and Smart grid technologies 
impact on the distribution level 
Network maintenance 
and expansion 
 1. High investments in new information and communication, monitoring and distribution 
grid reinforcements 
2. Strong competition for investments between new technologies in the distribution grid 
and expansion of the transmission network 
Connection of grid 
users 
 3. Significant increment in the DER connected to the distribution grid 
System operation 
 4. Higher degree of self-sufficiency for local networks (micro-grids, isolated grids) 
5. Higher range of flexibility options in the system due to the high penetration of DER 
6. The transmission grid is necessary to ensure the security of supply 
Interface with other 
TSOs 
   
Interface with other 
actors (DSOs, market 
operation) 
 7. Need of more interaction between TSOs and DSOs 
8. Coordination challenges in the system operation between TSOs and DSOs 
9. Better definition of the responsibilities between TSOs and DSOs 
 
Table 5: Main characteristics of scenario C: Higher decarbonisation within decentralised systems 
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d) Energy Union 
The main purpose of the “Energy Union” supported both by the Council and the Commission 
is to reconcile decarbonisation and market integration along the path depicted in Figure 14, 
enabling the active participation of actors at all levels of the Electricity Union electricity 
system. 
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2. The role of transmission networks in a low-carbon energy landscape – 
Hardware functions 
The three scenarios for the evolution of the European electricity systems are not intended as 
likely future scenarios. They are deliberately/purposely extreme scenarios. That way, it is 
easier to derive the most important possible evolutions of TSO functions. Conclusions are 
then not blurred by the complexity of reality. Moreover, not only are the 3 scenarios ideal in a 
conceptual manner, but this “analytical abstraction” is also reinforced by our construction of 
an “ideally rational” framework for each of these scenarios. For a straightforward analysis, we 
indeed assume that all transmission system operation functions are efficiently adapted to 
each scenario, aligning with the location and nature of flexibility resources and network 
constraints. It has an even stronger implication since the analysis of these conceptual 
scenarios doesn’t reveal anything of how a hybrid scenario (see section 4) will absorb the 
novelties.  
Meanwhile, the idea remains to produce recommendations for the possible and realistic 
future evolution of the TSO functions. Consequently, after the analysis of the possible 
evolutions of TSO functions in extreme scenarios, two steps will be required to reach 
conclusive recommendations (see section 4). First, a consistency check of scenarios will be 
needed, to ensure that each scenario allows the functions performed today by TSOs to 
continue in order to ensure reliability and system security, avoiding any black hole. 
Furthermore, hybrids of extreme scenarios should be considered for two main reasons. First 
of all, even if the characteristics of a future power system (in 2030 or 2050) are unknown, 
they may nevertheless be bounded by the characteristics of extreme scenarios. Besides, by 
nature, the existing power systems do not fit with any of the extreme scenarios but are 
already hybrid both in their architecture and in their functioning.  
The first step in our framework is to analyse the possible evolutions of the TSO functions 
under the three extreme scenarios, scenario A of lower decarbonisation within a pan-
European system, scenario B of higher decarbonisation within existing Member States 
systems, and scenario C of higher decarbonisation within decentralised systems. In this 
regard, this Chapter focuses on the possible evolutions of hardware TSO functions, namely 
the first connection of grid users, second network expansion and maintenance, and third ICT 
investment. Chapter 3 will then focus on the transformation of the software functions.  
2.1 Connecting the dots – connection of network users … 
Network operators must take into account the characteristics of the network users in order to 
connect them in an efficient and reliable manner. For instance, as more and more generators 
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and loads are asynchronous (producing with DC or asynchronous turbines) and therefore 
getting connected through a DC/AC converter to the AC network, this characteristic must be 
taken into account in connection requirements41. The characteristics of the load are also 
evolving. New types of load, such as the electric vehicle are expected to be able to provide 
flexibility and reserves, if not storage capacity. Meanwhile, the existing load can also be 
retrofitted to become more flexible 42 . Overall, some scenarios dramatically change the 
characteristics of network users compared to those of today. This can be analysed 
considering the characteristics of generators, namely:  
 Their notional size, and thus the voltage level (transmission or distribution level) they 
connect to. 
 The locational constraints of good quality resources, but dispersed location of poorer 
quality resources (wind and PV, storage with different technologies – centralised 
pump hydro storage versus decentralised batteries). 
 Their synchronous or asynchronous nature compared to the network frequency, 
hence naturally providing inertia to the power system and the frequency reserve in 
the first case (e.g. conventional generators – thermal, hydro or nuclear power plants) 
or being connected to the synchronous network through a DC/AC converter (for wind 
or PV generators, batteries or new asynchronous pump hydro storage). 
 Their level of predictability over time.  
 Their flexibility (at given output level – in particular for variable generators) and ability 
to provide network services (e.g. reserves, reactive power or black-start43).  
With this regard, it is also important to distinguish the design of rules for connection and the 
responsibility of connection operation. Indeed, each DSO can be in charge of the connection 
operation of dispersed generators on its (distribution) grid, but a broader system view is 
needed to define the rules because they impact upon the generation and load balance, 
frequency control, black start, and voltage control on the transmission grid. Although different 
organisations may be employed for the operation of connection in the different scenarios, the 
process for producing connection rules should be similar in all scenarios, even if participants 
                                                             
 
41 Remember that the classical power grid technology is alternative current (AC), vibrating at 50 Hz in Europe. It was adopted 
for two reasons. First, it was found to be easy to step up or down the voltage level with transformers between transmission and 
distribution grids. Second, it was also found easy to develop protection and switchgears on this technology because the current 
value is zero 100 times in one second. Generators can be synchronous, generating electricity with the same frequency as the 
power network, or asynchronous and then producing energy to a different possibly variable frequency. A third way to produce 
and even transmit electricity is to rely on an alternative technology for the power grid, to direct current (DC) with stable values. 
42 Note that the ability of the load to become flexible depends on its usage, that it can be postponed, rely on another form of 
energy (e.g. heating with wood or a dual fuel heater), or with energy that can be stored (for instance in the form of heat, cold or 
in an electrochemical form). 
43 Reactive power helps to maintain the local voltage level on the AC power network. As for black-start, it is a service provided 
by some generators that are able to start up, even if the network is blacked-out, relying on an ancillary diesel generator.  
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will differ from one scenario to another. Indeed, in all scenarios, considering the system-wide 
impact of connection rules, they should be defined at this global higher level. Although the 
TSO is one of the most impacted actors in the power system by the definition of connection 
rules (if not the most impacted one), it should not, however, set them unilaterally in order to 
avoid conflicts of interest. Consequently, as today, existing procedures for discussing the 
connection rules should be reinforced and adapted to generation at local level. Connection 
rules should be discussed by all the stakeholders (broadly speaking and irrespective of the 
scenarios), transmission and distribution grid users, TSOs and DSOs and regulators. As for 
the other rules in the power system, the regulator should organise the discussion to set these 
rules with the philosophy of a reflexive governance platform (Brousseau and Glachant, 2011). 
That way, each of the stakeholders can share its view on the required set of rules (in this 
case, connection) with the others. The regulator should then set the rules after identifying 
their pros and cons, benefits and costs from the discussions with and between the 
stakeholders. In this regard, the scenarios will differ for the main stakeholders participating in 
these discussions to set the connection rules.  
And lastly, transmission tariffs may also be transformed in the different scenarios. Indeed, 
depending on them, geographical differentiations of transmission tariffs encompassing cost-
reflectiveness may bring efficiency, more or less, and equity among the network users. The 
cost recovery of stranded assets may also be up for debate in some scenarios.  
2.1.1 …in scenario A of lower decarbonisation within a pan-European system 
In an extreme scenario of a power system becoming much more integrated at EU level, but 
missing the decarbonisation goal (because of relying only on centralised renewable 
resources), we cannot expect major change for connections to the network. The sources for 
power and network services will still mainly connect to the transmission grid or, to a far 
smaller extent, to the distribution grid (as it is today in most of the European countries). 
Connection requirements will be very similar to those that we know today, all the more as 
there has already been an effort to harmonise it at a European scale with the grid codes 
concerning connection (namely requirements for generators, demand connection and HVDC 
connection). If this effort is to be pursued, it will mainly take place between the conventional 
centralised generators connected to the transmission grid, local control centers of the (one or 
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two) European ISO(s) (similar to the today's TSOs), with these discussions framed by a 
European regulator44. 
Meanwhile, the location of generators will more likely impact their profitability since a pan-
European system will bring more competitive pressure. It should also be noted that the 
location of generators and the resulting cross-border flows are the main drivers of network 
expansion (see the last TYNDP, ENTSO-E, 2014). Consequently, it will be more efficient for 
the generators to pay a significant share of the network costs in this regard. Indeed, it is only 
with this condition that the generators will take the network cost into account while doing 
arbitrage with other locational costs (siting, access to primary energy and cold sources, costs 
arising from public opinion, etc. – see Olmos Camacho 2006)45 . The generators pay a 
transmission tariff reflecting the impact of the network cost. It is important for consumers to 
agree with the needed transmission tariff evolution (as the global cost will inevitably go up). 
Otherwise, EU consumers may feel they pay for costs they do not trigger and might oppose 
the required efficient network investments.  
2.1.2 … in scenario B of higher decarbonisation within existing Member States systems 
If a higher level of decarbonisation is achieved within existing Member States systems, 
generators will both connect to the distribution and transmission grids depending on their 
centralised or dispersed nature. In this extreme scenario, generation should be focusing on 
big units with fewer drivers for the development of small units, a certain amount of flexibility 
may also arise from consumers, mostly big ones connected to the transmission grid, but also, 
to a limited extent, smaller consumers connected to the distribution grid. Then, because of 
network users connecting either to the transmission grid or to the distribution grid depending 
on their size, and all the more because of the interconnected nature of the transmission grid, 
the stakeholders participating in the discussion to set the connection rules should include all 
the network users but also the national TSO, and DSOs46. It is only with the participation of 
                                                             
 
44 We will see in section 3 that the organisation of the power sector should be dramatically modified in this scenario with an 
important ISOfication of transmission system operation. One (or two) European ISO(s) should then be settled and national 
transmission owners will remain unless some of them merge. To which extent a national level remains will have to be assessed 
to keep the power system manageable. An EU ISO would be based on a multilayer control system extended at EU level 
encompassing the existing national and regional levels. The TSOs will then remain as Transmission Owners (TOs).  
45 It is sometimes argued that network tariffs paid by generators introduce distortion in the energy market. To the contrary, it is 
rather the exemption of network tariffs or uniform network tariffs for generators that distorts competition. For instance, 
generators pay (or do not pay) the same tariff whether they are close or far from consumers and so require a network service 
with almost no cost, on the one hand, and high cost on the other hand. Moreover, the network tariff will be all the more 
distortive that they are expressed in €/MW and not in €/MWh because they are then a fixed cost and not a variable cost for the 
network users.  
46 Note that, to simplify the discussion, we assume that there is only one TSO per Member State. They are, indeed, generally 
national entities, even if in some of the Member States, several TSOs operate different parts of the transmission grid, the most 
emblematic situation with this regard being in Germany.  
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all these stakeholders that the connection rules will ensure the reliable management of the 
interconnected power system. In this scenario with a national focus, these discussions should 
be framed by the national regulator.  
The TSO will then ensure that despite the asynchronous nature of several generators and 
some loads (e.g. electric transportation), the management of the almost instantaneous 
balance between generation and load and frequency remains reliable and without partial 
disruption of synchronisation. The TSO will also require that these generators, even if more 
dispersed and volatile than the conventional generators today, can nevertheless provide 
network services to maintain the frequency at 50 Hertz, to produce reactive power helping to 
control the voltage level on the transmission grid, or to be able to black start in order to help 
the system restoration after a black-out. This is at least partially already included in the grid 
codes for connection (in particular the requirements for generation, demand connection and 
HVDC – this later one is not adopted yet). 
In this scenario, network costs are expected to increase dramatically. Tariffs with 
geographical differentiation for the generators could then prompt them to locate more 
efficiently, taking into account not only other locational costs (siting, access to primary energy 
– and cold – sources, costs arising from public opinion, etc.), but also the network cost 
triggered by their connection and use (see, for instance, the project TransmiT led by OFGEM 
(2014) to reform the locational transmission tariff in Great-Britain to take into account the 
evolution of the energy mix with the integration of more renewable generators). As already 
mentioned in scenario A, the generators paying a transmission tariff reflecting their impact of 
the network cost is important for consumers to agree the required and efficient network 
investments. In scenario B, it is also important for the consumers to agree on higher 
decarbonisation and its impact on network costs. A cost-reflective tariff allows each network 
user is to pay its share of network costs according to its own impact on the grid. This applies 
to the generators whether they are connected to the transmission or the distribution grids. 
The distribution tariff could itself take different values for different connection points or 
locations. Compared to a situation with no cost-reflective transmission tariffs at the national 
scale, the need for transmission investment (and distribution investment) could be reduced to 
some extent because the generators will then take into account the network cost and their 
other locational costs (siting, access to primary energy and cold sources, costs arising from 
public opinion, etc.) in deciding where to locate. The locational differentiation of the tariff 
could also apply to the biggest consumers because they also have some flexibility of location.  
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2.1.3 … in scenario C of higher decarbonisation within decentralised systems 
If higher decarbonisation is achieved within decentralised systems, generators and 
consumers will be mainly connected to the distribution grid, and therefore by the DSO. 
Meanwhile, because of the interconnected nature of the transmission grid, even at the 
national scale and all the more at the European scale, the stakeholders participating in the 
discussion to set the connection rules should include all network users, the national TSO and 
DSOs. It is only with the participation of all these stakeholders that a reliable management of 
the interconnected power system will be ensured, in order to avoid that any local norm could 
endanger the management of the interconnected power system. Considering the 
decentralised nature of this (extreme) scenario and the need for a certain degree of 
harmonisation, these discussions should be framed by the national regulators. An extreme 
version of system decentralisation is the mushrooming of self-managed, independent, 
unregulated “micro-grids” and “load pockets”. However, it is not necessary to enter further 
into it, since it may be assumed that entirely independent –hence autarkic - new energy 
systems will not organically interact with the national or pan-European system levels. 
We can then expect that the connection requirements will be very similar whether higher 
decarbonisation is led at a national scale (scenario B), or within decentralised systems 
(scenario C). 
In this scenario, transmission network tariffs do not impact the location of new generators 
because these are located on the distribution grid, and so primarily pay this local tariff. 
Meanwhile, it would be efficient to implement a more-cost reflective tariff and with deeper 
geographical differentiation, so that microgrids can only develop when it is efficient at a more 
global level. Indeed, in a situation as today where transmission tariffs are uniform, the 
network users who have the higher incentive to see the development of microgrids are 
consumers located on the distribution grid, and using the transmission network to a lesser 
extent (because they are very close, for instance, to a generator being inserted/introduced 
into the transmission grid). Consequently, they pay a relatively high transmission tariff 
compared to the transmission grid service they need. In this situation, the development of a 
microgrid allows them to pay a smaller transmission bill. To the contrary, if they were paying 
a cost-reflective transmission tariff, this tariff would be aligned with their use of the network 
and, other things being equal, they would have a smaller incentive to see the development of 
a microgrid. Consequently, the more cost-reflective transmission tariff with locational 
differentiations would only allow microgrids to develop when they are efficient, and not 
because of a regressive incentive arising from badly shaped, non cost-reflective and 
inefficient transmission tariffs. This also raises the issue of the cost recovery of stranded 
assets (see section 2.2.3) because this recovery prevents transmission tariffs from being 
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cost-reflective. On the one hand, the TSO could reasonably desire to recover the cost of its 
stranded assets to maintain its overall financeability. On the other hand, by doing so, the 
TSO distorts the transmission tariff incentives and prevents the tariff from being cost-
reflective, which pushes for the development of microgrids, further increasing the amount of 
stranded assets and fuelling this vicious circle, out of any efficient rationale. A solution for the 
TSO could impair its stranded (now useless) assets to make the transmission more cost-
reflective and reset conditions for an efficient development of microgrids. Meanwhile, these 
stranded assets could be covered by a kind of public compensation to maintain the TSO 
financial equilibrium.  
2.1.4 Comparing the grid connection function in the three scenarios 
The table below sums up the possible transformation of the transmission grid connection 
function in the three scenarios.  
 
 
Scenarios 
 
Aspects  
of transmission  
grid connection  
function 
Lower decarbonisation 
within a pan-European 
system 
Higher decarbonisation 
within existing Member 
States systems 
Higher decarbonisation 
within decentralised 
systems 
Connection rules Consultation process integrating all the interested parties under the supervision of the regulators (as today) 
Connection operation Mainly TOs
47  (and 
possibly DSOs) 
DSOs and national 
TSO DSOs 
Stakeholders 
participating in the 
discussion to elaborate 
connection rules 
European ISO(s), 
national TOs (possibly 
DSOs) and centralised 
network users 
National TSO, DSOs, 
distribution and 
transmission network 
users 
National TSO, DSOs, 
distribution (and 
transmission) network 
users 
Transmission tariffs 
Need to be more cost-reflective with locational differentiations and a tariff 
structure aligned with the network cost structure to reflect the impact of 
network users on network costs With impairment of 
stranded assets 
 
Table 6: Grid connection function in the three scenarios  
 
                                                             
 
47 Transmission Owners 
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Whatever the scenario, we can notice that the process setting the connection rules should 
include the TSO (whether it is a national one or a European one) and the network users. 
DSOs could also participate (when resources of generation and flexibility develop on the 
distribution grid). Similarly, in all the scenarios, it is worth making the transmission tariffs 
more cost-reflective with a real geographical differentiation to incentivise the location of 
generators; to the extreme of impairing the stranded assets in the scenario of higher 
decarbonisation within decentralised systems. Inversely, the connection operation will move 
from TSOs to DSOs as the power system is more decarbonised and decentralised.  
2.2 Merging the meshes – network expansion and maintenance … 
The characteristics of the network users (voltage connection, location, synchronous or 
asynchronous nature, predictability, flexibility) deeply vary from one scenario to another. For 
instance, generators may be getting more and more dispersed (with decentralised 
generators), more and more variable with uncertain outcomes (with wind and PV generators). 
These characteristics of network users will inevitably change their use of the transmission 
network, that may be more dispersed and variable in our illustrative example. As a 
consequence, the network operators must take all this into account to plan, develop and 
maintain their assets efficiently (with this regard, see the last TYNDP by ENTSO-E in 2014). 
2.2.1 … in scenario A of lower decarbonisation within a pan-European system 
In this scenario of a pan-European system, new generators, some of them being renewable 
or having the flexible use of storage capacity, are all assumed to be centralised (either big 
wind or PV farms, or biomass generators; etc.). This makes decarbonisation lower than in the 
other scenarios. We can also assume that they have the possibility but not the obligation to 
be flexibilised (spilling energy in case of excess production, providing reserves or relying on 
local storage capacity). Connected at the transmission grid level, they are hence competing 
with centralised classical resources still remaining in the system such as “CO2 compliant” 
thermal, hydro or nuclear generators. The consumers are assumed to be just a bit more 
flexible than today.  
In this scenario, national imbalances persist on the European transmission network, similar to 
what we know today, with some countries producing (respectively consuming) more energy 
than others. As a result, a major swing of energy can flow through the European network 
over time (intraday, between days, weeks, months, seasons or years) and space (between 
regions), depending on the load profiles and the national energy mixes (e.g. with national 
focus respectively and possibly on nuclear, gas, coal, hydro or renewable energy sources).  
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In this pan-European scenario, flows on the transmission grid are expected to increase by a 
huge amount and to be more volatile across the whole European power grid. The network 
planning should then be done at the adequate geographical scale, meaning at the European 
scale, by a European System Operator, as if there was only the ENTSO-E TYNDP preparing 
transmission investment planning. Moreover, a higher amount of transmission assets at the 
European level than currently experienced will be required. The last ENTSO-E TYNDP from 
2014 is an example of what may be experienced in such an EU-first scenario. One main 
implication in regulatory terms is that any regulatory authority acting within this scenario 
should carefully consider the financeability of transmission owners when regulating their 
revenue, since a lot of the existing TSOs (assumed to stay alive in an EU ISO frame as 
“Transmission Owners”) have already reached a high level of gearing (Henriot, 2014), at 
least in the Western part of Europe (Roland Berger, 2011).  
Considering the NIMBY effects and the resulting difficulty to find new rights-of-way, a shift will 
be needed toward new and non-conventional transmission technologies. For example, 
“phase shifters” and “FACTS”48 offer new ways of optimising the capacity and use of existing 
assets. “High capacity conductors” (for extension or refurbished assets) will also provide 
more transmission capacity. If technological difficulties are overcome and locations are found 
for vast current conversion stations, the wider use of DC technologies could permit more 
lines to be buried49. Meanwhile, these technologies may still be more expensive than the 
conventional AC technologies to develop and renew the transmission network. Consequently, 
investment decisions may be more difficult to trigger because cost-benefit analyses with 
positive outcomes will be more difficult to produce. Besides, these technologies are not yet 
widely used by the TSOs. They consequently encompass industrial risks (problems to 
integrate them, problems to use them in the existing network, the unexpected interaction with 
other components in the network, etc.). This makes their integration more difficult and more 
risky in an industrial perspective in a power system whose reliability is fundamental for the 
whole economy. Besides, the asynchronous nature of some grid technologies (FACTS or DC 
lines and DC/AC converters) and generators will create a new risk of the synchronisation 
disruption of frequency on the interconnected network. This may make it harder, if not 
sometimes impossible, to integrate these technologies in some parts of the AC 
interconnected network50.  
                                                             
 
48 FACTS (Flexible AC Transmission Systems) are power electronics devices used to control power flows, voltage or dynamic 
stability of the power network.  
49 AC cables can only be buried for tens of kilometres while DC cables can easily be buried for hundreds of kilometres.  
50 For instance, the use of DC lines to increase the capacity of transmission grid in Normandy in France to evacuate energy 
produced by the future nuclear EPR generator was not possible because of the inherent risk of synchronisation disruption.  
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In this scenario, flows from the transmission grid to the distribution network could increase 
and important investments of transformers and substations could also be required if 
sustained economic growth returns and increases demand for electricity at the distribution 
level.  
In this EU-first scenario, the organisation of network maintenance will also change with the 
scope of flows calculation being set at a European scale. More coordination between the 
network owners on widespread cross-border areas will then be required to realise the 
maintenance operation while allowing major pan-European transits. Locally and temporarily, 
this may create important constraints on the European network, which may still require 
additional investments.  
2.2.2 … in scenario B of higher decarbonisation within existing Member States systems 
In scenario B of higher decarbonisation within existing Members States systems, new 
generators, mainly renewable ones or storage capacity, are assumed to be either centralised 
(big wind or PV farms, biomass generators) or dispersed ones (small windmills or PV 
rooftops, heat pumps), respectively connected to the transmission or distribution grids. They 
are also assumed to be flexibilised (spilling energy in case of excess production, providing 
reserves or still relying on a smaller local storage capacity). They are competing with 
centralised classical resources still remaining in the system (nuclear generators, gas power 
plants, etc.). The consumers are themselves assumed to be flexible and demand response is 
more developed than today.  
In this scenario, the local imbalance persists on the transmission network, similar to what we 
know today at the national scale with areas producing (respectively consuming) more energy 
than others. As a result, a major swing of energy flows can happen on the transmission 
network over time (intraday, between days, weeks, months, seasons or years) and space 
(between national regions), depending on the exploited renewable resources and the 
effective production of renewable generators (e.g. from windy or non-windy / sunny or non-
sunny / wet or dry seasons). Since energy mixes were only developed at the national scale, 
cross-border transits might be limited and far in distance for overall efficiency in this scenario.  
Flows on the transmission grid are hence expected to increase in a huge amount and to be 
more volatile at the national scale. Note also, that the new sources of energy will not be 
located in the same places as the older generators. However, the flows of exchange at the 
European level are not expected to be high in this case, since the national decarbonisation is 
here assumed to be realised with a national focus. The network planning should then be 
done at the policy driven geographical scale, meaning at the national scale, as if there were 
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only National Development Plans, realised by each TSO as it is today. A higher amount of 
transmission assets at the national level than currently experienced will then be required. The 
regulators should then be very careful about the financeability of TSOs, since a lot of them 
have already reached a high level of gearing (Henriot, 2014; Roland Berger, 2011). 
Considering the NIMBY effects and the resulting difficulty of finding new rights-of-way, a shift 
will then be needed toward non-conventional transmission technologies, with the same 
advantages and drawbacks as the ones exposed in scenario A. They will offer more transit 
capacity at the national scale while overcoming the Not In My Back-Yard (NIMBY) effect, but 
present higher costs and industrial interaction risks, making them more difficult to justify in a 
cost-benefit analysis.  
Knowing that decarbonisation could push for electrification of some energy uses (electric 
transportation, heating, cooling, etc.), flows from the transmission grid to the distribution 
network could increase, and important investments of transformers and substations could 
also be required, all the more if sustained economic growth was also to return.  
In this scenario, the organisation of maintenance will also be impacted by the characteristics 
of network users and resulting flows on the transmission grid. In particular, the volatility of 
flows on the transmission grid will require the maintenance operation to be scheduled or 
rescheduled at the very last minute, or to push for more online maintenance so that the 
network operation is less disturbed. Locally and temporarily, it may also create important 
constraints on the network. This may still require additional network investments. Flexible 
resources of network users (demand response or spilling of renewable energy) may also be 
more solicited. Temporary and mobile stationary storage capacity or network assets (e.g. 
capacitors or FACTS) could also be used to cope with those local and temporary constraints. 
2.2.3 … in scenario C of higher decarbonisation within decentralised systems 
Scenario C of higher decarbonisation within decentralised systems is characterised by 
generators and loads as follows. Generators are supposed to be dispersed, relying on local 
resources (wind, photovoltaic, biomass, geothermal, etc.) close to consumers. Generators 
are also assumed to be flexibilised (allowing energy spills in case of excess production, or 
relying on storage in the case of an energy shortage and generally providing reserves). The 
consumers are themselves assumed to be very flexible; and decentralised storage is 
supposed to be widely spread. As a consequence, the power system is made of almost 
autonomous (but not strictly autarkic) microgrids. 
The result is that flows on the transmission grid are reduced. That is what is already 
searched for, e.g. with some smart cities or "eco-district" targeting energy self-supply 
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(Steinbeis-Europa-Zentrum, 2014). As a consequence, in this scenario, there is no more 
need to develop the network and only a small number of ageing assets need to be renewed 
(depending on the result of a cost-benefit analysis of renewed assets compared to 
decommissioning assets). The transmission network asset base is hence shrinking when it is 
still useful, not only at the national level, but also at the European level. To the extreme, this 
trend has already produced some grid defections (The Rocky Mountain Institute, 2014 and 
2015). In this extreme situation, the network might even become useless. Transmission 
planning (even if focused on renewal in the scenario) should then be done at the national 
scale considering the limited need for cross-border assets. As already highlighted concerning 
the tariffs in this scenario (section 2.1.3), the regulator should manage a possible impairment 
of stranded assets, in particular to make transmission tariffs more cost-reflective and to 
ensure that microgrids develop only when it is socially efficient to do so.  
Maintenance must also be adapted in this scenario compared to the current situation. Since 
the transmission grid is less used compared to the current situation, it is less subject to 
operational constraints and maintenance scheduling is less of a problem. Possibly, 
coordination may be required with the DSOs if maintenance on the distribution grids would 
require a higher reliance on the transmission grid to supply, balance or evacuate power from 
the maintained part of the network.  
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2.2.4 Comparing the network expansion and maintenance function in the three scenarios 
The table below sums up the possible transformation of the network expansion and 
maintenance function of the transmission in the three scenarios.  
 
 
 
Scenarios 
Aspects  
of network  
expansion & 
maintenance function 
Lower decarbonisation 
within a pan-European 
system 
Higher decarbonisation 
within existing Member 
States systems 
Higher decarbonisation 
within decentralised 
systems 
Investment dynamics Transmission asset base increasing Transmission asset base shrinking 
MS Investment 
coordination 
Cross-border 
coordination for pan-
European projects 
None needed None needed 
Maintenance 
scheduling 
No change compared 
to actual management 
More uncertain 
because of volatile use 
of the network 
Easier because of a 
less used and 
constrained 
transmission grid 
Maintenance 
organisation 
Requiring cross-border 
coordination 
Requiring coordination 
between transmission 
and distribution system 
operators 
Possibly requiring 
coordination between 
transmission and 
distribution system 
operators 
 
Table 7: Network expansion and maintenance function in the three scenarios 
 
Contrasts between scenarios are high. In centralised scenarios (lower decarbonisation within 
a pan-European system versus higher decarbonisation within existing Member States 
systems), the transmission asset bases are expected to increase, raising financeability 
issues for TSOs and the question of adapted regulation. To the contrary, the transmission 
asset base should be shrinking in a scenario of decentralised systems. Coordination for 
investment or maintenance is rather needed in the pan-European scenario. And maintenance 
scheduling will be more uncertain in the scenario of higher decarbonisation within existing 
Member States because the network use will be more volatile.  
2.3 Managing the slots – provision of ICT for proper system operation 
Besides connecting, developing and maintaining the transmission grid, another fundamental 
function of a transmission grid is the system operation. If it is mainly a software function (see 
section 3), it requires also ICT assets, more precisely six main types:  
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1°, Measurement systems to collect information about the state of the power system and its 
different variables (frequency, voltage level, power flows, temperature of power lines and 
transformers, state of disruptors, wind force and sun irradiance, etc.).  
2°, Communication channels to exchange information and instructions with network users 
(generation and load forecast and real time levels, technical constraints and prices, orders to 
modify their power patters, etc.).  
3°, Computation tools to estimate and anticipate the future state of the power system and 
possible constraints from its current state variables and their potential evolutions.  
4°, Information systems for operating market platforms where different products will be 
exchanged between network users and with system operators.  
5°, Data storage for some of these pieces of information to be used later on for an ex post 
analysis or monitoring.  
6°, Devices ( “grid actuators with remote control”) that allow the system operator to modify 
the network configuration (changing transformers taps, connecting or disconnecting power 
lines, nodes, capacitors or inductors etc.) to adapt it to the need of network users.  
These six types of ICT assets needed for the system operation (measurement systems, 
communication channels, computation tools, information systems, data storage and remotely 
controlled grid actuators) can be developed either at the local scale, the national scale or the 
European scale. The most adapted and efficient solutions in this regard will vary from one 
scenario to another.  
As for the connection function, it is important to distinguish the informal process of discussing 
the pros and the cons of alternative rules for those ICT assets from the proper and formal 
responsibility of writing and issuing these rules. Indeed, the distribution operator can hence 
make its network smarter with more ICT, but rules should be elaborated considering the 
impact for all the interested stakeholders under the supervision of the regulator. Different 
stakeholders may then participate in the elaboration of rules for ICT assets and different 
organisations may then be implemented for the deployment of those assets in the different 
scenarios. 
2.3.1 … in scenario A of lower decarbonisation within a pan-European system 
In an extreme scenario of pan-European integration with lower decarbonisation, energy will 
be expected to flow throughout the whole European transmission grid. Consequently, 
optimisation of the network use should be realised at a European scale and the ICT 
investments should be adapted to this situation.  
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Since current measurement systems and remotely controlled actuators already allow for the 
management of power flows at national level, no specific large scale investment seem to be 
needed in this case. Only a reorganisation of the data collection would be needed at 
European scale. It is also worth noting that Wide Area Measurement Systems (WAMS), the 
last generation of large scale measurement systems, are already deployed in Europe and will 
continue to spread in order to have a synchronised view of frequency and major power flows 
over Europe51.  
In this scenario, with Europeanised power flows, it is obvious that it will be more efficient for 
computation tools and market platforms to be organised at a European level/ on a European 
scale. The same also applies to the organisation of data storage and communication 
channels. Besides, data formats are already common to a large extent, or being harmonised 
(e.g. with Common Information Model standards – CIM standards52). In this respect, if further 
standardisation is still needed, European bodies such as ENTSO-E and ACER will remain 
the nexus of the process.  
Computation tools, data storage or communication channels could be centralised in a unique 
entity, as is already done by the ISOs or RTOs in the USA. Coreso and TSC (Transmission 
Security Coordination) are also EU models of centralised computation tools and data storage, 
while the various TSOs remain in charge of the direct communication channels with the 
network users.  
Besides, even if the European scale clearly prevails in this scenario, it leaves different 
options open for the organisation of market platforms. For instance, a unique European 
market platform can be developed (for a given product – e.g. at the day-ahead stage – or 
several ones – e.g. both Day-Ahead and Intra-Day), or several platforms can be coupled and 
work shoulder to shoulder as a single entity. Those different solutions do not have the same 
resilience. Of course, solutions allowing redundancy will be more resilient. Redundancy can 
be at the same level, namely here, at the European scale. Redundancy can also be 
implemented at different levels, having sets of computation tools, data storage and 
communication systems both at the European and at the national level.  
2.3.2 … in scenario B of higher decarbonisation within existing Member States systems 
In an extreme scenario of higher decarbonisation realised at the scale of Member State 
systems, since the development of generation and flexibility sources (storage, demand 
                                                             
 
51 www.swissgrid.ch/swissgrid/en/home/reliability/wam.html  
52 www.entsoe.eu/major-projects/common-information-model-cim/Pages/default.aspx  
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response, etc.) is both located at the distribution and transmission levels, optimisation of 
these resources and the (distribution) grid configuration should be realised both at the local 
and national scale. It applies to the ICT investments.  
Measurement systems should then be installed at the distribution level to complete those 
already installed on the national transmission grid. With historically unidirectional flows, 
measurement systems in distribution networks were previously focused at the entry interface 
with the transmission network. Since flows on the distribution network will become 
bidirectional in this scenario, measurement systems should be spread all over the distribution 
grids themselves in order to know the local network transit margins compared to the flows. 
Besides, communication channels should also reach to the decentralised network users 
(generators or consumers). They will, indeed, provide flexibility to the distribution grid and to 
the transmission grid to the same extent as centralised flexibility sources (generators or 
demand response).  
Even if the management of the distribution system will become smarter and active in this 
scenario, the focus and nexus of the system operation will still remain at the transmission 
level. Hence, this situation raised a question about the most efficient organisation of 
computation tools and market platforms (for instance: centralised; but going down to the 
distribution level, or duplicating them at the distribution level). The same question arises for 
data storage (totally centralised or distributed between the transmission and distribution 
levels). An answer to this question may be determined by the ability of the national 
information system of the transmission grid to cope with the massive amount of information 
arising from the distribution system that should be managed in this scenario. The question of 
data handling should also be considered from a regulatory point of view (responsibility of data 
collection, data ownership, data accessibility, independency of data manager, etc.) and 
setting an EU principle with this consideration would allow the first corner stone of a 
European retail market to be raised.  
Whatever the chosen solution, the standardisation of the data format is fundamental to 
enable communication for an efficient, secure and reliable operation of both the transmission 
and distribution systems. In this respect, the system-wide scale will still be prevalent in the 
process to elaborate these standard requirements that local data formats should all adopt. 
That is why the supervision of this process by the regulator is fundamental. Considering that 
energy and network service providers will mainly compete at the transmission / wholesale 
level in this scenario, it will be harmful for the system reliability to let local data standards 
develop, even if they are partially interoperable with the main (transmission-centred) data 
standards.  
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With the connection of part of the new generators on the distribution grid, constraints should 
appear on the distribution grids. They should then become smarter to manage them, relying 
on remotely controlled actuators.  
2.3.3 … in scenario C of higher decarbonisation within decentralised systems 
In the decentralised scenario with higher decarbonisation, the development of generation and 
flexibility sources (storage, demand response, etc.) is local: on the distribution grids. 
Therefore optimisation of these resources and the (distribution) grid configuration should also 
be realised at the local level, like the ICT investments.  
Measurement systems should then be installed at the distribution level to complete those 
already installed on the transmission grid. Historically, they somewhat stopped at the 
interface between the transmission and the distribution levels. Information there was indeed 
sufficient to estimate the distribution network state because power flows were unidirectional 
on the distribution grid at that time. But the power flows will inevitably become bidirectional on 
the distribution grid in a scenario of higher decarbonisation within decentralised systems, and 
information at the interface between the transmission and distribution grids will say nothing 
about the network state of the latter.  
Communication channels should also reach the decentralised network users (generators or 
consumers), because they will be sources of flexibility for the power system (at the local level 
and at the interconnected level in last resort situations – see section 3.1 about the 
transformation of the system operation function).In addition to providing information on the 
state (power levels) of the network users, new ICT arrangements will also reveal their margin 
levels with regard to the different network services (power reserves for the interconnected 
transmission system, reactive power for the distribution grid, the dynamic ability to change 
their power levels, etc.).  
Since the bulk of the management of the power system will shift to the distribution level in this 
scenario (see section 3.1), it will be more efficient that computation tools and market 
platforms be localised at the local scale and duplicated in each distribution network. 
Consequently, it will also be more efficient for data storage to be organised at the local scale. 
Of course, the TSOs should still have computation tools and storage capability to manage 
their own grids and the residual and last resort generation and load balancing (see section 
3.1). That said, the computational capabilities of the TSO remains as it is today, with all the 
tools needed. Note also, that this organisation will ensure the resilience of the information 
system of the whole power grid. The information system of the distribution grid will, indeed, 
be mostly able to cope with any problem on the information system of the transmission grid. 
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Inversely, transmission ICT could partly rescue the information system of the distribution grid 
in case it experiences any problem, unless there is a redundancy of the information system of 
the distribution grid at the local scale.  
Even if the system operation will happen mainly at the distribution level, and only as a last 
resort at the transmission level, the standardisation of data format may still be required to 
enable a formatted and easy communication for those last resort situations. With this in mind, 
the system-wide scale will still be prevalent in the process to elaborate these standard 
requirements. That is why the supervision of this process by the regulator is fundamental. 
Since most of the energy will be locally exchanged, those standards can only be minimal 
requirements that local data formats should share, while DSOs can also complement them 
depending on their local needs and standards.  
Following the same rationale, since the core of the management of the power system will 
shift to the distribution level in this scenario, the distribution network should be smarter, with a 
more dynamic behaviour of local grids, relying on remotely controlled actuators. This would 
allow the distribution system operator to adapt the configuration of its grid to the generation 
and load patterns. It also has an organisational impact, as it will require the unbundling 
requirement (already imposed on TSO) to be extended to DSO to prevent any conflict of 
interest between network management and the related competitive activities.  
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2.3.4 Comparing the ICT investment function in the three scenarios 
The table below sums up the possible transformation of the ICT investment function in the 
three scenarios, in particular which entity should drive it.  
 
Scenarios 
 
 
Aspects  
of transmission  
grid connection  
function 
Lower decarbonisation 
within a pan-European 
system 
Higher decarbonisation 
within existing Member 
States systems 
Higher decarbonisation 
within decentralised 
systems 
Measurement systems 
One or two EU bodies 
responsible for system 
operation 
DSOs and national 
TSOs DSOs 
Communication 
channels 
Remotely controlled 
actuators  
Computation tools Different possible 
organisations between 
a European System 
Operator and national 
TSOs 
Different possible 
organisations between 
national DSOs & TSOs 
Mainly DSOs versus 
TSO for last resort 
action for the 
transmission system 
Market platforms 
Data storage 
 
Table 8: ICT investment function in the three scenarios 
 
To conclude: these ICT investments should be realised by the most suitable/appropriate 
entity, aligned with the geographical scope of each scenario (respectively the European, 
national or local one). Meanwhile, different organisations are possible for computation tools, 
market platforms and data storage in the centralised scenarios (namely with a lower 
decarbonisation within a pan-European system or a higher decarbonisation within existing 
Member States systems), from very centralised organisations managed by the operator with 
the larger geographical scope (respectively the European System Operator in scenario A and 
the national TSOs in scenario B) to organisations also relying on shared responsibility 
between different geographical scopes and system operators (respectively the European 
System Operator and national TSOs in scenario A; and the national TSOs and DSOs in 
scenario B). Whatever the scenario, it should be noticed that the digitalisation of the system 
operation and market operation will maintain the need for common standards for ICT to allow 
interoperability between the actors in the power system.    
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3. The role of transmission networks in a low-carbon energy landscape – 
Software functions 
Like the hardware functions, “software” functions of transmission and system operation will 
also experiment with transformations in the different scenarios. This section hence focuses 
on the possible evolutions of software TSO functions, namely the system operation and 
coordination between TSOs, as well as vertical interaction with other power system actors 
and institutional players.  
3.1 System operation and horizontal coordination between TSOs … 
Any change from the current situation to one of the three stylised scenarios would require a 
major transformation of the power system operation, and even these scenarios are quite 
different from each other. Transformation will impact not only day-ahead and intraday 
markets, but also balancing and reserves markets. The definition of energy and reserves 
products should adapt to each scenario (including the definition of price zones and the 
organisation of the dispatch – being self-dispatch versus central dispatch).  
Moreover, the liberalisation process has shown that horizontal coordination between TSOs 
has been one, if not the, key success factor. Since the different stylised scenarios do not 
entice the same degree of interconnectivity between the TSOs, one should then expect 
different organisations for the coordination of TSOs in each scenario.  
3.1.1 … in scenario A of lower decarbonisation within a pan-European system 
A major transformation that should arise in the pan-European scenario should be the system 
operation. If this scenario was to happen, it would require that the system operation be no 
longer organised at the national scale but at a European level. Of course, it would rely on the 
momentum of current arrangements, in particular the major step of harmonisation permitted 
by the grid codes and day-ahead market coupling (see ENTSO-E, 2014b). This 
harmonisation process should also expand to intraday markets as well as to balancing and 
reserves markets, as already planned (see ACER, 2014). A pan-European market would 
then expand to all the energy and reserves products, leading to a true European level playing 
field for all the competitive market players.  
Nevertheless, one cannot expect major changes in the proper definition of electricity 
products. Indeed, in this scenario, no new massive integration of renewable energy is 
expected. The energy mix will still be grounded in conventional generation. The definition of 
the current electricity products fit conventional generation. The hourly or half-hourly definition 
of energy blocks would fit the dynamics of conventional (rather thermal) generators. Since 
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there would be no major shift in the energy mix in this scenario, one should not expect major 
changes either in the energy sources or in their location. Hence, the price zones as they are 
defined today at the national scale, or at the regional scale in some countries, should fit the 
energy mix and its location. The need for reserves in this scenario is quite predictable and 
stable over time (depending on the load level and unexpected outages of generators – mainly 
thermal ones). Reserves products could hence be defined as long term ones, up to monthly 
or yearly products. Consequently, no finer time and space energy and reserves products 
would be needed in this scenario. Self-dispatch of generators could still be the rule in this 
scenario, meaning that suppliers would propose bids and offers encompassing several units 
to mutualise their technical characteristics, in particular to better fit the definition of energy 
and reserves blocks. Finally, in this scenario, the question of a capacity market should be 
investigated and put in place with European implementation, if required.  
A further ISOfication of the European transmission system operation is needed in this 
scenario to allow a Europeanisation of electricity markets. In a scenario of deep 
Europeanisation, more and more tasks of the system operation have become independent of 
national TSOs, even if it came from their initiative. Nordpool or market coupling were set by 
TSOs' subsidiaries. CASC was also set by TSOs to auction transmission capacity. TSOs 
have also set regional associations to share good practices about technical procedures, then 
extended to generation adequacy, market operation and network development planning. 
ENTSO-E is now in charge of all these activities at the European level.  
TSOs have also seen an opportunity to cooperate in Regional Security Coordination 
Initiatives. While the security analysis and dispatching have historically been managed at the 
national or infra-national scale to ensure that flows do not exceed the capacity of power lines, 
several events (in particular the blackouts in Italy in 2003 and in Western Europe in 2006) 
have made it necessary to have a common security analysis on a broader scale, either 
multinational and even European-wide. Both Coreso and TSC were considered in this way. It 
is only with a whole view of the interconnected power system that one can understand how 
each part is functioning. One event - even if a bit old - makes it clear. On the 14th of July 
1999, the Belgian power system suffered a situation where, on average, 59% of power flows 
(and up to 76%) through its network were unscheduled, creating unexpected constraints.  
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Source: RTE & Elia, 2002 
Fig. 15: Power flows through the Belgian power network, 14th July 1999  
   
This was because physical exchanges had not been forecasted to take place between 
France and the Netherlands through Belgium. Indeed, commercial exchanges were mainly 
planned between France, Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands and more directly 
between France, Germany and the Netherlands, but not strictly between France and the 
Netherlands through Belgium. However, these commercial exchanges indeed led to physical 
exchanges between France and the Netherlands through Belgium. Coreso or TSC with their 
European vision of the patterns of power generation, load and flows would have been able to 
forecast such a situation and propose corrective actions to avoid a real time overload of the 
Belgium power system while there were only limited possibilities for responsive actions at 
that time.  
Similarly, Grid Control Cooperations (German GCC – Grid Control Cooperation – IGCC, e-
GCC) were set by TSOs to mutualise imbalances. That way, it avoids the following typically 
adverse situation. Assume that an interconnected power system is managed by two TSOs (A 
& B). TSO A notices a lack of energy on its national system and dispatches a power plant 
upward to re-balance the generation and load (on its national system); meanwhile TSO B 
notices an excess of energy on its national system and dispatches a power plant downward 
to re-balance generation on its national system. Each TSO acts in opposition to the other 
while their imbalances could have been mutualised.  
This is inefficient for two reasons. First, it is costly because the upward dispatching of the 
power plant in country A is more expensive than the downward dispatching of the power 
plant in country B. This is a general statement because you usually have a higher number of 
generators that can be dispatched downward (because they are already running) than the 
number of generators that can be dispatched upward (because they must be started up, as 
Planned flows Unidentified flows Share of unidentified flows 
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quickly as possible). Besides, it endangers the interconnected system security. Indeed, each 
of the TSO reduces its reserve margin, activating a balancing order (TSO A reduces its 
upward reserves while TSO B reduces its downward reserves) that would be needed in case 
a new imbalance appears. Mutualising the national imbalances before triggering balancing 
actions would leave the (downward and upward) reserves untouched at no cost. The TSOs 
would then limit their actions to the ones really needed to re-balance system-wide 
imbalances. In parallel, this scenario should also see the implementation of a unique EU-
wide balancing market. Even if this is harmonised, it should also be adapted to the locally 
available balancing products allowing an efficient balancing management (e.g. replacement 
reserves activated several hours ahead of real time to maintain a high enough volume of 
frequency restoration reserves some hours later). Having different habits in system balancing 
(as TSOs can choose to reserve more or less power in advance; and be more or less 
proactive ahead of their operational balancing window), the EU–wide harmonisation of 
balancing will surely require a lot of discussion between TSOs to understand each other’s 
point of view and practices, to integrate them and to find a common efficient solution adapted 
to the different national system dynamics (from very flexible hydro-based power systems to 
far less flexible thermal-based power systems).  
This whole process of ISOfication will continue to expand on the European power system 
while transmission ownership could remain diversified at the national scale. Indeed, even if 
this process was pushed, some European regulatory pressure (in a broad sense from the 
European directives and regulations), new organisations were born from initiatives of a 
vanguard of TSOs before seeing other newcomer TSOs expanding them (see market 
coupling and price coupling of regions; RSCIs; GCCs; UCTE then ENTSOE being 
progressively extended). It is certain, that such a process is to be reinforced by a new 
European legislative production53. To the contrary, any merger or reallocation of transmission 
assets between TSOs is constrained by the willingness of their shareholders (whether they 
are public or private). While we have seen several initiatives for merging part of the system 
operation at a multinational level in Europe, only two acquisitions of TSOs by others did occur 
(in 2010, the Belgian Elia acquiring the German 50Hertz with IFM; and Tennet the Dutch 
acquiring another German Transpower).  
                                                             
 
53 Note that a further ISOfication in Europe will question the national scope of responsibility of system operation imposed on 
TSOs by their national law. With this regard, this scenario should require a change in the scope of responsibility of system 
operation toward the European level with an adequate legislative framework.  
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3.1.2 … in scenario B of higher decarbonisation within existing Member States systems 
In an extreme scenario of higher decarbonisation within existing Member States systems, 
one should not expect major changes in the scale and responsibility of the system operation 
(except for multi-TSO countries as already seen in the UK). The national scale should still be 
prevalent. Of course, it would rely on the momentum of current arrangements, in particular 
the major step of harmonisation permitted by the grid codes and day-ahead market coupling. 
This harmonisation process could also expand to intraday markets. But as soon as balancing 
and reserves markets are concerned and encompassed the responsibility and liability of 
TSOs as regards to their national law, one should expect no major change. The principle of 
subsidiarity is indeed central in this scenario, since decarbonisation is led at the national 
scale.  
To the contrary, major changes in the definition of electricity products would be needed to 
facilitate and incentivise/allow for the integration of renewable energy. Indeed, in this 
scenario, an extremely large amount of renewable energy would create a lot of temporal and 
spatial constraints within the national systems for two main reasons: 
1°, renewable sources, mainly wind and PV, are difficult to predict and significantly variable 
for a far shorter duration than an hour;  
2°, they are generally located in areas where there was previously no, or a low level, of 
power production. Wind mills may locate in coastal or rural windy areas. PV power plants 
may locate in sunny areas. They may connect both on the transmission network and on the 
distribution network depending on their unit size.  
Besides, in this scenario, a development of demand response both on the transmission and 
the distribution grids should be expected. 
The existing electricity products as defined today would not then fit both the massive 
integration of renewable energy and the demand response novelties, whether these 
resources are concentrated or dispersed. The hourly or half-hourly definition of energy blocks 
would not fit the quicker dynamics of renewable generators and demand response (see figure 
25, for an example with photovoltaic production). From the side of a photovoltaic generator or 
an aggregator aggregating PV, at the moment where the photovoltaic production ramps up in 
the morning, during the first half of this ramping hour, there is a deficit of energy between the 
energy being sold and the energy being produced by the PV. While, for the next half hour, it 
is the opposite and there is a surplus of energy between the energy sold and the energy 
produced.  
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Source: Markedskraft Deutschland GmbH 
Fig. 16: Market design specific reasons for ID trading in Germany: The Sunrise Quarters  
 
Considering the expected high amount of photovoltaic production, this would create an 
important imbalance. That is why a specific day-ahead market, based on 15-minute products, 
has to be cleared just after the common coupled day-ahead market based on one-hour 
products. That is also the reason why the intraday market was organised for 15-minute 
products in Germany. That way the market players are allowed to cope with the ramp up and 
ramp down of PV energy (see figures 26).  
For the first half of a given hour while photovoltaic is ramping up, photovoltaic producers are, 
on average, producing less than what they sold on the day-ahead market based on one-hour 
products and are then forced to buy energy to re-balance. In the opposite case, for the 
second half an hour (while they are ramping up), they are on average producing more than 
what they sold on the day-ahead market based on one-hour products and must then sell their 
excessive energy to re-balance. Markets with one-hour products ignore the oscillating 
behaviour of PV while the photovoltaic production is actually ramping up or down within the 
one-hour product window.  
The other way around, demand response or battery-based storage capacity can be very 
flexible. Their flexibility will only be valued to a high enough price if the energy and reserves 
products have a fine enough temporal definition (see the decisions by the Federal energy 
regulator in the USA on this topic – FERC Order 784 (2013) and FERC Order 755 (2011)).  
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Source: Markedskraft Deutschland GmbH 
Fig. 17:  “The Sunrise Quarters” causing a systematic daily price pattern (Volume weighted average prices for 
quarters) 
 
Besides, since the location of renewable energy sources in this scenario would be quite 
different from the location today of conventional generators, the network will have to be 
adapted and new congestions will appear. Hence, the today price zones defined at the 
national scale, or infra-national scale in some countries, would be outdated. A reflection on 
congestion pricing and the price zone definition is hence needed. Without a redefinition of 
price zones, too much redispatching would be needed. But this is inefficient because it does 
not give any signal where network constraints (congestion or voltage constraints) are located. 
It is mutualising their cost and gives ideally placed market players the opportunity to create 
these congestions while proposing their services at a very high cost in order to relieve those 
under pressure (Hogan, 1999). This problem also appears if the price zones have to be 
frequently redefined because the congestions are moving on the network with flows, all the 
more if the generation and load are variable (renewable generators and demand response), 
and generally more quickly than the redefinition of price zones (Stoft, 1998). Nodal pricing 
would handle this problem efficiently, integrating the detailed configuration of the network into 
the market representation. But this is to the expense of new types of costs (transaction costs, 
hedging costs against locational price differentials, etc.). These should then be compared 
with the benefits to come before a recommendation or a mitigation action with this regard. 
Whatever the final chosen solution, a mutual optimisation between system operation and 
market operation would be required to ensure a secure and efficient management of the 
power system.  
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Because of the limited predictability of renewable energy sources, the activation of reserves 
would be higher and less predictable over time (depending on the load level and unexpected 
outages of generators – mainly thermal ones). Reserves products should hence be defined 
on shorter periods to adapt to the actual variation induced by renewable generation. 
Consequently, finer time and space energy and reserves products would be needed in this 
scenario.  
Considering the need for flexibility and the network constraints in this scenario, the system 
operation and market operation should be more integrated. That being said, and to sum up 
what was shown in the previous paragraph, the energy and reserves products should be 
redefined to take into account, as precisely as possible, the technical constraints, by 
progressively merging the system operation and market operation. A mutual optimisation of 
the market and technical conditions could then be achieved.  
Meanwhile, generators as intermittent renewable generators (wind or PV generators) should 
not be isolated from balancing the responsibility usually borne by TSOs or incumbents. A 
generalised balancing responsibility should apply to all types of network users in particular to 
the intermittent renewable generators. That way, for generators putting a strain on the power 
system, balancing would be incentivised to find ways to compensate their intermittency 
(either with better generation forecast, taking the margin to sell their production day-ahead, 
rescheduling with intraday products, or pooling their production with those of other 
generators, etc.).  
In this scenario, even if the system and market operation should be based on a central 
dispatch, it should also remain open to innovation from market actors. For instance, 
compared to what we see today, a wider participation of renewables, DR and decentralised 
resources (generation, storage and DR) to the market and system operation should be 
achievable. This should be eased by the redefinition of reserve and energy products.  
Furthermore, markets should place a higher value in resources that can track signals for 
reserves and balancing needs (e.g. frequency containment reserve, automatic recovery 
reserve, ramping), considering the very high requirement of flexibility in this scenario. 
And finally, in this scenario, a capacity remuneration mechanism could be needed to provide 
more stable revenue to (efficient) back-up generators. Otherwise, the volatility of their 
revenues (from the energy-only markets) would prevent them from investing, being too 
unstable/unpredictable and risky.   
Contrary to scenario A, this scenario B would not assume a further ISOfication of the 
European transmission system operation. Of course, the momentum of the current EU 
arrangements (ENTSOE, RSCIs, GCCs) could remain. Nevertheless, the deeper 
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decarbonisation is grounded on subsidiarity and national resources only in this scenario. In 
an extreme sense, there would be no highly organised reliance on external resources. In 
order to do so, the national power systems must be oversized to be able to cope alone with 
the variability of renewable generators (e.g. with a lot of back-up capacity – in the form of 
generation, storage or demand response – or with an outsized national transmission network 
to mutualise their indigenous renewable energy sources). The absence of cooperation for 
system operation at the European level would be compensated by a far higher expense in 
fixed costs (in generation, storage, demand response and transmission capacity).  
3.1.3 … in scenario C of higher decarbonisation within decentralised systems 
In an extreme scenario of higher decarbonisation within decentralised systems, one should 
expect major changes in the scale and responsibility of the system operation and in the 
definition of energy and reserves products. Of course, this would rely on the momentum of 
current arrangements (grid codes and market coupling). Meanwhile remember that, in this 
scenario, generators are assumed to be flexibilised and close to consumers, the consumers 
being also flexibilised, and decentralised storage to allow for it to be widely spread.  
As a consequence, the core of the system operation should shift from the transmission level 
to the distribution level. Indeed, balancing and reserves should be mainly organised at the 
local scale because the distribution grid would aim at being almost autonomous microgrids. 
As a result, the network constraints management should also focus on the distribution 
network while the transmission network should be less used as a primary action tool. This 
permits that the price zones for products offered at the central (say national), level as they 
are defined today for the wholesale market would not be necessarily questioned in this 
scenario. Moreover, reserves could still be shared at the transmission level to some extent 
and the transmission system operation could still organise an open & reliable last resort 
balancing.  
Considering the limited role for the transmission system operation in this scenario, it does not 
seem essential to refine energy or reserves products with higher time granularity or higher 
integration between the system operation and market rules, and we see no need for a central 
dispatch. However, to the contrary, a reflection on interchangeable products between 
national TSOs could be initiated in this scenario. In parallel, it is worth noting that both the 
distribution system and market operations should be entirely revisited in this scenario 
compared to what we know today. Finer energy and reserves products with higher time 
granularity and higher integration between the system operation and market rules should be 
deployed at the local level by the distribution system operators. Furthermore, the 
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development of different local market models would question the fairness and the reliability of 
the power market because of its very local nature in this scenario.  
This scenario would not assume a further ISOfication of the European transmission system 
operation. Once again, decarbonisation is grounded on local resources only. That said, in an 
extreme manner, there would be no fundamental reliance on resources at the transmission / 
wholesale level, either from a national or a European point of view since flexible resources 
are assumed to be mainly at the local level. One should nevertheless notice that the 
momentum of the current EU arrangements will remain in this scenario, and that imbalances 
could always be mutualised in a GCC-like manner, even if no major convergence of a 
balancing mechanism is needed here.  
3.1.4 Comparing the system operation function in the three scenarios 
The table below sums up the possible transformation of the system operation function in the 
three scenarios, in particular concerning the organisation of the day-ahead and intraday 
markets, the balancing and reserves markets, the definition of energy and reserves products 
as well as the possible ISOfication of transmission system operation functions.  
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Scenarios 
Aspects  
of system  
operation function 
Lower decarbonisation 
within a pan-European 
system 
Higher decarbonisation 
within existing Member 
States systems 
Higher decarbonisation 
within decentralised 
systems 
Day-ahead and 
intraday markets Relies on momentum of current EU arrangements 
(Transmission) 
balancing and reserves 
markets 
Pan-European system 
operation and markets 
(RSCIs, GCCs, etc.) 
No driver for further 
pan-European markets 
 No driver for further 
pan-European 
markets  
 TSO as the last 
resort balancing 
provider 
Definition of energy 
and reserves products 
 Energy products 
time granularity 
 Reserves products 
time granularity 
 Price zone 
definition 
 Self- or central 
dispatch 
No major change:  
 (half-)hourly 
energy products 
 Monthly or yearly 
reserves products 
 Unchanged pricing 
zones 
 
 
 Self-dispatch can 
remain 
Need to refine energy 
and reserves products 
 Quarter-hourly 
energy products 
 Daily or intraday 
reserves products 
 Reflection on 
congestion pricing 
and definition of  
price zones 
 Mutual system and 
market operation 
No major change at 
the transmission level 
 (half-)hourly 
energy products 
 Monthly or yearly 
reserves products 
 Unchanged pricing 
zones 
 
 
 Self / distributed 
dispatch  
ISOfication of 
transmission system 
operation 
Required Not needed Not needed 
 
Table 9: System operation function in the three scenarios 
 
To conclude: if one should expect that the momentum of current EU arrangements should 
persist in the three scenarios, they should differ by the form of balancing and reserves 
markets, the definition of energy and reserves products and the need for ISOfication of the 
system operation. Balancing and reserves markets will then mainly be aligned with the 
relevant scope of each scenario (i.e. respectively a European, national or local level). 
Besides, one should expect no major change in the definition of energy and reserves 
products on the wholesale market in the pan-European and decentralised scenarios. But the 
nationally decarbonised scenario requires a definition of energy and reserves products that 
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should be finer and closer to physical rules with central dispatch both in order to cope with 
the constraints of flexibility and to push for the flexibility resources.  
3.2 Interactions with other players in the power system supply chain  
Setting aside the interaction with other TSOs, in a power system supply chain, a TSO 
interacts mainly with the DSOs, the final network users being generators and consumers 
directly connected to its network, market participants (that are partly the same as network 
users but that can also be pure traders or more financial actors) and institutional actors (in 
particular the national regulatory agency, national government, or the European Commission, 
and local communities impacted by its assets). These interactions would certainly be highly 
impacted by the different scenarios as compared to their nature today.  
3.2.1 … in scenario A of lower decarbonisation within a pan-European system 
In an extreme scenario of a pan-European system, the interactions of a TSO with the other 
economic agents will end up organised mainly at the European scale. Hence, the DSOs are 
not expected to interact more than today with the TSO (ISO or TOs) because no important 
decentralised resources are expected to develop in this scenario.  
The interaction of market players with TSOs is not expected to change dramatically in this 
scenario. As today, they will remain centralised market players with different sources of 
flexibility. To the extreme, market players could face one or two ISOs over Europe as a 
whole. Otherwise, they will still propose portfolio bids or offers for the whole set of energy and 
reserves products, localised in the different existing bidding zones. An important change 
could still occur from the new transmission arrangements in order to compel generators to 
optimise their location in the whole of Europe taking into account the long term constraints of 
the EU transmission grid. This point has already been mentioned in the theoretical literature 
in Europe (e.g. Comillas 2002). Nevertheless, it generally faced a fierce opposition from the 
generators (e.g. see Association of British generators in 2002 against losses; recent cases in 
Belgium and a decision in France).  
If generators could see a new type of transmission tariff applied, consumers could also suffer 
an increase in the transmission tariff depending on the effective load increase. Indeed, in this 
EU-first scenario, major transmission investments are required, calling TO revenues to 
increase substantially. Consequently, if the load itself does not sufficiently increase, given the 
higher transmission revenue needed, the transmission tariff for consumers will indeed 
increase. Otherwise, if the load sufficiently increases, the transmission tariff for consumers 
could stabilise or even decrease. 
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The computation of a new tariff is also the main change that could test the relationship 
between TSOs and the institutional players (namely the regulators including ACER and the 
European Commission). The institutional players would have to agree on this new 
transmission tariff for generators (today very low under the 838/2010 regulation; see opinion 
by ACER, 2014). This calls for harmonisation and the resetting of the tariff structure in most 
of the European countries.  
Besides the tariff structure, the question of transmission financeability should also pop up and 
impact the interaction between the TOs and the institutional players. Indeed, in this EU–first 
scenario, major transmission investments are required, tariffs are hence expected to increase 
substantially, and the TOs will need a great amount of extra financial resources (either in the 
form of an external equity injection or debt issuance, or an increase in regulated revenue). 
Regulation should then be adapted to this situation. Regulation should provide enough 
guaranties that tariffs and the regulatory regime will be remain stable, so that financing can 
be done in the easiest and cheapest manner (see Roland Berger 2011 and Henriot 2014). To 
conclude, the relationship related to the network codes is expected to keep on the same track 
as today. 
3.2.2 … in scenario B of higher decarbonisation within existing Member States systems 
In an extreme scenario of a Member State-first system, the interactions of the TSO with the 
other economic agents occur and are organised mainly at the national scale. The DSOs are 
expected to interact more than they currently do with their national TSO(s) because 
decentralised (renewable generation or demand response) resources are expected to 
develop significantly in this scenario to deeper decarbonisation. It will then be necessary to 
better and more fully account for the mutual impact of transmission and distribution system 
management decisions. For instance, when a legitimate (transmission originated) balancing 
decision creates congestion on a distribution network. As a consequence, the congestion 
management decisions at the distribution level should be conceived to be either neutral with 
regard to the (transmission) power system balancing or having to pay a (transmission) 
imbalance originated by a DSO reaction. That way, either it is effectively neutral for the 
transmission power system or the DSO bears the cost of the actions on its network creating 
imbalances for the whole transmission power system. The other way around, the value of 
decentralised (generation or demand) resources for the management of the transmission 
system should not only consider their declared price in the balancing market, but also their 
shadow cost for the distribution system that is positive (resp. negative) if it creates (resp. 
relieve) a distribution network congestion, and zero otherwise. That way, the national TSO 
takes into account the local impact of any of the nationwide system decisions. This leaves 
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open the concrete organisation of the system operation between the distribution and 
transmission system operators. Even if the system operation becomes more relevant at 
distribution level, this does not mean that the distribution system operators will act in a 
discretionary manner. Three solutions can be envisaged: 
-  distribution system operators perform the system operation on their network within 
the format of their respective transmission system operators . Distribution system 
operators should then closely communicate with the TSO, in particular for the 
shadow cost of decentralised resources.  
- the transmission system operator expands its own system operation over the 
distribution systems operation.  
- TSO and DSOs share a kind of TSO-DSO security cooperation initiative. Note that 
whatever the chosen solution, the corresponding data hub design should be 
consistent with the chosen option and the beaded consumer data protection.  
In this scenario, the interactions of market players with TSOs are also expected to change 
dramatically. Since decentralised resources develop and compete with centralised resources, 
market rules should adapt to those new resources (with a decentralised, variable but 
flexibilised nature) while also allowing the aggregators to participate in the market. Market 
players, facing the national TSO as today (and also their own local DSO), should then 
propose unit bids or offers for the whole set of energy and reserves products, being now (in 
this scenario) localised at the nodal scale within a central dispatch with shorter energy 
duration and reserves blocks jointly optimised. Another important change could still come 
from new transmission tariffs for generators.  It is related to locational incentives given at the 
national level - taking into account the long term constraints of the power transmission grid; 
and with the same opposition expected as that mentioned for scenario A. Moreover, as in 
scenario A and for the same reason, consumers could also suffer an increase in the 
transmission tariff if their load does not sufficiently increase compared to the transmission 
revenue needs. 
Once again, as for scenario A, the computation of the new tariff is a main topic that should 
change the relationship between TSOs and the institutional players. However, the deemed 
institutional players are different in that it is an EU-first scenario and restricted here to 
national regulators. The interaction with the European institutional players (as ACER and the 
European Commission) should remain limited in this scenario, focusing on the national level. 
Each NRA should then define a new transmission tariff for generators. The national 
regulation should also be adapted to the high need of financial resources for TSOs in this 
national scenario. To end, the relationship linked to the network codes is expected to be 
loosened since this scenario gives a greater role to the national subsidiarity. Note also that 
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the NRA will have to frame all the discussions for redefining the energy and the reserves 
products. 
3.2.3 … in scenario C of higher decarbonisation within decentralised systems 
In a scenario of extremely decarbonised and decentralised systems, the interactions of the 
TSO with the other economic agents remain organised mainly at the national scale. The 
DSOs are expected to interact with their national TSOs mainly when they are out of local 
balancing resources. Similar to national scenario B, this leaves open the concrete 
organisation of the system operation between the distribution and the transmission system 
operators. DSOs could conduct the system operation on their network independently, as the 
transmission system operator does today. Another framework could be that the transmission 
system operator expands its system operation to the distribution system operation. Similarly, 
for connection contracts, two arrangements can be implemented, between the TSO, the 
DSOs and the network users connected to the transmission grid. A first option could be that 
the TSO imposes a quality requirement/control on the DSOs in their connection contract to 
the transmission grid. The DSOs are then compelled to transmit and translate those 
requirements in their connection contracts for the distribution grid. Another solution could be 
that connection to the distribution grid is necessarily a three-party contract between 
distribution network users, DSO and TSO, hence including, directly, the TSO requirements.   
In this scenario, the interactions of market players with TSOs are also expected to change 
dramatically. Since markets are mainly organised at the local scale and the TSO should 
mainly be solicited for last resort balancing, the interactions of market players with TSOs 
should be very limited. Market design will have to be adapted to the highly decentralised and 
intermediated nature of power resources. As for the transmission level today, transparent 
rules will then be needed at the local level for designing the market, with the unbundling of 
the DSOs in order to avoid conflicts of interest. Meanwhile, there is no need for a more 
refined market design at the national and European scale because of the reduced volume of 
transactions. An important change could still happen from the application of a geographically 
differentiated transmission tariff to DSOs in order to induce them to optimise the development 
of local generation resources; and see more microgrids deployed only where it is efficient. 
Moreover, as in scenario A and for the same reason, consumers could also suffer from an 
increase in the transmission tariff if their load level does not match the transmission revenue 
needs. This could easily become a very pointed/prickly issue. 
Once again, as for scenarios A and B, the computation of a new tariff is the main topic that 
should change the relationship between TSOs and the institutional players. However, the 
deemed institutional players are different from EU-first scenario and restrained to national 
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regulators only - since the interaction with the European institutional players (namely the 
ACER and the European Commission) should remain limited in this scenario, focused on the 
local level. The NRAs should then agree on a more cost-reflective transmission tariff and the 
impairment of transmission stranded costs (with a possible compensation by means other 
than a transmission tariff, e.g. state subsidy or tax). Regulation should also be adapted to the 
shrinking asset base, studying the required network renewal and otherwise dismantling. The 
NRA should also frame the discussion of the organisation of system operation at the 
distribution level, considering both options, by the DSO itself or with a TSO expanding its 
current activity to the distribution grid. Finally, the discussions related to the updates of 
network codes are expected to be loosened since this scenario gives a broader role to the 
local decision-making power. 
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3.2.4 Comparing the interactions between the TSO and the other stakeholders the in the three 
scenarios 
The table below sums up the possible transformation of the interactions between the TSO 
and the other stakeholders (DSOs, market participants and regulators) in the three 
scenarios.  
 
Scenarios 
 
Interactions  
between the  
TSO and … 
Lower decarbonisation 
within a pan-European 
system 
Higher decarbonisation 
within existing Member 
States systems 
Higher decarbonisation 
within decentralised 
systems 
DSOs  As today 
 Different possible 
organisations 
between national 
DSOs & TSOs for 
system operation 
and connection 
arrangements 
 For last resort 
provision of 
balancing + different 
possible 
organisations 
between national 
DSOs & TSOs for 
system operation 
and connection 
arrangements 
Market participants 
 Intensive interaction 
through self-dispatch 
 Intensive interaction 
through central 
dispatch 
 Very limited (during 
event of last resort 
balancing provision) 
Regulatory authorities 
 European-wide 
regulatory 
interaction through 
ACER mainly 
 Regulation adapted 
to investment wave 
 Cost-reflective tariff 
applied both to load 
and generation 
 No interaction with 
ACER 
 Regulation adapted 
to investment wave 
 Cost-reflective tariff 
applied both to load 
and generation 
 Framing discussion 
for organisation of 
distribution system 
operation 
 No interaction of 
ACER 
 Cost-reflective tariff 
including impairment 
of stranded assets 
 Framing discussion 
for organisation of 
distribution system 
operation 
 
Table 10: Interactions between the TSO and the other stakeholders in the three scenarios 
 
 102 
Interaction between the TSO and market participants should be intensive in the pan-
European and national scenarios, respectively centered on self-dispatch or on central 
dispatch. To the contrary, interactions with market participants should be limited in the 
decentralised scenario, except in extreme situations, as a last resort solution for balancing. 
As a consequence, interactions with DSOs should also be more limited in the pan-European 
and the decentralised scenario; while it should be intensive in the national scenario to guide 
the TSO for establishing a framework for decentralised resources useful both to the 
transmission and the distribution grids. As for regulation, the scope should be European in 
the pan-European scenario and national otherwise. Besides, it should be adapted to the 
investment wave on the transmission network in the pan-European and national scenarios. 
Cost-reflectiveness should ground the new transmission tariff design in all the scenarios, 
including the impairment of transmission stranded assets in the decentralised scenario. The 
regulator should also frame the discussion for the organisation of a new distribution system 
operation framework between the TSO and DSOs.  
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4. The case for a “hybrid scenario” and the corresponding checkpoints for 
an “Energy Union” low-carbon transmission framework 
Introduction 
 The earlier chapters have demonstrated that the negotiations/proposals for the 3rd Package, 
dating from 2006 to 2009, are no longer as relevant, because the system has irrevocably 
changed and it cannot be implemented as it was first designed. The legal and regulatory 
framework that we have today is mainly the one forecasted in the 3rd Package, although 
implementation of this package is still a work in progress. However, with increasingly 
ambitious new (national and EU) policies and innovative new technologies, the dynamics of 
the power system have changed. While the hardware and the software of power systems are 
evolving at an ever-faster pace, the legal and regulatory frameworks have not changed 
significantly; hence, the gap between norms and incentives (“what should be done”), and 
reality (“what is actually being done”),  becomes untenable. Moving from the current “legacy 
framework” towards a new setting (let’s call it a “2030” EU system vision) will be a long and 
complex process. 
It is essential for the successful evolution of the EU energy policy and EU power systems that 
we identify and develop an understanding of this new terrain. As researchers and experts, we 
chose to make the novelty more explicit, and easier to grasp, by investigating three 
alternative scenarios concerning the evolution of power systems, assessing, for each 
scenario, how key TSO functions would evolve. We want the reader to fully appreciate the 
possible impact of structural changes upon the functioning of the power system, the functions 
performed by different actors and overall governance.  
Three conceptual scenarios are needed to identify and investigate the new factors at play in 
the ongoing EU system change.  They are:  
1° “Full Europeanisation, but low decarbonisation” (a strong internal market is achieved, but 
has not been conceived to deliver a strong energy transition and climate policy);  
2° “High decarbonisation, but at national level” (within 28 Germanies or Great Britains);  
3° “High decarbonisation, but at local level” (within thousands of “green autonomous zones”).  
As shown above in Chapters 2 and 3, and summarised in Chapters 4.1 and 4.2 below, none 
of these three scenarios is fully consistent with the present “legacy framework”, and they all 
require substantial changes in terms of governance mechanisms and regulatory policies. 
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The main goal of this research is not to recommend the best scenario of the EU TSOs future 
from the perspective of European public interest, or to prescribe an ideal road map conducive 
to an optimal European future. 
The objective is more humble and more preliminary. It is to decipher how the European 
power system might evolve; the TSOs tasks, constraints and environment; as this should 
allow the reader to make their own conclusions of the best and worst aspects and how they 
should be resolved. 
 It is also ambitious, as understanding the ongoing motivation for change in the power system 
is imperative, both for the numerous interest groups and the various relevant institutional 
players in the shaping of any successful EU policy.  We would like our research to contribute 
toward framing an “Energy Union” for the future of our power transmission.  
 
In Chapter 4.3 we will consider the case of a fourth scenario, named “Hybrid”, because it 
assembles various features from each of the three basic conceptual scenarios. Firstly, it is 
unlikely that the EU can realise/achieve a fully European or a fully local system and 
framework in the coming decade. But secondly, retaining a fully national framework seems 
impossible given the overriding strength of the single market and its open borders, as well as 
the unprecedented growth of distributed generation at local level. However, thirdly and finally, 
it is not because “hybridation” is the solution that, in practice, will most likely work well and 
easily deliver. In fact, on its own, it is full of holes and foreseeable contradictions... If we can 
anticipate the evolution of the EU power system and TSOs, we can prepare for, and monitor, 
each step towards our common future.   
 
Aware of the drawbacks of “Hybridation” actually progressing in the EU, either “by design” or 
“by accident”, Chapter 4.4 will examine at a set of “checkpoints” aimed at ensuring critical 
levels of coherence, consistency and resilience along the energy system journey towards a 
low-carbon future (say by 2050). We can only suggest how to begin this transition for the 
coming decade.  The process will inevitably be full of unexpected and surprising, good and 
bad news.  As we know little of yet, there is a high level of uncertainty around numerous 
issues, making it vital to establish check-points to ensure the EU system can continue to 
operate and implement EU policy during a process of trial and error. In particular, the 
governance of both the DSOs and the TSOs will have to take strides to catch up with the 
existing and numerous imminent transformations of the EU power system.  From our current 
perspective, the EU DSO is still in its infancy, while some progress has already been made 
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with the EU TSO. Nevertheless, both would have to be fully mature by 2030: demanding a 
serious catch-up. 
4.1 Overview of the three conceptual scenarios 
The three basic conceptual scenarios were introduced to better grasp some structural 
novelties of the new world that we are entering into, and to identify major critical issues, as 
described in the following table (See Table 11 next page). 
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Network governance             
(who is in charge of what?) 
Regulation 
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y EU-wide 
competition of 
centralised 
resources 
European  
and 
national 
European SO tools and markets 
with EU wide  and/or EU regional 
ISO(s) 
 
Adapted to an investment wave for 
(mainly cross-border) transmission; better 
cross-border cost allocation; supervision 
of complex supra-national markets and 
system operation. EU regulator needed, 
as well as coordination with NRA. 
B
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A
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ve
d 
A
s 
to
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y 
Competing 
centralised 
and 
decentralised 
resources 
National 
and       
local 
TSO managing T grid 
DSOs managing D grids  
+ T-D coordination needed for 
cross-network externality 
Adapted to an investment wave for 
(mainly national) transmission, T-D 
interfaces and smart grids; local markets 
design; rules for coordination between 
local and national markets and system 
operation.  
C
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Le
ss
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y 
Mostly local 
resources 
Mostly 
local 
TSO for last resort actions 
(balancing or blackstart) in their 
national scope 
Adapted to an investment wave for mainly 
smart grids ; local markets design and 
coordination; rules for coordination 
between local and national markets and 
system operation handling of potential T 
and D stranded assets.  
Table 11: Overview of the main structural, governance and regulatory characteristics of the three basic conceptual scenarios 
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4.1.1 A) A scenario of “full Europeanisation but low decarbonisation” 
The following table sums up the transformation of the transmission system operation in a 
scenario of full Europeanisation, but low decarbonisation. It is assumed that there will be a 
very strong and open internal market, which will dictate/shape the operation and level of 
investment. The key characteristic of this market structure is EU-wide competition among 
“centralised” generation resources. In order to ensure the reliability and efficiency of such a 
large-scale unified system and market, the current trend towards a European system 
operation, meaning both (analytical, forecasting) computations and (control) actions at EU 
level, must be reinforced. From the organisational point of view, this can be achieved through 
the creation of either a single European ISO coordinating all TSOs, or a European system 
operator chairing a pool of regional ISOs. The regulatory framework needs to cope with a 
wave of EU transmission investments, providing the right incentives and allocating its costs to 
beneficiaries in a transparent and acceptable manner. The creation of a truly European 
energy regulator to supervise supra-national markets and all forms of cross-border 
transactions (energy trade, “green” electricity exchanges, provision of ancillary services, etc.) 
becomes inevitable, in spite of all the political and institutional difficulties. The institutional 
interface between this new body and national regulatory authorities also needs to be 
established. 
While this scenario would materialise the “old” internal market model, it is most unlikely that it 
would deliver the expected results of the current EU energy transition and climate policy, 
because it ignores the ongoing decentralised green revolution, abandoning all innovations 
that do not fit the centralised approach.  
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Function Entity in charge today 
The scenario 
Function scope Entity in charge 
Connection 
Operation TSO 
Adapted to centralised and "flexibilised" 
RES resources 
ISO(s) 
Involvement in rules   
design 
Mostly TSO + 
DSOs Mostly ISO(s) + DSOs 
Network investment TSO Higher (cross-border) investment and use of innovative grid technologies TOs 
ICT 
investment 
Operation TSO 
Momentum of current arrangements 
(grid codes) 
 + Harmonisation of bal. and res. mkt  
but no finer time & space E & R products 
Need of EU capacity market? 
Enhanced ISO bodies going 
beyond (ENTSOE, RSCIs, 
GCCs) but national TOs for 
investment 
Involvement in rules  
design TSOs 
Sys. & market 
operation 
Operation TSO 
Involvement in rules   
design TSOs 
TSO coordination  TSOs  
Table 12: TSO functions transformation in scenario A - full Europeanisation but low decarbonisation 
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4.1.2 B) A scenario of national decarbonisation  
The table that follows sums up the transformation of the transmission system operation in the 
case of a Member States’ driven decarbonisation. The Member States fully mobilise their 
political, legislative, regulatory and economic resources in a strong decarbonisation process 
without the significant Europeanisation of electricity systems and markets. In each Member 
State centralised and decentralised generation resources co-exist. The system operation is 
still mainly conceived and carried out at national level, but with a growing need for 
coordination between DSOs and TSOs. The same applies to a market redesign, where 
“local” and “national” platforms must be compatible, thus requiring considerable 
harmonisation efforts at national level. Governance issues are mainly addressed at national 
level, leading to potentially very different market and operational architectures across the EU 
Member States. 
The regulatory framework must be adapted to incentivise, for both types of system operators, 
the necessary investments, and to establish formal cooperation and coordination 
mechanisms from the grids planning stage to actual flow operation. Local markets may be 
more or less regulated, but national regulatory authorities must define or approve rules 
concerning all kind of transactions between the local and national levels (energy trade, 
“green” electricity exchanges, the provision of ancillary services, etc.). 
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Function Entity in charge today 
The scenario 
Function scope Entity in charge 
Connection 
Operation TSO 
Expanding toward distribution & adapting 
to new decentralised sources 
DSO 
Involvement in rules design Mostly TSO + DSOs Mostly TSO + DSOs 
Network investment TSO Higher investment and more use of innovative grid technologies TSO 
ICT 
investment 
Operation 
TSO 
Adapting to new decentralised sources 
Finer time & space E & R products 
DSOs 
Involvement in rules design 
+ TSO-DSO coordination needed for 
cross-network T-D externality 
Sys. & market 
operation 
Operation 
Involvement in rules  design  
TSO coordination  TSOs  
Lacking integrated reserves, balancing & 
intraday markets for European flexible 
resources integration 
TSOs in current EU arrangements 
momentum 
Table 13: TSO functions transformation in scenario B - Member States driven national decarbonisation  
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4.1.3 C) A scenario of deeply local decarbonisation  
The following table summarises the transformation of the transmission system operation in a 
local decarbonisation scenario. In a context of sharply declining costs and plenty of 
technological and societal innovations, the offer and demand of low-carbon energy systems 
meet in reduced size sets of strongly interactive devices and behaviours. The European and 
national power markets have lost their central role. Hundreds (or thousands) of local systems 
have been organised or built. DSOs or new intermediaries (being private ones with 
contracted services; or public ones supported by local authorities) operate all these systems, 
which extensively use local storage and local balancing to run autonomous small power 
systems, some of them strongly interconnected with other energy systems (heating, cooling, 
gas, mobility, etc.).  
TSOs subsist with their infrastructures and tools, most of them accepted as “sunk costs” from 
the past. They still play a role - but limited to what central resources can deliver in a 
fragmented decentralised low-carbon world.  
From the governance point of view, ensuring proper coordination among a large number of 
quasi-autonomous systems, including both normal and abnormal system conditions, 
represents a formidable challenge. 
The regulatory framework has lost a significant part of its substance as these local systems 
are much more “self-regulated” than traditional centralised (national) systems. However, 
regulation must address the definition and implementation of distribution network tariffs with 
the high decentralisation of agents, “random” transactions and potentially high stranded 
costs. Furthermore, interactions among agents from different local systems must be 
regulated, in addition to the provision of “back-up” services. An important part of the new 
regulatory framework is the management of many “stranded assets”, the definition of a new 
class of actions for the TSOs within new incentive and cost allocation schemes. 
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Function Entity in charge today 
The scenario 
Function scope Entity in charge 
Connection 
Operation TSO 
Shifting from T to D 
DSO 
Involvement in rules 
design Mostly TSO + DSOs Sharing DSOs / TSO?? 
Network investment TSO Shrinking with only partial renewal TSO 
ICT 
investment 
Operation TSO 
Expanding toward distribution 
DSOs 
Involvement in rules 
design TSO Sharing DSOs / TSO?? 
System & 
market 
operation 
Operation TSO Shifting from transmission to 
distribution & adapting to 
decentralised sources 
DSO + TSO for last resort 
balancing 
Involvement in rules 
design TSO Sharing DSOs / TSO?? 
TSO coordination  TSOs  Transnational imbalance mutualisation 
TSOs in momentum of current EU 
arrangements 
Table 14: TSO functions transformation in scenario C - local decarbonisation  
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4.2 Consistency and feasibility of the three basic scenarios 
After having analysed in detail each one of the three basic scenarios, two main 
questions arise: 
- Are the scenarios consistent? (i.e., are they able to deliver what a society 
expects from the energy transition, namely decarbonisation and the 
Europeanisation of electricity markets?) 
- Are the scenarios feasible? (i.e., is each scenario self-consistent, or does it 
contain incoherent features that render the system potentially unreliable or 
unstable?)  
Although all three scenarios were constructed in order to fulfil EU energy and climate 
policy objectives, no individual scenario can easily fully meet all of the goals at a 
reasonable cost. Societal expectations, technological developments and public 
policies are not necessarily, and not always, aligned, therefore this difficulty should 
be of no surprise.  
As regards their internal coherence or self-consistency, it should be pointed out that 
implementation of any scenario requires substantial changes in the current legal and 
regulatory frameworks. In particular, two points deserve special attention: 
1) Some critical system operational functions, currently mainly performed by 
national TSOs, will be totally or partially performed by other entities. These 
entities may be supra-national organizations, either emanating from or acting 
in close cooperation with TSOs, DSOs (individually or somehow associated) 
or even new players. Therefore, the legal and regulatory frameworks must be 
adapted, namely in order to: 
i) Clearly define and assign each system operational function, indicating, for 
each, appropriate cost and liability sharing mechanisms. 
ii) Establish appropriate coordination mechanisms, for both normal and 
abnormal situations, including appropriate redundancy safeguards and 
supervision tools. 
 
2) Even if from the technical (system operation) point of view it is theoretically 
possible to ensure appropriate system reliability (assuming that the necessary 
legal and regulatory changes are implemented), several “black holes” may 
still jeopardize the efficient functioning of electricity systems and markets. The 
report discusses how to patch them. 
 114 
Table 15 describes both the major “black holes” that need to be patched up and the 
main expected transfers at system operation level.   
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How regulation can be fair & reliable if different 
market models pop up at local level? 
Liabilities in case of critical situation between 
DSOs and TSO  TSO as a mutualisation 
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Table 15: Scenarios consistency check 
1° In a fully Europeanised system, the companies invested in grid infrastructures are 
still alive and cannot be deprived of their assets. They may lose their rights on the 
“System Operation”, which is a statutory role given by legislation and regulation. They 
then become “Transmission Owners” (TOs) while the grids are operated by new 
entities created under the model of “Independent System Operators” (ISOs). On the 
hardware part of the European grid, it is unclear how the transmission investments 
are conceived, planned and made; financed and allocated to users through tariffs or 
prices for services. On the software part of the European grid, how will the 
coexistence of several layers of grids (the proper EU “super grid”; the several regional 
transmission zones; the remaining national and sub-national sub-systems) work? 
What will be the definition of responsibility and liability if the computation of the 
system operation, and the requisite actions to be undertaken, are indistinct and 
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clearly non-competitive?? What type of rights or duties will be given to the regional 
operators by the Member States?   
2° In a national decarbonisation scenario, the role of the DSOs will inevitably grow 
because low-carbon energy will not be fully centralised, even if the central types of 
bio-mass, bio-fuels, bio-gas, off-shore grids (etc., such as nuclear) will play a big role. 
How will this come to life? Might TSOs keep the bulk of their current functions and 
finally extend them to distribution operation? Or will DSOs increasingly push for a 
combined DSO and TSO power to negotiate and enforce detailed protocols of 
coordination and cooperation? Will we see more and more “TSO-DSO joint Security 
Cooperation Initiatives”? 
3° Inevitably, in a local decarbonisation scenario, DSOs will become “small TSOs”, 
leading to four questions. Firstly, the transmission grid will still be able to link, and to 
bridge, many or most of the local zones of operation. How, then, will the proper role 
and the system responsibilities of the TSO be defined? Secondly, what will happen to 
the “voluntarily fully autarchic” local zones when confronted with the unexpected 
ruptures of their self-sufficiency? Thirdly, how will DSOs manage the interactions of 
their numerous local zones at their many common borders? Fourthly, in a scenario of 
radical decentralisation, many micro-grids owners and operators will not be DSOs, but 
private or local public undertakings. How will these interact with the DSOs or the TSO 
if they act outside of the DSO and TSO regulatory framework? 
4.3 The case for a “Hybrid scenario” 
We will now consider the case for a fourth scenario, named “Hybrid”, because it 
assembles various features from each of the three conceptual scenarios previously 
analysed. What makes a “Hybrid” scenario likely? And is this hybridation a magic 
bullet, or rather a mere contradiction? Will hybridation happen “by design” (i.e., 
because decision-makers consciously opt for a hybrid model) or “by accident” (i.e., 
because decisions being taken by different agents at different places and at different 
points in time result in a dynamic hybrid outcome that does not correspond to the 
expected outcome of any individual agent)? 
4.3.1 Is there any “hybrid” scenario to regroup the best of all three conceptual worlds? 
 All three conceptual scenarios previously analysed have weak points; but two of 
them (A and C - the EU and the local) show serious feasibility difficulties, which make 
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the “MS national” scenario the more realistic option in a “conservative” approach to 
the EU energy transition (i.e., taking into account current institutional inertia). 
a- Hardware feasibility:  The existing method for EU generation cannot be fully 
localised or fully Europeanised in the course of ten years. The grids themselves 
cannot be transitioned within this time frame. Thus, a longer period of time is 
necessary to achieve a fully decentralised or fully European set-up. Any transition will 
presumably be a protracted process, during which the “hardware” functions of the EU 
power system will remain “hybrid”.  
b- Software feasibility:  a full reallocation of most of the “system operation” 
responsibilities (both data and processing tools, plus full control or decision making) 
to fully European players or fully local (being existing DSOs or new local “micro grids 
operators”) in a decade is not more realistic. On the one hand, full Europeanisation 
would involve challenging the strength of existing MS transmission operation 
frameworks (as the duly legal and regulatory frameworks for system operation). On 
the other hand, the full decentralisation of the system operation would involve dealing 
with the weaknesses (operational tools; professional skills; assets and resources) of 
new players, not the existing TSOs. Any transition will be a lengthy and difficult 
process because both the framework for operation and the capabilities to operate will 
long resist a full or speedy transformation. 
4.3.2 While the “MS national” scenario is less hypothetical, it has serious weaknesses 
 a-  Full “nationalisation” of the hardware functions is not realistic because, on the one 
hand, distributed generation at local level is already substantial in many countries 
while, on the other hand, interactions between national systems are high enough to 
push TSOs into a real “hardware dialogue” (see how much the Nordics and the 
Benelux are building new cross-border lines; or the new France-Italy 1bn euro link 
under the Alps). 
b- Full “nationalisation” of the software functions is not any more realistic. On the one 
hand, there is already considerable Europeanisation of the market operation in 
several countries, and cooperation between TSOs has already followed (think 
ENTSO-E, RCSIs, TSC, Coreso). On the other hand, the European Commission has 
serious weapons to impede a full “renationalisation” by MS. This arsenal includes the 
Commission’s “Internal Market” and “State Aid” powers (see, for instance, the new 
sector enquiry on “Generation Capacity mechanisms” launched at the end of April 
2015).  
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4.3.3 The three conceptual scenarios are more conceptual than actual 
It is not a surprise that the three conceptual scenarios are more conceptual than 
actual. But, it doesn’t necessarily mean that any hybrid option is a better option or 
“more realistic”. It may be that hybridation has certain good properties “per se”; be 
they economic, technological or systemic. Hybridation might permit a better use of the 
various low-carbon resources of the EU (from biomass and PV to onshore and 
offshore wind). Hybridation might keep options open and allow for the gradual 
discovery and experimentation of new ways of generating power, operating grids and 
using markets, even new means of efficiently consuming energy. 
 
4.3.4 Conceptually, hybridation is mainly a phase of difficulty and transition  
However, there are also obviously strong contradictions and major drawbacks to 
hybridation. The co-existence of three levels of system hardware and software 
inevitably raises conflicts and contradictions. These three levels do not require the 
same set of rules, nor the same roles, for the same governance to enforce these rules 
reasonably well. This is a big concern, and decision-makers should be fully aware of 
this fact and prepared to respond to it. 
While nobody yet knows which system we will end up with by 2030, we already know 
that it won’t be that referenced in the 3rd EU Package.  Regardless of whether 
“hybridation” is the more likely scenario, it will not be an easy solution, either in its 
implementation or delivery, as the process is full of holes and contradictions.    
 
4.3.5 Towards an EU Regulation 2.0.  
Our existing EU regulatory frame is questioned both at its top and at its bottom.  
At its top we do not find yet the robust Europeanized frame corresponding to the 
cross-border system and cross-border markets that are expanding. One expects a 
deeper regional coordination for grid planning and system operation as well as open 
market platforms for intra-day and balancing. This also implies an effective cross-
border frame for grid and system costs-benefits analysis, costs allocation and 
revenues collection; if not for financing and building. Hence a really Europeanized (or 
regionalized) regulatory frame. 
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At the bottom of the existing EU regulatory frame we do not find yet a coherent 
response to the convergence of low carbon objectives and wave of innovation. Most 
of the national regulatory frames do not have yet reorganized for distributed 
generation, demand response and smart technologies. With presumably less grid 
traffic to come but more services to deliver, less revenue certainty but new investment 
to be made, and more trade-offs between capital and operation expenditures (Capex 
vs Opex), the whole architecture of network regulation has to be rethought and 
reviewed.  It goes up to create a brand new regulatory frame for brand new 
interactions between transmission grids and distributions grids, national system and 
local systems. 
Between this more Europeanized top and this more local bottom the regulation for 
security of supply has to move and to catch up. More distributed and more 
intermittent generation resources ask for new system rules, with less “socialization”, 
more responsibility for players (incl. for demand), and finer localisation and time 
definitions of products, prices and actions.  The adequacy of the generation set might 
even not be guaranteed anymore in energy markets transformed by massive RES 
integration. However one does not expect a robust pricing of system flexibility or an 
efficient capacity market to be built without a clear regulation of reliability standards, 
of cross-border contracting and activation of capacity related services.  
And, at the end of this wide EU-local loop, it is the resulting menu of grid access and 
tariffs, services definition and revenues opportunities which will create the incentives 
for a long wave of low-carbon investments and technology innovation (see IEA 2015).    
4.4 Checkpoints for the launching of an “Energy Union” system and “grid 
framework” 
All of the limitations, deficiencies and contradictions observed in any scenario, 
including “hybridation”, call for a set of checkpoints to facilitate the coming “Energy 
Union” and make the best of existing limits and constraints.  A set of relevant 
checkpoints should advance the process of full decarbonisation, and ensure 
successful EU integration within a relatively secure power system, toward a long-
lasting “Energy Union”.  
We will start our recommendations by looking at the “primary checkpoints”, targeting 
the likely properties of an EU hybrid scenario which could conflict with the main goals 
of the EU policy (being 1° an open internal market; 2° secure power system; 3° low-
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carbon and high level innovation). In the second part, we will look at the “secondary 
checkpoints”, relating to governance issues. 
a/ Primary checkpoints: a matrix with “Three dimensions and Two channels” 
Our primary checkpoints aim at keeping control of the key properties deemed 
necessary for the internal market, and for the power system, on the long road toward 
an EU energy transition. There are three dimensions of “EU policy” at stake there . 
and each is questioned by the new properties of the power system and market: 
- First, to keep an open and unbiased internal market where players can easily enter, 
act, invest, operate, innovate and move across the EU.   
-Second, to protect the security of the power system: the reliability of its operation and 
the adequacy of its structural evolution.  
- Third, and last but not least, to favour a low-carbon trajectory and the necessary 
corresponding technological wave of innovation.  
Having already identified two channels of power transmission grid functions (noted in 
previous chapters as the hardware’s functions and the software’s functions) at work, 
and having added the three key EU policy dimensions at stake, we end up with a 
table of recommended checkpoints, being a matrix of 2 lines for the two channels of 
grid functions and 3 columns for the three dimensions of the system and market, as 
illustrated in the table below. 
 
Network functions 
EU policy goals 
Open internal market Secure power system low-carbon and high 
level of innovation 
Hardware    
Software    
Table 16: Primary checkpoints 
 
b/ Secondary checkpoints: the Governance issues 
Our recommended Energy Union checkpoints also cover a set of governance issues. 
The primary checkpoints, as referred to above, are not providing a fully defined, fully 
implementable and non-ambiguous set of rules and actions according to each 
possible state of the EU system, market and environment. Good and bad surprises 
will occur, to some extent. Therefore, the primary recommended checkpoints have to 
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be completed by secondary “governance checkpoints”, which anticipate the 
institutional control keys for the stakeholders’ interactions in the process of aligning 
actions and rules to a shifting reality. 
Since three distinct operational levels must be considered (local, national and EU), 
the above described checkpoints must be applied at each interface between them. 
Figure 18 shows these interfaces and indicates the Sections where the respective 
analysis will be performed. 
 
 
Fig. 18: Critical Interfaces 
4.4.1 Recommended checkpoints to better articulate the local level with the national 
level vis-à-vis the three main EU policy goals 
In any hybrid scenario, the local and the national levels co-exist. One may think of the 
communication between them as a purely “subsidiarity matter”. And this is mainly true 
from a restrictive “governance” point of view: institutionally the local interacts with and 
reports at MS level and not at an EU level.  However, this does little to alleviate 
concerns of a de facto “hybrid” scenario for an “EU system and market” policy. 
Subsidiarity is a key European principle because all subsidiarity affairs are assumed 
to be of no fundamental impact on the EU policy, power system and market.  This 
strong “neutrality” principle between the local and the European has to be monitored. 
This would be particularly important if any type of articulation between local and 
national levels was also reasonably EU internal market friendly, plus resilient enough 
LOCAL 
NATIONAL 4.4.2 EU 
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vis-à-vis system reliability and adequacy, and favourable enough to low-carbon 
transition and technological innovation. This neutrality is far from being granted in the 
practice of existing hybridation because of serious contradictions that grow, or can 
grow, between the local and the national MS levels.  
Of course, it is not the task of the European level to select what best suits the 
trajectory of each Member State. But, as independent experts and researchers, we 
have to flag the areas where the Energy Union would need safeguards. It is there to 
favour minimal consistency and the robustness of local scenarios vis-à-vis the MS 
national “2030” trajectories. These national trajectories will be given by the MS as 
“building blocks” toward the EU level “2030 trajectory”.  Here lies one of the big 
gambles of the growing hybrid EU power system: change happens quickly and widely 
at the local level; where only national authorities and national frameworks can keep 
the playing/game open enough, secure enough and innovative enough for the EU 
common interest. 
a- Internal Market dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments and connections), coherence 
between DSOs and TSO(s) is not yet given. The information relevant for grid 
planning, the way DSOs and TSOs define formats and the protocols of information 
gathering and information exchange would have to become consistent and 
interoperable. The same seems necessary to give reciprocal consistency to the 
DSOs/TSOs respective grid planning methodologies and system scenarios. 
On the software side (operation and interactions), we could fear a wave of foreclosure 
of the mushrooming local markets by local incumbents and / or integrated national 
companies. What safeguards should be implemented to keep local affairs open? A 
similarly workable gateway, and interoperability, would be welcome between the 
operation of the local markets and systems and the national ones. If none is provided, 
a deep fragmentation and balkanisation of the EU system and market could be 
voluntarily, and quietly, built at the local level: where the EU level cannot act or react. 
There is a major tension there. Economists would call it a “trade-off” between the 
respected and required autonomy to choose and experiment at local level, and the 
threat of an easy foreclosure by local cartels, monopolists or dominant players.  
b- Reliability and Adequacy dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments and connections), we also 
find a real issue. For the past few years, most of the new generation capacity 
investment has been made at the distribution level, while interactions between this 
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new RES generation set and the rest of the system occur via the transmission grid. A 
minimum of consistency should come for the format and the protocols of information 
gathering and exchange between the DSOs and TSOs. A similar move could give 
consistency to the DSOs/TSOs respective grid planning methodologies and system 
scenarios. Why should MS policy care that much about generation adequacy and grid 
adequacy at each MS national level, if neither is checked at the MS local level to see 
if it is already deeply influencing the MS national level outcome?  
On the software side (operation and interactions), the national security of the system 
operation relies more and more on distributed generation behaviour and the 
responsiveness to the local and national system needs. Again, one could expect a 
definition of the respective roles and responsibilities (rights and duties; actions and 
liabilities) of DSOs and TSOs (as for: information and monitoring standards; 
congestion management; balancing procurement; emergency handling; etc.). 
c- The Low Carbon and Technological Wave dimension  
On the hardware side of the grid functions (grid investments and connections), we 
hope that more and more low-carbon, energy efficient or system responsive 
innovations and novelties will appear and grow at the local level; either for distributed 
generation, or consumers behaviour, or both (“prosumers”).  A main concern, for the 
success of this awaited wave, is to retain the scope and scale of incentives for 
economies, which can be gained at national level. This suggests that DSOs should 
ensure a minimum of technology pluralism and grid user neutrality in their grid 
planning and connections (both for methodology and implementation). 
On the software side (operation and interactions), a similar concern to “keep locals 
open to changes and novelties” suggests finding safeguards against the worst 
scenario, that “existing suppliers or integrated companies take all and pick 
themselves as winners”.   It would also be welcome to get at local level a pro-active 
demand activation enabling. 
4.4.2 Recommended primary checkpoints to better articulate the national level with the 
EU level, vis-à-vis the three main EU policy goals 
In any hybrid scenario, the national and the EU levels co-exist. This topic is familiar 
because it is the enduring story of building the internal market since the Single Act in 
1986. As there are at least three dimensions of interest there (= internal market; 
reliability and adequacy; low-carbon and a technological wave), one cannot expect to 
find the same single combination of these three dimensions in each and every EU 
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country.  However, each of these three dimensions has a strong EU common interest 
and none can be fully disregarded as purely of “national choice and MS sovereignty”.  
a- Internal Market dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments & connections), the way MS 
TSOs plan and build their grids shapes the way the infrastructure of the EU internal 
market is framed or constrained. The EU internal market should reach an EU level 
playing field, as with: an open TSO data base; explicitly interoperable system 
scenarios and analysis; joint projects suppressing the border seams between 
adjacent TSOs zones etc. For the transmission connections, one could expect a 
harmonised and transparent set of connection options, and price calculation 
harmonisation (=i.e., not the same price everywhere, but everywhere a consistent 
logic in the pricing of connection options).  
On the software side (operation and interactions), one could expect a coordinated 
management of the interdependence between the national system and market zones. 
A coordinated approach to the system operation, to maximise the benefits delivered 
by the internal market, is needed. Hence, one expects regional sets of: forecast, 
capacity calculation, and a menu of potential actions, as well as a regional approach 
to an efficient zoning of grids and the operation of markets. In the same vein, one 
should deliver a regional approach to enhanced RES integration, system flexibility 
maturity, demand response enabling, etc. 
b- Reliability and Adequacy dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments & connections), one expects 
the same as above for planning (an EU level playing field for: an open data base; 
explicitly interoperable system scenarios and analysis; etc.) to get greater consistency 
between interdependent TSOs. It should go to a regional approach to grid planning, 
as to a regional monitoring of the MS’ Security of Supply infrastructure planning 
consistency. 
On the software side (operation and interactions), one would expect deeper 
coordination of the TSOs as; regional assessment of generation adequacy, security of 
supply and the handling of “emergency” scenarios, as well as regional arrangements 
to increase system flexibility and responsiveness both for supply and for demand. As 
national TSOs control zones are still kept as a core of system operation, a deep 
harmonisation of the TSOs’ behaviour and tools is needed. The handling of intraday, 
balancing and reserves has to converge between adjacent TSOs; the products, 
certification, activation and trade rules etc. have to be harmonised. 
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c- Low Carbon & Technological Wave dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments and connections), it is 
important to understand how national TSOs conceive of their “tool-box”, and how they 
build their contributions to MS policy targets and 2030 trajectories. It could come via 
transparency by revealing “low-carbon” assumptions made by TSOs in their system 
scenarios and grid planning. It could also act as voluntary guide lines for technology 
plurality for the connections &and users; sustained by ex-ante transparency for the 
connection charges calculation. Another way could be the TSOs defining KPIs (“Key 
Performance Indicators”), permitting to follow, ex post, the contribution of the national 
transmission grids to the MS trajectories within the National Action Plan(s).  
On the software side (operation and interactions), we would welcome safeguards for 
technology pluralism and users neutrality. This welcome would extend to a pro-active 
demand system enabling role. 
4.4.3 Recommended checkpoints to better articulate the EU level with the local level 
How could the EU level address anything legitimate or relevant for the local level to 
achieve a common EU interest? It is, of course, a quite irritating question for many EU 
citizens and authorities.  The EU level is no more than the EU level; and each 
European is better off when choosing locally what to eat at breakfast (as at lunch…). 
However, it is well known why we ended up with EU common rules for fishing or 
hunting endangered species, as well as why the “EU” frames the MS action vis-à-vis 
the basic freedom of any EU citizen or undertaking to move and exist inside the EU. It 
is because logically a local action principle cannot significantly jeopardise a 
fundamental principle having being legally established at a higher level (in this case, 
at EU level).  
We have identified three of these “fundamental principles” at the EU energy level: 1° 
openness and non-discrimination in the internal market; 2° reliability and adequacy of 
the power system; 3° the effective twinning of low-carbon action within a technological 
and innovation wave. The aim, here, is not European harmonisation, as such. 
Europeans prize and value local actions; so they can freely deviate, differentiate or 
ignore each other. Nothing wrong: very welcome. The only EU aim, should be asking 
for a minimal level of consistency with the highest EU common interest, for people 
building the frameworks for local actions. Any kind of national guidelines or voluntary 
“Convenant of Mayors” could look at how the welcome autonomy and diversity in 
local actions does not derail into systematically killing any common targeting, or 
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common interest, expressed at EU level. This aim is minimalist by nature: it calls 
mainly for some safeguards or voluntary limits. 
a- Internal Market dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments and connections), initiatives 
could be taken to favour guidelines or codes of conduct defining what is friendly/ 
unfriendly to the internal market in the planning and connection principles used by 
local grids for their corresponding “pocket markets”. A key debate is if “purely closed 
shop” micro-grids (as a “mall”, an “industry park”, a “university research park”, a 
“municipal collective housing”, etc.) could escape those principles. Such a debate, to 
better know what is, and isn’t, at stake is necessary and urgent.  
On the software side (operation and interactions), there are similar concerns and 
hopes. Could voluntary guidelines or commitments define the “internal market” 
friendly operation principles for local grids and pocket markets? Initiatives looking to 
be consistent with the coming “Advanced EU Target Model”, expected to be working 
in 2020, are necessary. 
b- Reliability and Adequacy dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments and connections), the 
growing importance of distributed generation makes the EU power system tremble in 
its roots: the local grids. One would give the whole EU tree more stability and 
resilience by establishing a minimal coherence and interoperability of local 
information data-base, data processing and access. It might also help to provide 
some visibility or sharing of the actual planning methods and developing the system 
scenarios. 
On the software side (operation and interactions), the not very positive role played by 
some distribution grids in the 2006 EU blackout management cannot be ignored. And, 
at that time, the local generation set was not at all what it has become. Medium-size 
cities’ airports do not self-manage their skies because there, at local level, some of 
what has been already said is needed: coherence, interoperability, openness…  
Working definitions of local grid players’ roles, responsibility, rights, duties, liabilities 
etc. for congestion, balancing, emergency etc. are urgently needed.  
c- The Low Carbon and Technological Wave dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments and connections), it is 
important to understand how local players operate in the common journey toward 
energy transition.  It might be some way of revealing the “low-carbon” assumptions for 
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system scenarios and grid planning. It could also go toward ex ante transparency for 
the calculation of connection charges within technology plurality for connections and 
users. Advanced DSOs might also define their own KPIs (“Key Performance 
Indicators”) permitting us to follow their role in the MS trajectory(ies) revealed by the 
National Action Plan(s). Local players should be interested in showing how their 
investments structure the common manoeuvre against climate change and for smart 
energy systems.  
On the software side (operation and interactions), the EU expected wave of low-
carbon, energy efficient and responsive innovation might benefit from voluntary 
safeguards for technology pluralism and user neutrality; as well as a pro-active 
demand system enabling role. 
 
The Governance issues 
The set of “primary” checkpoints proposed above do not guarantee a smooth energy 
transition for the coming decades (say 2020-2050).  Only the opposite can be 
guaranteed: they will not be sufficient. They only offer a framework to begin this 
transition, which will inevitably be full of uncertainty, surprises, incredible errors and 
unexpected lucky strikes.  
It is why these primary checkpoints have to be complemented by secondary ones. 
They are a matter of “governance” (i.e. the “definition of roles”). Proper governance is 
what would help to organise the interactions of the energy system stakeholders in the 
discovery process of better implementation / adaptation of the primary rules. Of 
course, here or there, a deeper shake up or rupture of the primary rules will also 
occur in the future. Therefore, the established governance itself will be questioned, at 
times, by earthquakes and tornadoes (the authors hope that “no tsunami” will ever 
happen in the EU…). 
To be realistic, the existing EU governance set-up cannot easily remedy a strong 
deficiency with primary rules. First, it is impossible to create a “governance 
framework”, which simultaneously works perfectly well at EU, MS and local levels. 
The process by which governance is created at each of these three levels is not and 
will never be coordinated, coherent and unified. We will forever live in a “multi-level” 
world of governance. Second, the process by which rules are defined, enacted and 
adapted is, itself, at least as fragmented (if not more) than the process of building 
governance. It is very difficult to match the two processes of rule making and 
governance building. Third, many forms of EU governance (notably forums, 
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committees, consultations; etc.) have no effective decision making process: too many 
veto rights and then bargaining strategies that are too strong. They also lack clearly 
binding implementation principles with no direct delegation of power to a responsible 
‘Managing Third Party’. Thus is European life. We lived with this, from the Single Act 
(1986) to the 1st energy Package (1996). No doubt, the Energy Union will again find a 
way of going ahead with our baroque framework for EU governance.  
Nevertheless, as recently expressed by the departing head of ENTSOE (and of the 
National Grid): “Yes, we know it looks quite baroque there, in the EU, but. But 
nowhere in the world had anyone done more than the EU for establishing a gigantic-
scale open market for power”. Let’s hope that we will make it –again- “just workable 
enough” to better combining our internal market, our reliability and adequacy, with a 
low-carbon trajectory and a wave of innovation.  
4.4.4 Secondary checkpoints for better governance between the local and the national 
level 
As already stated, in any hybrid scenario the local and the national levels co-exist. 
One may think that the articulation between them is a purely “subsidiarity matter”. It is 
not very likely, as most of the expected wave of investments, changes and innovation 
should be located at this local level. And then, all the new dynamics of the MS policy, 
system and markets could end up located at this level and be transmitted throughout 
the EU via the national MS level. In this setting, they indicate the quality and the 
robustness of the link between the local and the MS levels, which become the key 
factor of success for each MS 2030 trajectory expressed in MS NAPs. All MS being 
aggregated, these NAPs will also be producing the whole –right or wrong-trajectory of 
the EU policy, system and market. 
It is, hence, the duty of independent EU experts and researchers to share what they 
see as offering a more open and more robust governance of the many possible local 
trajectories of energy transition within the proper MS national trajectories.   
a- Internal Market dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments and connections), the main 
concern is to continue the expansion of local grids, providing access and connection 
to the national markets (and beyond: the European). It is legitimate for “fully private” 
grid undertakings (we mean:  really autarchic and closed “microgrids”) to refuse to 
give access to their own set of system resources. When there is no “essential facility” 
acting as a “natural monopoly” vis-à-vis third parties, there is no mandate for “Third 
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Party Access”. However, this will never be the case with each and every regulated 
DSO. All DSOs are “statutory entities” managing “franchised monopolies”, and then 
have an obligation to offer a reasonable two-way access between their local system 
and the national one. This suggests thinking about the following arrangements. 1°: 
looking for a structural guarantee of independence and neutrality of the DSOs in a full 
unbundling from all suppliers. 2°: opening dialogue and consultation at the national 
level between DSOs, TSOs, NRAs and categories of grid users to follow the state and 
evolution of “access and connection issues” between the local systems and the 
national ones; and making recommendations of improvements. Various new forms of 
DSO governance, at national level, could be explored as: the national DSO body; a 
joint committee of transmission and distribution grid operators; DSOs voluntary task 
force; DSOs initiatives; etc. The NRAs will control the accuracy of the outcome. 
On the software side (operation and interactions), given the small individual size of 
“pocket markets” and their cumulative part within the national market guarantees the 
DSOs’ neutrality and openness in a full unbundling from any supplier are also 
necessary. One also needs a dialogue at national level between the DSOs, TSOs, 
Regulators and Third Parties to look at workable regulatory frameworks guaranteeing 
access, openness, technology plurality and users neutrality in the operation of local 
grids and pocket markets. Again, the NRAs should keep control of the accuracy of the 
outcome. 
b- Reliability and Adequacy dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments and connections), the 
growing interactions between DSOs and TSOs have to be better addressed by 
enlightened forms of cooperative governance at the national level. It could lead to the 
emergence of national principles of harmonisation, or “good practices” for local grids 
planning and connection principles. National dialogues between DSOs, TSOs and 
NRAS can go toward enhancing coordination of the transmission and distribution in 
grid planning and connection principles; under the umbrella of the NRAs’ content 
checking.  
On the software side (operation and interactions), DSOs, TSOs, NRAs and Third 
Parties need to clarify and better define the respective system and market 
responsibilities of the DSOs and TSOs in the management of reliability and adequacy 
(as: information and monitoring standards; ownership and access to data; congestion; 
balancing (including the definition of products); emergency; etc.). All of this should 
again be conducted under the supervision of the NRA. 
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c- Low Carbon and Technological Wave dimension  
On the hardware side of grid functions (grid investments and connections), more 
explicit links between the local “hardware” functions and the low-carbon and 
innovation trajectory, defined at national level, are needed. Might advanced DSOs be 
encouraged to define their own “low-carbon” friendly and “innovation friendly” best 
practice or code of conduct? Could it stretch as far as pencilling local networks KPIs 
logically consistent with a follow-up of each kind of National Action Plan 2020-2030? 
This matter could also be in the realm of NRAs or the Government, or any other 
national relevant entity. 
On the software side (operation and interactions), it is necessary to achieve a similar 
approach for new forms of governance addressing principles of local grids operation 
which are low-carbon friendly, technologically pluralist and its users neutral, and 
logically consistent with the main trajectory of the national action plans. As earlier 
noted, many different forms of governance of DSOs may be explored, such as: the 
national DSO body; the joint committee of grid operators; DSOs voluntary task force; 
advanced DSOs initiatives; etc. This will most likely be considered as the NRAs 
duties, but not in every MS. 
4.4.5 Secondary checkpoints for better governance between the national and the EU 
level 
Assuming that, in the short-term, implementation of 3rd Package legislation and 
associated Network Codes will continue and no new legislation will be issued, a  core 
governance issue between the national (the MS) and the European levels is the one 
of a full and deeper Europeanisation “à la Third Package” for the transmission grids 
and related power markets facilitation. This issue has at least three different 
dimensions being - from the softest to the hardest:  
1° TSOs information, data, calculation, analysis, proposals;  
2° TSOs decisions, actions, responsibility and liabilities;  
3° TSOs assets, resources, revenue collection, financing, balance sheet.  
It is key to treat these three levels of Europeanisation differently because of their 
different institutional flexibility, industry sensitivity and European priority.  
The first level (being: Information, data, calculation, analysis, proposals, etc.), can 
easily be “regionalised” or “Europeanised” as soon as all the TSOs will (many already 
do) see the benefits and start cooperating more. It is the story told by TSC, Coreso 
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and the ENTSO-E voluntary regionalisation called “RSCIs”. It is already the practice 
for producing the TYNDP as well as in existing regional planning. It is also 
exemplified by the platforms built for the benefits of Day Ahead and Intraday markets. 
The second level (decisions, actions, responsibility and liabilities) raises really critical 
questions. They mainly deal with the difficulty of assigning decision powers to 
different levels of TSO organisation (national TSOs, Regional RSCIs, European 
“ISO”) having to co-exist and tightly coordinate altogether in system operation. In 
practice, the transmission grid in Europe constitutes one single grid with so many 
interactions that any splitting of decision-making (with possible overlapping between 
the different levels) raises serious questions on separation of responsibilities and 
liabilities between the different levels of decision making. 
The third level (assets, resources, revenue collection, financing, balance sheet, etc.), 
has for long been the hard core of resistance to regionalisation or Europeanisation of 
EU transmission grids. Experts and academics can only see that the Nordic countries 
and Germany still have not merged their TSOs while those are visibly smaller than 
their respective wholesale markets: will national interests and national politics finally 
unlock this deadlock? Two new “open fields” might bring some novelty there. On the 
one hand, the creation of vast “off-shore” domains calls for new grids to be built from 
scratch (architecture; technology; regulation; operation). New forms of governance 
may arise. On the other hand, the still unsuccessful onshore “EU Super-grid” policy 
may become reality anytime - if countries were agreeing on. An EU “Super-grid” could 
start by being the mutualisation of existing lines within a “multi-MS corridor”. All these 
existing lines could then be technologically upgraded to the highest standards and 
jointly operated as a common EU backbone /EU corridor. 
This general TSOs’ landscape having been addressed, we are going to recommend 
some MS/EU governance checkpoints on the following lines. 
a- Internal Market dimension  
On the hardware part of grid functions (grid investments & connections) the main 
concern is to keep national grids expansion providing access and connexion to the 
other national markets as if only one fully European market was existing. At some 
point this key European principle will have to be translated into a mutualised 
governance being put above (or across) the TSO borders. 
TSOs should regionalise by themselves the “light dimension” of their grid planning 
(data; methodology) as they already did for system analysis. At least voluntarily (as 
with ENTSO-E RSCIs). Once mature enough, this could become an EU kind of 
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“legally binding Light ISO” (collecting data; performing more advanced calculation 
with more robust scenarios; offering menus for national TSOs decision making) with 
an amendment to 3d Package voted as an ordinary EU law. At a further stage, 
coming from a “Nordic” or “Pentalateral”-like cooperation between voluntary MS, 
some RTOs might emerge. It might well be a North-Sea off-shore grid entity or an 
onshore Super-grid corridor’s one (twinning a kind of mutualisation of off-shore 
support schemes and support policies among the same MS). Parallel to this 
reinforced TSO cooperation, ACER should receive strengthened powers mirroring this 
TSOs planning governance to check if EU common interest principles are reasonably 
implemented. 
 
On the software part (operation and interactions)  
There are robust EU principles having being established. They come from the logic of 
the EU building and the legal order of our constitutional treaty, plus some important 
legal decisions (as DG COMP versus Swedish TSO Svenska Kraftnät). The EU TSOs 
have no right to give systematic ex-ante preference to commodity trade and power 
flows inside the borders of their control zones vis-a-vis the crossing of these borders.  
Increased regionalisation of system operation for forecasting, capacity calculation, 
proposals of menu of actions, and an efficient regional approach to “zoning grids and 
markets” can be expected. 
Other aspects of this MS/EU governance issue 
This higher regionalisation of the EU grids and systems call for a deeper review of the 
existing organisation of the NRAs as to get them engaged in the regionalisation of 
grid planning and system operation. It also calls to review the internal governance of 
both ENTSO-E and ACER. Should TSOs continue to managing ENTSO-e 
simultaneously as their general assemblee, their executive board and their higher 
European advocacy body – since  the 3rd Package did not define more precisely 
what a European statutory body is? And, symmetrically, should NRAs having to keep 
a so unilateral power on the Board of ACER - except to mirror ENTSO-E? Could more 
flexible or more pluralist forms of governance being explored on both sides? 
Could the regulatory gap concerning Power Exchanges (PXs) being addressed too? 
PXs manage core platforms of the EU internal market but are not proper parts of the 
EU regulatory frame. They even claim being “free marketers” by statute. Could EU 
law and regulation bridge that gap? 
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How will the existing and coming grid codes continue to be updated and adapted to 
the changing circumstances to come? What will be the respective roles of ENTSO-E, 
ACER, NRAs, Third Parties and the EU Commission in this process? 
As we have just seen, the EU has not yet found a stable frame of governance for a 
deeper Europeanisation of its applied grid and market regulation, and of its applied 
system operation. 
b- Reliability & Adequacy dimension  
On the hardware part of grid functions (grid investments & connections) a significant 
regionalisation of the TSOs for security analysis, scenarios, and menus of actions is 
also expected; as well as for the monitoring of MS “Security of Supply” infrastructure 
planning consistency. How will TSOs, NRAs and ACER combine in the making of this 
upgrade and the many other adaptations to come? 
On the software part (operation and interactions) a similar regionalisation of the TSOs 
when assessing generation adequacy of the regional MS is expected; setting 
emergency scenarios consistent with regional generation adequacy arrangements; 
suggesting arrangements for higher flexibilisation of regional supply and demand (it 
however requires a consequent European legislative upgrade to touch upon 
demand).  
c- Low Carbon & Technological Wave dimension  
On the hardware part of grid functions (grid investments and connections) an issue 
arises as regional planning would be influenced by a regional TSOs entity while MS 
will commit only on their own vis-a-vis Commission via National Action Plans. These 
NAPs will enter as reference scenarios in the work process of the TSOs regional 
entity through NRAs validation. Would this regional TSOs entity also act as a 
consultant, advisor or reviewer of the NAPs in its region? How will a regional entity 
organise its work to deliver to national scenarios a regional value added knowing that 
systems at countries level will diverge regarding the set of technologies, the load and 
demand characteristics as well as for reliability standards?  
On the software part (operation and interactions) we might expect similar issues in 
articulating regionalisation of TSOs with the MS commitments within NAPs; as well as 
to articulating the new Fora to come and the more restricted mandate of certain NRAs 
and of ACER. 
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4.4.6 Secondary checkpoints for better governance between the local and the European 
levels 
Most of this issue “Local / European” happens at the infra-country level where MS 
have an exclusive right to take decisions and frame regulation. It does not seem that 
this will change. As the Energy Union will be defined and built within the existing 
institutional frame it will take this as given. 
Therefore, Energy Union has no blueprint for DSOs. It will let MS decide how they will 
manage the DSOs and the articulation between their own DSOs and TSOs.  
At the EU level, reinforced by the likely creation of an EU regulator, action will mainly 
be indirect and come via the interfaces EU/TSOs or EU/NRAs that already exist; and 
the new ones to come from the scenarios that we have explored. Some other lines of 
action might also come from outside the energy industry; as from the “Digital Single 
Market Strategy for Europe” where the EU is looking for a common frame for 
platforms, online intermediaries, data and cloud, and the collaborative economy.    
This said, at this “Local/European” level, variety and autonomy will flourish for long all 
across the EU. 
Conclusion for all governance issues 
In terms of governance the EU is entering very challenging times due to the 
“hybridation” of its systems and markets. 
A big challenge –as we have seen- is the regionalisation of grid planning, system and 
market operation which should deliver a better coordination or mutualisation of 
hardware and software TSOs functions as well as of the NRAs actions. It also 
touches MS policies regarding security of supply and generation adequacy. ACER 
might become a good referee there, if allowed by a new legal frame. 
As big (as a challenge) is the articulation between MS “2030 NAPs”, the grids, the 
systems and the markets. No such articulation is provided yet but NAPs will ask for 
some links and bridges between them as they become the actual “building blocks” of 
EU level energy policy targets. MS NAPs should then be articulated in a certain way 
with TSOs & DSOs actions. 
Another key challenge is the articulation for local and national grids, systems and 
pocket markets, between DSOs, TSOs, NRAs and MS. This concerns equally internal 
market, reliability and adequacy, pluralism of low-carbon paths and openness to 
innovation waves. While it will inevitably be said “national affairs only” it will actually 
more and more become the foundations of the entire EU system and market 
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transformation. What will we, Europeans, get as governance for this local and 
distributed process will be decided country by country with some indirect action via 
the channels EU/TSOs or EU/NRAs. Will we be able to also create and informal 
while; a reasonable “EU sunshine regulation” working through influence and good 
reasoning? OCDE and IEA do work through influence and good reasoning every day. 
Might we find a way to copy their recipe (see IEA 2015)? 
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5. General Conclusions 
The EU power transmission enters a brand new world which has not been foreseen 
by the former three “single energy market” packages. This is because major changes 
are dictated by the need to simultaneously accomplish integration of European 
energy markets and build a low‐carbon economy; and because these changes are 
reinforced by a wave of coming or already come technological innovation. 
Florence School of Regulation did build in this report a conceptual framework to 
understand where the European power system and transmission networks are going 
to; and what are the biggest challenges and alternatives for the EU power regulation 
and governance. 
 
Florence School of Regulation is not pushing any roadmap or blueprint. We are only 
offering “food for thought”: knowledge frames to understand how the power 
landscape moves. It will be up to decision makers and stakeholders to draw the 
actual future that EU deserves and will get. 
Our research report did give the reader five big contributions.  
1°: An analysis of how “European Integration”, “Low-Carbon Target” and “Wave of 
Innovation” shake up the EU power system and transmission industry.  
2°: Three conceptual scenarios of evolution being: #1# Full European Market 
Integration; #2# National only Low Carbon System & Policy; #3# Local only Low 
Carbon System & Policy.  
3° A detailed application of these scenarios to the core tasks performed by a typical 
EU TSO: Hardware tasks (as network planning and investment); and Software tasks 
(as balancing, congestion, cross-border exchange, market facilitation, relationships 
with DSOs or NRAs, etc.).  
4° A fourth scenario being “Hybrid” where Low-Carbon Target and Wave of 
Innovation co-exist at three levels (European, National and Local) but with a 
substantial regulatory gap if the current frame is not updated.  
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5° A set of check-points to build an EU multi-layer coordination frame and make our 
power system transition to a European Low-Carbon System coherent, efficient and 
resilient enough to succeed. 
To conclude our work, we would like to draw attention to seven key points. 
Firstly, although all three scenarios were constructed in order to fulfil EU energy and 
climate policy objectives, no individual scenario can easily and fully meet all goals at 
reasonable cost. It should be no surprise as in real life the societal expectations, the 
technological developments and the public policies are not necessarily and not 
always aligned.  
Secondly, some critical system operational functions, currently mainly performed by 
national TSOs, will be totally or partially performed by other entities. These entities 
may be supra-national organizations, either emanating from or acting in close 
cooperation with TSOs, DSOs (individually or somehow associated) or even new 
players.  
Thirdly, therefore, the legal and regulatory frameworks must be adapted, namely in 
order to clearly define and assign each operational function, indicating, for each, 
appropriate cost and liability sharing mechanisms. It is also needed to establish 
appropriate coordination mechanisms, for both normal and abnormal situations, 
including appropriate redundancy safeguards and supervision tools. 
Fourthly, even if from the technical (system operation) point of view it is theoretically 
possible to ensure appropriate system reliability (assuming that the necessary legal 
and regulatory changes are implemented), several “black holes” may still jeopardize 
the efficient functioning of electricity systems and markets. The Energy Union will 
have to patch them. 
Fifthly, assuming that, in the short-term, implementation of 3rd Package legislation and 
associated Network Codes will continue and no fundamentally new legislation will be 
issued, serious governance issues must be somehow addressed. In this respect, not 
only national/EU interfaces require continuous attention; local/national interfaces 
become increasingly critical for transparency and reliability.  
Sixthly, among the many governance challenges to be addressed the following are 
particularly important. 1° the regionalisation and Europeanisation of grid planning, 
system and market operation, leading to better coordination or mutualisation of 
hardware and software TSOs functions, as well as of the NRAs actions. 2° the 
Member States policies regarding security of supply and generation adequacy. 3° the 
articulation between Member States “2030 NAPs”, network investments, systems and 
markets. 4° the articulation of local and national grids, systems and pocket markets, 
implying new forms of multi-layer coordination between DSOs, TSOs, NRAs and 
Member States.  
Seventhly, in the past, voluntary, informal cooperation among major actors (namely 
the European Commission, regulators and TSOs) has been crucial for the 
development of the internal energy market. This kind of cooperation can still deliver 
substantial results on the road to decarbonisation. However, the speed of delivering 
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the many missing “building blocks” for the proper functioning of the system (from 
planning to real-time operation) needs to be considerably increased in the short-term.  
For the Energy Union transition (to a low carbon economy in a European market open 
to a wave of innovation) to succeed, governance and regulatory mechanisms have to 
be quickly adapted and partially redesigned with the reliability “absolute must” in 
mind. 
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